893.00/15124: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:09 p.m.]
1741. 1. A usually well informed and reliable Chinese source has commented to us on the recently concluded CEC session as follows:
- a.
- From the beginning of the session on September 6 until the 10th feeling against the Communists ran high, Kuomintang die-hards demanding their liquidation by armed force. Successful counter-influences included (1) a telegram from T. V. Soong (which became generally known among the delegates) emphasizing the adverse effect in the United States of civil war in China and (2) advice to Chiang Kai-shek by Chang Chun who pointed out that the Szechuan militarists Teng Hsi-hou, Lui Wen-hui and Pan Wen-hua had not accepted invitation to attend the session and that in the event of civil war their forces would lie astride the line of communications between Chungking and the Communist areas, thus giving them opportunity to capitalize on their opposition to the Central Government. Fu Tso-yi and Ma Hung-kuei, chairmen of the Suiyuan and Ninghsia Provincial Governments respectively, also opposed military action.
- b.
- The session revealed China’s dependence upon the United States: (1) need for financial assistance to which Chiang referred in his speech describing the uses to which part of the American credits to be put; (2) need for military equipment under Lend-Lease; (3) dependence upon the United States to defeat Japan.
- c.
- The election of Chiang as President now makes him more independent of the CC clique and his power to make decisions without reference to others long exercised in some degree is thus reinforced.
2. The informant’s description of the anti-Communist feeling prevailing at the CEC sessions corroborated by a statement made on September 10 by another well-informed reliable Chinese who spoke of the “war spirit” of the CEC and expressed fear that a manifesto might be issued tantamount to a virtual declaration of war against the Communists.
3. We feel that the informant’s comments offer additional evidence both of the extent to which the United States is in a position to influence Chinese Government policy and of the Kuomintang’s intention to liquidate the Communists if and when direct action can be taken without too adverse an effect upon China’s international relations and the party’s internal position.