893.00/15166
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 6.]
Sir: Reference is made to the Embassy’s telegrams No. 1709, September 14, and No. 1741, September 17, 12 noon in regard to the discussion of the Chinese Communist question by the 11th Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in September and to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1639 [1636] of September 29, 1943,61 regarding the C.E.C.
There are now enclosed the following, as reported by Central News Agency’s English Service: (a) copy of General Chiang Kai-shek’s instructions to the C.E.C. Session on the Communist problem;62 (b) copy of the resolution adopted by the C.E.C. in regard to this question; and (c) copy of the resolution approved by the Third People’s Political Council at its session in September regarding the 18th Group Army (Communist).63
[Page 352]Summary. The attitude of the Kuomintang toward the Chinese Communist Party, as indicated in the instructions issued by General Chiang Kai-shek at the C.E.C. Session and in the resolution adopted by the C.E.C. on the Communist question, is outwardly conciliatory. Other indications are that, while there has been no change in the military situation in the border region, relations between the two parties have worsened, those indications being comprised in the bitter propaganda campaign now being carried on by both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party (Embassy’s despatch 1651 of October 6), the attack made on the Communist Party by the Minister of War at the Third People’s Political Council in September, the resolution adopted by the P.P.C. on the question of the Communist army, the reduction of the number of Communist Party representatives at Chungking and the reported recently instituted close surveillance by Kuomintang secret police of those representatives. It is generally believed that the Central Government is committed to a policy of liquidation of the Chinese Communist Party by one means or the other and that this policy will be carried out if and when the Kuomintang decides that it can be achieved without too great danger to its internal position and to China’s international position. The peaceful settlement of the Communist problem and the ascendancy of liberal elements over Communist and Fascist groups in China are matters of serious concern to the United States. End of summary.
Kuomintang Charges Against the Chinese Communists; Communist Denial
Both General Chiang Kai-shek’s instructions to the C. E. C. and the C. E. C. resolution on the Communist problem state that the Communist problem is a political problem to be solved by political means. They emphasize the failure of the Chinese Communist Party to fulfill the promises made in its manifesto of September 22, 1937,64 in which the Communist Party is said to have agreed (1) to struggle for the thorough realization of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles; (2) to abandon its policy of attempting to overthrow the Kuomin-tang’s political power; (3) to abolish its soviet form of government and “to realize political democracy”, thus helping to bring about the political unity of the nation; and (4) to reorganize the Chinese Red Army into a national revolutionary army under the command of the National Military Council, the army to await orders to move to the front to fight the Japanese. The Communists affirm that they have carried out these promises and that the promise “to realize political democracy” has been fulfilled in areas under Communist control in that a democratic form of government has been established in those areas under which one-third of the representation in the government is Communist, one-third Kuomintang and one-third members without party affiliation. They add that this promise envisaged the establishment of similar governmental forms in the Kuomintang-controlled [Page 353] areas and that this idea was implicit in the statement that the Communist Party would “realize political democracy in the hope that the political power (of the people) of the whole nation might be unified.” They point out that their armies have opposed the Japanese since the beginning of the war, without receiving any military supplies and drugs from the Central Government since the end of 1938 and without governmental subsidies since 1939.
In General Chiang’s instructions and in the C. E. C. resolution the Communist Party is accused of sabotaging the war effort and of endangering the security of the state and the tolerant attitude of the Kuomintang is pointed to, as shown in the manifesto issued by the 10th Plenary Session of the C. E. C. in November 1942 in which the C. E. C. declared that the Central Government was prepared to overlook the past record, either in thought or in deed, and would respect the opportunity of individuals or political groups to serve their country.
The Minister of Information on several occasions during recent months has bitterly attacked the Communists at his weekly press conferences. In reply to a question from newspaper correspondents at a press conference shortly after the conclusion of the C. E. C. Session in regard to the measures to be adopted to solve the Communist problem if political means failed, the Minister stated that the Kuomintang would seek a solution on the basis of the resolution passed and of the views expressed by General Chiang and that it was hoped that the Chinese Communists would place national interests above those of their party and would not hinder the prosecution of the war.
The Central Government has recently charged the Communists with attacking Chungking troops instead of engaging in operations against the Japanese (as in General Chiang’s instructions to the C. E. C. and the Kuomintang press propaganda campaign against the Communists). This was one of the charges made by General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and Minister of War, during the recently concluded session of the Third People’s Political Council (Embassy’s telegram No. 1804, September 25, 2 p.m.). Mr. Tung Pi-wu, the Communist delegate to the P. P. C. in denying at the P. P. C. session the truth of the charge, pointed to the existence in General Ho’s files of letters from his commanders in the field reporting that Communist troops had on the occasions mentioned by Ho come to the assistance of the Chungking troops and had aided them in repulsing the Japanese. The Communists also state that the recent report that the Communist troops had attacked Central Government troops in Shantung (Embassy’s telegram No. 1722, September 15, 4 p.m.) was without foundation, that these troops were former Chungking forces which had deserted to the Japanese in early July previous to the attack [Page 354] made on them by the Communists and that the headquarters of the Shantung Provincial Government at Chungking had never received such a report and was completely surprised to see the report published. According to the Communists, the Kuomintang fears that the end of the war may find the Communist troops rather than Central Government forces in control in those areas of north China from which the Japanese withdraw and that the Central Government may not be sufficiently strong to oppose them successfully. In this connection, the Communists charge that the Chungking authorities are now encouraging defections from their own (Kuomintang) troops to the Japanese in north China as a means of providing opposition to the Communist forces, of solving the supply and food problem and of having their own troops in that area at the end of the war following Japanese withdrawals.
