857.85/396
The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State
Excellency: I have been instructed by my Government to propose to the Government of the United States of America that negotiations be initiated in order to arrive at a general shipping agreement between the two Governments.
The fact that it becomes clearer, month by month, that the problem of leaking the potential power of the United Nations effective upon the war fronts of the world is primarily a problem of ocean transportation, has led my Government to the conclusion that this is an appropriate time to suggest to the Government of the United States the desirability of concluding a general agreement covering the terms of employment of that very considerable part of Norway’s Fleet which my Government has for some time past been voluntarily operating in compliance with the wishes and recommendations of the War Shipping Administration. It is my Government’s conviction that such a general agreement would render much easier of fulfilment the common purpose of the United States Government and of my Government that all Norwegian ships so employed shall be utilized to the greatest possible advantage in winning the war.
Ever since the United States by the unprovoked Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, and the German declaration of war became the active ally of the nations already engaged, including Norway, it has seemed to my Government that a general agreement between the United States and Norway would be more in keeping with their status as allied belligerents than is the present arrangement through which Norwegian ships, requisitioned and operated by my Government, are temporarily subject to a system of warrant control which was devised to cover operation by private owners, some of whom might not be as completely consecrated to the war effort as are the Governments involved. Nevertheless, in order not to permit the slightest interruption in the coordinated war effort of the Norwegian and American Fleets, my Government has complied with all the requirements of the warrant system until the proper time should come for a discussion of a general agreement to replace it. Your Excellency will recall, however, that on [Page 92] January 29, 1942, the Norwegian Legation presented a note to your Government,13 referring to the difficulties presented by the reduced ceiling rates proposed and requesting that the continued application of the so-called “Uniform Conditions” to Norwegian vessels be left open for future discussion.
A short survey of the War Shipping Agreement entered into between Norway and the United Kingdom may be of interest in this connection:
When Great Britain entered the war in September 1939, she immediately initiated negotiations with the Norwegian Shipowners Association for a shipping agreement securing the continued service of a part of the Norwegian Fleet. At that time the major part of the Norwegian Merchant Fleet, consisting of about 7.625.600 tons deadweight (of which about 3.200.000 tons deadweight were tankers inch whaling factories) was trading to the United Kingdom and the United States of America. An agreement was concluded in November 1939, supplemented by an agreement of March 1940, putting at the disposal of the British Ministry of Shipping, or firms appointed by that institution, about 2.250.000 tons deadweight (of which about 1.650.000 terns deadweight were tankers). Charter terms and a scale of charter hire were agreed to.
When Norway entered the war in April 1940, its entire Merchant Fleet, outside enemy occupied territories was requisitioned by my Government. Charter hire under the charters made in accordance with the agreement of November 1939, was thereafter paid to my Government. From time to time thereafter, as Great Britain’s need for ships increased, my Government agreed with the British Ministry of War Transport to the chartering of an increasing number of Norwegian ships through series of agreements supplementing the agreement of November 1939. By July 1941, of the approximately 5.000.000 tons deadweight of Norwegian vessels then remaining, 557 vessels totalling about 3.800.000 tons deadweight were running for the British Empire and the balance for United States interests.
On October 10, 1941 my Government and the Government of Great Britain entered into an agreement covering generally the terms upon which any further Norwegian tonnage should thereafter be made available and providing that my Government in determining the employment of Norwegian shipping should give absolute priority to the requirement of ships for the transportation of supplies essential to the war effort. To facilitate such determination an Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee was appointed with the dual function of advising The Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission in connection with the [Page 93] employment of Norwegian ships not previously time chartered to the British and advising the British Ministry of War Transport in connection with Norwegian vessels already on time charter under earlier agreements with the British.
