893.00/15050: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:17 p.m.]
1125. 1. The secretary of General Chou En-lai, Communist Party representative at Chungking, called July 7th and offered an officer of the Embassy information and comment regarding recent developments in the Kuomintang-Communist situation as follows:
- (a)
- The Communist representatives at Chungking have received a report from Sian that General Hu Tsung-nan has recently transferred seven divisions of Central Government troops including an armored unit from the Honan area south of Yellow River to Lochwan (near border between Kuomintang and Communist areas in Shensi). They have received a report from Yenan quoting a telegram which General Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief [of] Communist area, sent on July 4th to General Hu in which Chu warns of the harmful results of civil war and protests against massing of Central Government troops in this area. (The informant states that there were already approximately 14 divisions of Central Government troops in that region and that the troops of General Yen Hsi-shan are stationed east of this area in Shansi.) The Communist Party representatives at Chungking have sent a copy of this telegram to General Chang Chih-chung, Director of the Political Training Board of Ministry of Military Administration, and to Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Chief Secretary General of the People’s Political Council. The Communist newspaper at Chungking was not permitted to publish the message of the Communist Party prepared for the double seventh (July 7) special edition. Generals Chou and Lin Piao whose plans for a return to Yenan were reported in Embassy’s 1012, June 24, 2 p.m., are now somewhere between Kwangyuan (north Szechuan) and [Page 278] Paochi (railhead in Shensi) en route to Sian. It is not believed that they are aware of these developments although Chou prior to his departure from Chungking predicted that the Central Government might be expected to exert pressure of this sort in order to settle Kuomintang-Communist differences.
- (b)
- While Chiang Kai-shek’s permission must have been obtained for the transfer of these troops to border area and while it is not believed that the Kuomintang desires at present to come to an outright clash with Communists, there is a possible danger that the situation may develop along lines similar to those at time of the New Fourth Army incident in January 1941 when local commanders of Central Government troops acted against the Communist troops without prior reference to the Chungking authorities.
- (c)
- The Central Government feels that it is in position to “blackmail” its allies in the matter—that is, the Central Government considers that it can adopt an openly harsh attitude against Communists without risk of open criticism or interference by China’s allies because of the latter’s fear of giving offense or of injuring their relations with China in any way which might adversely affect the Central Government’s willingness to keep at war with Japan. American, British and Russian failure to interfere with such action by the Chinese Government would be in the nature of a “concession” in order to keep China in the war. Soviet Russia has in a sense made one such concession by its withdrawal from Sinkiang. The Communist Party would also be compelled to make concessions of some kind in order to prevent civil war and in order to avoid condemnation by United Nations. General Chiang probably feels that the dissolution of Comintern has given the Kuomintang a freer hand with the Communists and this feeling together with the above described situation has resulted in his stronger attitude toward the Communists. Pressure on Communists for their acceptance of Kuomintang terms may be expected to continue and perhaps to grow stronger.
2. Following is the substance of the telegram sent by Chu to Hu on July 4, a copy of which the Embassy obtained from a reliable additional source.
Begin summary. It is generally said that the Central Government plans to utilize the opportunity offered by the dissolution of the Comintern to attack the Communists. You have brought many troops from Honan and are sending ammunition and food to this area. Since your arrival in the Lochwan–Ichun area there have been many evidences of military activity. You have urged your generals to make preparations for an attack. There is danger that civil war may break out at any time. At a time when our war against Japan is at a difficult stage, everything should be done to maintain unity. National unity and national resistance would suffer irreparable harm from a civil war which will benefit only Japan. This unexpected change in the situation [Page 279] has greatly surprised us and leaves us in doubt. Please reply. End summary.
We have been reliably informed that Chu again despatched the telegram to Hu on July 6 as he had not at that time received a reply.
3. Although this situation undoubtedly has serious aspects, the Embassy is of the opinion that the Central Government is not likely under present circumstances to undertake direct military action against the Communists, first, in general, because of the adverse reaction which could be expected to result among the United Nations, particularly in the United States and Britain, upon whom China depends for the defeat of Japan, direct military aid and assistance in Chinese postwar reconstruction plans; and, second, specifically because of the effect on Chinese relations with Soviet Russia and Chinese continuing hopes that Russia will eventually enter the war as an ally of China against Japan. It seems improbable that the Kuomintang leaders will wish to be responsible in the eyes of the United Nations for causing civil war, and the reported massing of Central Government troops would appear to be a form of pressure upon the Communists to accept Kuomintang terms which is not intended to extend to the point of actual conflict.