Possibilities of Compromise
General Chiang’s instructions to the C. E. C. and the C. E. C. manifesto, coming at a time when there were fears of a Kuomintang ultimatum to the Chinese Communist Party, served to ease the tension momentarily and in a relative sense but it is an uneasy truce which continues to exist. (Generals Hu Tsung-nan, Deputy Commander of the 8th War Zone, Fu Tso-yi, Chairman of the Suiyuan Provincial Government and Commander of the Chinese Forces in Suiyuan, Ma Hung-kuei, Chairman of the Ninghsia Provincial Government, Chang Chih-chung, Chief of the Political Training Board of the National Military Council, and Chiang Ting-wen, Commander of the 1st War Zone, were all reportedly summoned to Chungking by General Chiang Kai-shek on very short notice at the time of C. E. C. session in September to participate in military conferences which are believed to have been related to possible action against the Communists.) Neither of the two parties seems willing to make concessions necessary to bring about an agreement. Such concessions on the part of the Communists would certainly entail the removal of the Communist army from the area it now occupies and its incorporation into other units of the Central Government forces, probably scattered over the entire country. The governmental power would be expected to be placed under Kuomintang control as is the case in other parts of free China, for it is not likely that the Communists would be permitted to retain any voice in the Government in their present areas unless that voice were backed by armed force—a force which would be lost with the relinquishment of its army. Kuomintang concessions, according to Communist sources, would entail the establishment of some form of representative government in which the Communist Party and other minority groups would have a share. It would also require freedom of [Page 355] speech, of assembly and of the press—i.e. guarantees of security for the Communists.
It is debatable what the result of such a move would be at the present moment. Many liberal Chinese in addition to the Communists insist that establishment of a truly representative government would not necessarily entail the loss of a dominant voice in the Government by the Kuomintang but that it would mean the elimination of the oppressive and corrupt practices in which the Kuomintang now indulges in order to enable it to hold its power; that such a move would result in a greater spirit of unity on the part of the people and a genuine whole-hearted support of the war effort and of the Government. The Kuomintang on the other hand points to the unrest already existing and fears that without the strong controls now in existence chaos would result and that too much freedom at the present moment might lead to disruptive tendencies with every individual and every group trying to make its voice heard. The result is that there seems to be no common meeting ground for the two parties. The Kuomintang, therefore, continues to maintain its blockade of Communist-occupied territories, asserting that the slightest relaxation of that blockade will mean the extension of Communist control over adjacent areas. It employs the blockade both as a form of pressure on the Communist Party for the acceptance of the Kuomintang demands and as a preventive of the extension of Communist control.
Communist Estimate of Present Situation
The Communists state that General Ho Ying-chin’s attack on the Communists is but one phase of the propaganda campaign decided upon by the Kuomintang to publicize and expose Communist “crimes”. Mr. Tung Pi-wu warns that further reports of this type are to be expected in the future and that many of them will come from provincial, municipal and hsien assemblies. He asserts that the occasion of General Ho’s attack was the first time since the organization of the P. P. C. that the Communists had thus been openly attacked, although an effort had been made to initiate such an attack during the P. P. C. session in 1942—an effort which was forestalled by his (Tung’s) prompt protest. Mr. Tung states that General Chiang Kai-shek purports to feel that the Communist question is purely a domestic problem and that foreign opinion in this matter should be disregarded. He asserts that General Chiang has so informed his associates and has stated that in any event the American and British Governments are capitalist regimes which have no regard for the Communists. Mr. Tung is of the opinion that as matters now stand the situation is generally worse than at any time since the crisis in July of this year when the Central Government concentrated additional troops around the Communist [Page 356] areas in Shensi. He expresses the belief, however, that General Chiang does give consideration to foreign opinion regarding the Communist problem in spite of his apparent indifference, He adds that the question of the Szechuan militarists also enters into any estimate of the situation and that the Central Government has recently moved an army corps from Paochi, Shensi, to Tahsien, eastern Szechuan, to provide for eventualities in the event of a Kuomintang-Communist conflict.
Communist sources state that General Chou En-lai, the Communist representative who left for Yenan at the end of June, will not return to Chungking in the immediate future and that the question of his return may well serve as a barometer of improved relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists. It is to be noted that the Communist Party representation at Chungking has been reduced and that there remains only a minimum number considered essential in the operation of the 18th Group Army Headquarters and of General Chou’s office and in the publication of the Communist daily and bi-monthly magazine. The Communists also state that following the withdrawal of Mr. Tung from the P.P.C. session their representatives have been under close surveillance by the Kuomintang secret police and that one non-Communist Chinese who was seen talking to Communist members on the street was followed and warned by the secret police that serious consequences could be expected if she were again found with Communists.
