860H.01/434
The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 13, 1943.]
Sir: Referring to my cable Yugoslav Series No. 9, December 23, 12 midnight,48 concerning the current Cabinet crisis, pending Cabinet changes, and the reopening of the question of Ambassador Fotić’s position, I have the honor herein to report the following:
In conversation several weeks ago with King Peter, he confidentially remarked that he only wished he could “get rid of a number of old fossils” in his Government who constantly obstructed the formulation of constructive forward-looking policy. Most of this element, he said, continued to think in terms of the pre-Great War period and seemed unable to adjust their minds to the current world trend. They were continuously quarrelling with each other, and if they were any younger they would probably end up by killing each other. The King went on to say that had it not been for these obstructionists, he would have gone further in his declaration of post-war policy on December [Page 837] 1 (see my cable Yugoslav Series No. 8, December 2, and my despatch Yugoslav Series No. 36, December 549). He sincerely hoped that reaction in the United States had been favorable to what he had said on that occasion. Now he wanted to get on with the framing of a very definite policy. What was more, he wanted his Government to frame a definite formula for the practical application of this policy. He was, therefore, determined that the members of his Government iron out differences amongst themselves and get down to some very definite policy in favor of the nation as a whole. He would like, he said, to talk to me further about the best means of bringing this about. In response, I said I should, of course, be delighted to discuss informally with him, at any time, any and all aspects of his problems. However, I wanted him to know that neither my Government nor I would ever care to have either himself or the members of his Government gain the impression that we wished to intervene in strictly Yugoslav affairs. The King said he thoroughly appreciated this point, and would have it in mind during any discussions which we might have in future.
[Here follows detailed information on possible changes in Yugoslav Cabinet.]
I feel that the chances favor the appointment of Minister Grol.50 At the same time I believe that his candidacy will be warmly contested by the Pan-Serb element. Moreover, I feel that if the opposition becomes unduly vigorous, Prime Minister Jovanović may possibly feel called upon to make a compromise in the form of taking the portfolio of the Foreign Ministry himself. This, in my opinion, would be a great mistake as his great value is his independence of thought and action, hence his ability to throw his weight in the right direction at the crucial moment.
I personally believe that Minister Grol’s appointment would prove a constructive move, at least in the next phase of developments, for the following reasons: (a) he feels very strongly that his Government has neglected to give General Mihailović the proper political directive; that it should have impressed upon the General the importance of coordinating the efforts of the resistance forces in Yugoslavia. In this connection Grol feels that the civil strife in Yugoslavia is assuming the aspect of an international conflict: in terms of the extreme elements, the communists against the Mihailovićists. He therefore feels that the power to consolidate these forces rests in the hands of London and Moscow. Accordingly he proposes that these two capitals settle their differences in the matter and define a clear cut policy which in turn Grol would impart to Mihailović as a directive; [Page 838] (b) he is none the less opposed than the Croat and Slovene elements to Ambassador Fotić’s machinations in the United States; however he is of the opinion that Fotić’s eventual withdrawal should be handled as gracefully as possible through gradual steps; (c) in connection with the Ministerial Mission in the United States, Grol would be inclined to include several of that group in the proposed withdrawals from the Cabinet.
In connection with this Ministerial Mission, I find that behind the proposal on part of the Pan-Serb element to completely withdraw it, is an aim of reducing the number of parties represented in the Cabinet. As opposed to this idea the Croat and Slovene and Serb-Democratic elements favor each party (except the Croats) withdrawing one of its two representatives from the Cabinet. If the latter gain their point it is not unlikely that several of the Ministers of the Mission in the United States may be withdrawn (these four Ministers are included as Cabinet Ministers in the total of 17). As regards the position of this Mission in the United States, it is felt by the Croat and Slovene elements here that Ambassador Fotić has been exerting vigorous efforts to liquidate it. Hence, since the Croat, Slovene and Serb-Democratic elements in the Government have energetically striven to have Fotić removed, and since these efforts have the blessings of the majority of the Mission in the United States, relations between the Ambassador and the Mission have become delicate, to say the least, and their respective positions vis-à-vis each other have become a matter of prestige. This situation in turn reflects itself in the present conflict within the Cabinet.
The foregoing are the main points in the developments which have led to the current Cabinet crisis. In the background there are, among other problems, the question of consolidating the resistance forces in Yugoslavia which, over a period of the past few months, have served to increase the conflict of opinion and emotions amongst the Cabinet members. It therefore took but a pretext to bring matters to a head.
Respectfully yours,