Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China

893.00/15081

The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1330

Chungking, July 8, 1943.
[Received August 4.]

Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s despatch no. 1312 of June 30, 1943, concerning conditions in Shensi Province, there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum² of conversation with Dr. Basu, a member of the Indian Medical Unit in China, in regard to conditions in the Communist-controlled areas in north China.

Dr. Basu is a member of the Indian Medical Unit sent to China by the Indian National Congress Medical Union in 1938. Following the fall of Hankow in October 1938 and the subsequent threat to Ichang, the group proceeded under orders of the Chinese Army Medical Corps to the north China area where it remained until the time of the New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941 when the Indian National Congress, at the request of the Central Government, recalled the Unit to India. Dr. Basu, who was then in the Wutaishan area, did not receive the orders for his recall until a later date and, feeling that his services were badly needed by the Communist troops in that area, did not leave north China until May 1943.

Dr. Basu states that economic conditions in the Communist-controlled areas are now considerably better than in 1942 and that the general price level is about half that obtaining at Chungking. The serious shortage of many commodities and foodstuffs in 1942 impelled the Border Government (Communist) at Yenan to release all government officials, except the most essential, and many of the troops for service in industrial and agricultural productive units. Central Government troops maintain a fairly effective blockade of the Communist-controlled areas which is directed particularly toward preventing cotton and iron from reaching the Communists. Some supplies of these materials do, however, get through the blockade, perhaps with the connivance of the Central Government troops.

The Communist troops are said by Dr. Basu to confine their military operations against the Japanese to defensive action as they are not sufficiently well-equipped to assume the offensive. The Communists pay particular attention to the establishment of strong bases, economically and politically, in the areas which they occupy, for without the support of the people it is impossible for them to operate behind the enemy lines. As evidence of the popular support the Communists enjoy he cites many Communist-controlled areas behind Japanese lines and points out that Central Government troops are not found in such areas chiefly because their oppression of the people deprives them of the support of the people necessary for their existence in those areas. Political support of the people is obtained through the establishment of representative governments in Communist-occupied districts which are elected by the vote of the people and in which the Communist representation is limited to one-third, the remaining two-thirds being shared by Kuomintang members and non-party persons. Economically, the Communists encourage the organization of cooperatives and home industries which prevent raw materials, particularly cotton in the Communist areas in Hopei, reaching the Japanese and provide commodities for the people.

The absence of any comment on the part of Dr. Basu critical of Communist activities is perhaps partially the natural result of four years’ work in the Communist areas among people with whom he may feel sympathetic from the standpoint of a person who himself opposes in India a ruling class. (He claims, however, that he is a member of the Indian National Congress Party and not a Communist.) At the same time, it is worth noting that all foreign observers (and the majority have not been Communists) who have lived or traveled in the Communist-controlled areas in recent years have had much the same reaction to Communist activities there as that of Dr. Basu. There is doubtless a studied effort on the part of the Communists to show foreigners only the favorable side of the situation there, but one cannot escape the conclusion that, without regard to the ultimate aims of the Communist Party in China, the Communists are following a policy which has increased their standing among the majority of people in the areas which they control.³

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

2. Not printed.

3. In a memorandum dated August 10, Augustus S. Chase of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs made the following comment:

   “There is little new information in the memorandum, but the following points are perhaps of especial interest:

   “Despite the Central Government’s blockade of the Communist areas, some wool and iron get through to the Communists, perhaps with the connivance of the Central Government troops. As far as Dr. Basu knows, there is no truth in the charges that the Communists are cultivating opium in Shensi. The Communist Army’s spirit is superlative. Its total strength is about 500,000–600,000. Increased production has solved the Communists’ food problems. The chief problem is an acute lack of medicines. The Communists manufacture their own mortars and rifles from steel rails taken from Japanese-controlled railways. They can carry on defensive war indefinitely.”