893.00/15168
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 6.]
Sir: Referring to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1675 of October 14, 1943, in regard to Kuomintang-Communist relations, I have the honor to enclose a copy of despatch No. 51 of August 27, 1943, from the Secretary on detail at Sian67 reporting a conversation on that subject with General Li Kun-kang, Chief of Staff to General Hu Tsung-nan, Deputy Commander of the Eighth War Zone.
Summary. According to the despatch. General Li denies the rumors of Central Government troop concentrations in July on the boundaries of the Border Region in Shensi and states that there has not been and not now is there any intention on the part of the Central Government of using military force against the Communists. General Li is said to feel that the Central Government’s policy is to seek a political solution of the Communist problem but he admits that the Chinese Communists will not be willing to disband their organizations. It is General Li’s professed opinion that the Communists are weak, militarily and economically, that they do not enjoy the support of the people in the areas which they control and that they are not active militarily against the Japanese. Mr. Drumright adds that he has been unable to confirm that the Central Government troops concentrations against the Communist Border Region in July were anything more than replacement transfers. End of summary.
Central Government officials at Chungking who have discussed the matter with the Embassy have admitted the concentration of Chungking troops in Shensi during July, explaining it as a measure of pressure on the Communists for acceptance of Kuomintang terms (Embassy’s telegrams No. 1136, July 9, 4 p.m.; No. 1173, July 13, 4 p.m.; and No. 1214, July 17, 6 [3] p.m.)
Denials of these reports have come from General Hu Tsung-nan himself, who was the commander of the Central Government forces in question, from General Chang Chih-chung, who denied even the concentration of any troops, and from various officials at Sian. Whether or not the concentrations represented an increase in the number of [Page 361] troops participating in the blockade of the Communist-controlled areas or merely replacement transfers, the purpose seems to have been an effort to impel Communist acceptance of Central Government demands and perhaps partially to prevent extension of Communist control in areas adjacent to their present territory.
Respectfully yours,
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