Chinese Suspicion of Soviet Russia
In the background of the situation is inevitably present a deep-seated Chinese fear and suspicion of Soviet Russia and its intentions with regard both to the Chinese Communists and the Northeastern Provinces. (The Embassy has reported on this subject on a number of occasions.) That the Russians are not altogether disinterested in the Chinese Communist Party is evident from the call made in July at the American Embassy by representatives of the Soviet Embassy at Chungking who expressed Soviet concern over the possibilities of civil war between the Central Government and the Communist Party (Embassy’s telegram No. 1183, July 14, 12 noon). This fear gives added reason for the Kuomintang to wish to dispose of the Communist question before the conclusion of the war in order that a post-war Kuomintang-Chinese Communist struggle for control in north China may not occur. Even should Soviet Russia remain outside the war against Japan, there would exist the possibility of Russian assistance, outright or under cover, to the Chinese Communists.
[Page 357]Possibilities of Civil War
All these factors point to but one conclusion to the continued struggle between the two rival parties—civil war at some undetermined future date. Whether it will come prior to the conclusion of the war against Japan or after that date would seem to depend largely upon the Kuomintang’s estimate of the possibilities of success. If the Kuomintang believes that it can embark upon such a campaign with chances of rapid success, it is possible that it will not await the end of the war against Japan. The end of the war in Europe will find a militarily-strong Soviet Russia which may be expected to take an active interest in the Far Eastern situation. That interest is likely to include the Chinese Communists and every day that passes brings nearer the possibility of Russian interference in the Communist situation in China. The Kuomintang may feel that the present offers the greatest chance of non-interference from the American and British Governments which might be expected to exert no great pressure against such a move because of a desire to keep China in the war. There would seem to be more arguments against the advisability of launching into civil war in the post-war period provided the Kuomintang should feel that it could successfully carry through such a campaign prior to that time. The present propaganda campaign against the Communists is expected by the Kuomintang to build up a picture of an obstructionist and disobedient Communist Party which is hindering the prosecution of the war against Japan and is in well nigh open revolt against the legally constituted government of China, contrary to the wishes of the people—a propaganda campaign which is perhaps a necessary prelude to outright action against the Communists.
The Embassy feels that the chief danger in the situation lies in a possible miscalculation by the Kuomintang of its chances of success if its armies attack the Communists. The Kuomintang may consider that it is strong enough to accomplish its objective—the liquidation of the Communists—before the end of the war. (In this connection, the Secretary of Embassy at Sian has recently reported that Central Government military officials there seem for the most part to make light of the military strength of the Communists, especially in respect to military equipment and supplies. They seem to suggest that the Chinese Communist forces, at least those in north Shensi, could be liquidated speedily and easily.) Indications are that the result of civil war in the near future would be the end of what little affirmative contributory war effort is now being made by China. The dissident provincial elements, such as the Szechuan militarists (whose possible [Page 358] opposition was reportedly one of the reasons for the failure of the C. E. C. to issue an ultimatum against the Communists in September), are not likely to neglect an opportunity to “fish in muddy waters” and utter chaos might well result. The general condition of Central Government troops, suffering from malnutrition and insufficient medical attention and in many cases lacking—through long inactivity—the spirit to fight, would necessarily be a factor in any campaign against Communist troops, who are described by Central Government military officials as well led and trained, disciplined and of good fighting spirit but lacking military equipment in all categories.
The possible alternatives to any civil war in China may be (1) a compromise between the two rival parties, which, gained under the pretext of democracy, might serve through the limited exercise of such principles to prevent the spread of Communism in China or (2) the carrying out by the Kuomintang of democratic reforms, particularly in the agrarian field, designed to deprive the Chinese Communist Party of one of its greatest sources of popular appeal among the peasants. (The Communist Party’s present strength has perhaps resulted largely from the failure of the Central Government to take any effective measures of agrarian reform and the Communist movement as at present constituted in its non-industrialized bases is chiefly a symbol of agrarian protest.)
It is of importance to the United States that there emerges a new China which will be friendly to the United States and which will not be torn by civil strife nor controlled by reactionary ultra-chauvinistic elements. There already exist among these powerful elements suspicion of western ideas and influence and some latent anti-foreign-ism which under their direction could readily be encouraged and extended over the country. If civil war is prevented and if the Kuomintang is forced by virtue of circumstances to give way to demands for reforms or for the broadening of the base of the government with resultant liberalizing influence, China may be saved both from Communism and from the perhaps worse evil of the Chinese brand of Fascism which masquerades under Sun Yat-sen’s San Min Chu I. Fascist tendencies of this kind are becoming more and more evident. A solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem which will avert civil war and by liberalizing the present regime lessen the influence of the reactionary elements now in power would provide a solution greatly to the advantage of the United States in the light of its long-term interests.
Respectfully yours,