Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China

Brigadier General Patrick J. Hurley^97b to President Roosevelt ^97c

Cairo, 20 November 1943.

I have inspected the Chinese Theatre of Operations. I spent considerable time with the American Generals, Lieutenant General Stilwell, Major General Chennault, and other Chinese and American Army Officers. I was accompanied into the Chinese Theatre by Major General Stratemeyer who is Commander of the American Air Operations in the India and China Theatres. I had two conferences with the President of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo expressed his complete confidence in you, in your motives, and in the principles that you have promulgated.

The Generalissimo talked very frankly about the coming conference in Cairo. He questioned whether or not he could meet Marshal Stalin at Teheran on the terms of amity becoming such a meeting. He related to me frankly the causes that impelled him to hesitate to have a personal meeting with Marshal Stalin. He related to me his suspicions concerning Russia’s desires to communize China and perhaps for complete conquest and annexation to Russia of a portion of China.

I recalled to him Marshal Stalin’s renunciation of world conquest as a fundamental policy of communism. I told him that in my opinion Marshal Stalin is now committed to the proposition that communism can succeed in Russia alone without an attempt being made to force it on the rest of the world. I said also that in my opinion Russia is no longer subsidizing or directing communist activities in other nations. I suggested to the Generalissimo that Russia’s own experience with communism in Russia is to some extent neutralizing what we considered to be the harsher elements of the communistic ideology. I said that I realized that there are communist political parties in other nations but in my opinion such parties are neither directed nor subsidized from Russia.

In corroboration of these arguments I drew the Generalissimo’s attention to the recent Moscow declaration. Notwithstanding this, the Generalissimo still appeared to entertain grave doubts of the friendly intentions of the Soviet Government toward China.

The Generalissimo stated that he wished to see you first in Cairo and much depended on his conference with you as to whether or not he would subsequently confer with Marshal Stalin.

I hope I may have the opportunity of discussing with you the Chinese-Russian problem before you have a conference with the Generalissimo.

The Generalissimo stated that so far as you and Prime Minister Churchill are concerned he has no doubt of being able to find a basis of complete cooperation.

As President of China and as Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek will recommend that the coming conference reiterate the Atlantic Charter.⁹⁸ If possible he would like to have your Four Freedoms^98a specifically included in the declaration of the Cairo or Teheran conference.

After conferences with the Generalissimo which covered approximately six hours, I have drawn the following conclusions:

(1) The Generalissimo and the Chinese people favor the principles of democracy and liberty.

(2) The Generalissimo and the Chinese people are opposed to the principles of imperialism and communism.

(3) He believes that you, of course, favor democracy and liberty. He understands, however, that you may temporarily have to temporize with imperialism and communism in the interests of the joint war effort.

(4) He is aware that the future co-operation and unity of the United Nations must depend upon your ability to assimilate rather than eliminate divergent ideologies. He is convinced that you must find principles on which the Big Four nations can agree. In seeking these principles he feels that you must have extensive freedom of action.

(5) He wanted me to say to you that he has implicit confidence in your motives and that he is committed to the fundamental principles which you have promulgated.

(6) He will, therefore, follow your leadership on the diplomatic and political questions that will be considered in the impending conference.

On strategy he finds himself unable to accept a subordinate position in the Asiatic area to Lord Mountbatten. He stated that so far as the Chinese Theatre of Operations is concerned he must be supreme. He stated that if he should accept a secondary position in that theatre it would divide his following and eventually so weaken his position that he could no longer maintain himself as the leader of all China. Notwithstanding this attitude he is ready to cooperate fully with Lord Mountbatten and he thinks that in Northern Burma and eventually in Thailand and possibly in Indo-China, there would be circumstances in which he would favor the control of British, American and Chinese troops being placed under one commander. He said that he personally liked Lord Mountbatten and that he could visualize future operations outside of China where he would want his Lordship to be the Supreme Commander of United Nations forces, including Chinese Armies. However, he was steadfast in maintenance of the principle that in the Chinese Theatre it is better for himself and China and the United Nations that he should remain the ultimate authority.

He expressed the opinion that the subjugation of Japan should be sought through an attack on Japan in Japan. Attacks should be made from various sectors of the Pacific Theatre, the India-Burmese and the Chinese Theatres simultaneously. These attacks should be coordinated and directed toward the ultimate occupation and conquest of Japan in Japan. Tokio and all Japan is the objective rather than any state, island or citadel outside of Japan. He also spoke with clarity of the strategy of attacking Tokio and all Japan through China.

In all of the foregoing it will be apparent to you that I have confined myself to a discussion of the attitude of President-Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek toward a meeting with Marshal Stalin.^98b I have purposely refrained from injecting into this letter any of the reasons why Marshal Stalin might not want a public meeting with Chiang Kai-shek at this moment. For instance, Marshal Stalin might be opposed to taking any action that might cause the closing of the Port of Vladivostok. Moreover, you may find that Marshal Stalin might be convinced that it would be unwise to take any action that might bring an enemy down on his rear in the present posture of the conflict.

In evaluating the Generalissimo’s conversations it is advisable to consider with some skepticism the Chinese capacity, or readiness, to contribute materially to offensive warfare. It is advisable likewise to give consideration to the relative importance placed by the Chinese Central Government upon conserving its strength for maintenance of its postwar internal supremacy as against the more immediate objective of defeating Japan. These are questions I should like to discuss with you further.

Respectfully yours,

Patrick J. Hurley

1. Special representative of President Roosevelt in the Near East; he had made an inspection trip to China.
2. Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
98. Joint declaration by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941; Department of State Bulletin, August 16, 1941, p. 125, or 55 Stat. 1603.
99. See address by President Roosevelt to Congress, January 6, 1941, Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 608.
100. In a message to President Roosevelt dated November 12, 1943, Marshal Stalin stated: “It goes without saying that at Tehran there will take place a meeting of the heads of only the three Governments as was agreed. The participation of the representatives of any other powers must be absolutely excluded.” (Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F–96.)