857.85/10–2642
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)
| Participants: | Mr. Jörgen Galbe, Norwegian Chargé d’Affaires, |
| Mr. Lorentzen of the Norwegian Shipping Mission, | |
| Mr. Lorentzen’s Secretary, | |
| Mr. Irgens, Counselor of Norwegian Embassy, | |
| Mr. Long. |
The Norwegian Chargé d’Affaires came in with Mr. Lorentzen, his Secretary, and Mr. Irgens, to express their objection to the transfer of old tonnage instead of new tonnage. They said they thought the old vessels ought to be transferred only outside of the agreement and not [Page 88] within the agreement; that they had from the beginning in conversations started with Mr. Winant11 discussed only new tonnage; that they had always considered that the transfer in fulfillment of lost tonnage would be of new tonnage; that the Norwegian Government would be very much disappointed, and they themselves and the Norwegian sailors would be disappointed to have to accept vessels which were built in 1926; that the reason we were transferring diesel engines was that Americans were not very successful with diesel engines, had had a lot of trouble with them and wanted the Norwegians to take over the trouble; that they had only heard of old tonnage the last day or so and were greatly surprised when Mr. Lorentzen lunched with Mr. Douglas today to find that the offer of five vessels was composed entirely of old tonnage.
The above was the summary of the conversation of each of the four gentlemen. To it I replied that I thought they were lucky to get five: vessels irrespective of their age; that the reaction of the Norwegian Government and Norwegian sailors would be dependent largely on the way the matter was approached to them; that these vessels were to be considered part of the commitment to replace lost tonnage; that they were perfectly good vessels of approximately 10,000 tons each; and that there must have been some misconception in their minds as to the intention of the American Government to transfer to them new tonnage; that this was to be the first step, and that Mr. Douglas, in his conversation with me this afternoon, had stated that in the course of time other ships would be transferred and amongst the ships transferred there probably would be new vessels. I closed by suggesting that if they approached the proposition in the proper spirit they would realize that ships were almost the scarcest things in the world. We were transferring to them for the duration of the war five vessels in full realization of Norway’s effort on the seas during the war, but also because we considered Norway in a class somewhat distinct from other nations in that we realized that Norway’s principal source of wealth was shipping and that this might be translated to the interest of Norway, whether it was sailors or members of the Government, in a way which would produce an agreeable impression instead of a disagreeable impression.
I hoped very much that they would accept the situation as the best that could be done at the time and look forward to the allocation from time to time of additional vessels, some of which might be new vessels. I emphasized the thought, however, that it was preposterous to think that the United States would have entered into a commitment to furnish brand new vessels in replacement of all the vessels lost by Norway.
- John G. Winant, Ambassador in the United Kingdom.↩