On November 15th, last, of the remaining Norwegian Fleet of about 3.952.831 tons deadweight (of which about 1.961.993 tons deadweight are tankers) there are running on time charter to the British Ministry of War Transport under the agreements with the British Government entered into before October 10, 1941, or otherwise at pre-war sterling rates about 2.232.943 tons deadweight and on Norwegian lines to the United Kingdom about 303.867 tons deadweight,—a total of about 2.536.810 tons deadweight (of which about 1.290.493 tons deadweight are tinkers). The additional tonnage made available under the October Agreement totals 350.474 tons deadweight (of which 113.420 tons deadweight are tankers) under time charter for round voyages. Further, a number of tankers on time charter to American Oil Companies, of which about 138.169 tons deadweight remain afloat, were put into the United Kingdom trade the summer of 1941 under the so-called “Four-Party Agreements” between the Governments of the United States, of Great Britain and of Norway and the several Oil Companies. These contracts have expired, but the vessels are continuing in the same service pending a new arrangement.
During the negotiations with the British Government which started in May, 1941, and which resulted in the agreement of October 10, 1941, the British Government demanded that the tonnage employed on lines in the Western Hemisphere, or on charter to American charterers, should be made available for the British Ministry of War Transport. The question to which extent this should be done was made the subject of Tripartite negotiations in Washington, during which the Maritime Commission claimed that certain ships should continue in the American trade. Largely, as a result of this demand, 987618 tons deadweight (whereof 558.080 tons deadweight are tankers) are still employed on lines to the United States of America (lines to the United Kingdom excluded) or on charter to the War Shipping Administration or private American charterers or to Canadian charterers. The balance of the tonnage, 77.929 tons deadweight, are chiefly employed in Australian and Indian trade. The time chartering of vessels to the British under the October Agreement was made the subject of a Tripartite Agreement executed May 6th, 1942, between the appropriate Government Agencies of the United States, of Great Britain and of Norway. Under the Tripartite Agreement the vessels are chartered from time to time for such periods as may be determined by the Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee and for operation on such routes as may be approved by the United States War Shipping Administration.
[Page 94]The present moment would seem to be timely for the conclusion of an agreement between the Government of the United States and my Government under which Norway, as an actively belligerent ally, should participate (as is done through the Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee) in all determinations affecting the allocation, maintenance and employment of all vessels now operating in accordance with the sole direction of the War Shipping Administration under the warrant system with the Norwegian Government’s temporary consent, as well as such future vessels as may be brought within the scope of the proposed employment agreement. When in 1940 my Government requisitioned all Norwegian vessels, it promptly, in order to operate this fleet of approximately 6 million tons, created a Governmental Agency, designated The Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission, manned by picked shipping executives including specialists in the operation of each particular type of vessel in each particular trade. Since July 1940, this Governmental Agency has maintained in active operation a fully manned and equipped office in New York and another in London. It is believed that the proposed American-Norwegian Shipping Committee could so coordinate the joint efforts of the War Shipping Administration and The Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission in connection with Norwegian tonnage that the fullest possible benefit could be derived from the particular skills and special experience of the personnel of each, It is important to note that many of the Norwegian vessels now operating in accordance with the requests of the War Shipping Administration are specialized types in the handling of which the personnel of The Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission is particularly trained.
Without attempting to include all the points to be covered in such an agreement, the following matters for discussion may be noted:
- (1)
- The establishment of an American-Norwegian Shipping Committee analogous to the Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee. This Committee would have to be consulted beforehand regarding the employment of Norwegian tonnage.
- (2)
- General provisions as to charter rates and charter terms.
- (3)
- Provisions for the protection of established Norwegian Lines whose operations have been or may be curtailed or suspended by reason of the war.
- (4)
- Some clarification in the light of experience since the conclusion of the Lend-Lease Agreement of July 11, 1942, of the practical interpretation to be put upon the language of Clause 2 of my note of that date, when applied to the varying facts of actual cases as they arise.
My Government feels that the total contribution of the Norwegian Merchant Marine to the solution of the transportation problem justifies Norwegian participation in the direction of the transportation [Page 95] policies of the United Nations. The training and long experience of those in charge of the Norwegian Merchant Marine would thus be better utilized than now in the common war effort.
Accept [etc.]
- Not printed.↩