860H.00/1421c
The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 2.]
Sir: Referring to my Despatch Yugoslav Series No. 31 of October 16, 194242 and my Cable Yugoslav Series No. 64 of October 7, 1942 (12 midnight), I have the honor to report my following observations on the trend of political developments within the Yugoslav Government.
As to the prospect of the Cabinet’s ironing out its differences in regard to the main issues currently under consideration, I personally am, as I reported in my Cable Yugoslav Series No. 64 of October 7, 1942, more hopeful than optimistic.
Grounds for hopefulness:
(1) I gained the impression at the outset of my recent talk with Foreign Minister Nincić that he had had some message (possibly from the Yugoslav Mission in the United States; he avoided my efforts to pin him down either as to the contents or the source) indicating growing displeasure in Washington over the unfavorable repercussions which the Yugoslav Cabinet’s continued differences of opinion were effecting among the American citizens of Yugoslav descent. Sensing his agitation, I took occasion to “drive home” the importance of his Government’s ironing out its differences, and coming to an agreement on a liberal forward-looking policy. Perceiving the Minister’s unfeigned interest in my remarks, I reiterated my view (one, which I had previously expressed to him, and subsequently reported in my Despatch Yugoslav Series No. 25 of September 16, 1942,42 page 4) as to the desirability of a declaration of post-war policy envisaging equal economic, social and political opportunity for all. In response to his request for my ideas on procedure, I suggested, that in order to render such a declaration the maximum importance and effectiveness, (a) it should be issued by the King, and following its endorsement by all elements in the Cabinet, it should be announced publicly by the Prime Minister, here, and simultaneously by the Minister in Washington; (b) It should be announced on some appropriate date, for example December 1, the anniversary of Yugoslavia’s creation.
[Page 828]I emphasized my opinion that, provided the Government united in seeing through the application of the principles involved, such a declaration might be made to serve a constructive purpose.
In thanking me for my suggestions, the Minister said he favored the idea, and would keep me posted as to the reactions of his associates.
(2) Increasing concern of Serb Democrats in Cabinet over continued governmental differences and their unfavorable repercussions in the United States, Minister Grol, one of their number, recently told me that he and his fellow-democrats were exercised over the situation and that they were bent upon bringing about a just and constructive settlement of issues now before the Cabinet.
(3) Minister Nincić, in reiterating an expression of, the King’s and his deep appreciation of the welcome accorded them in Washington by the President and by other members of our Government, said that the King was profoundly impressed by the President. The King had told Nincić that he had never met a man who had to such an extent as the President, instantly inspired his confidence, esteem and affection.
Nincić added significantly, that he believed the President was the only man the King had ever met who could give him advice and from whom the King would gladly take that advice. This, to my mind, is well to bear in mind in event the present situation in the Cabinet reaches an unsurmountable impasse.
Unfavorable factors:
(1) The impression in Croat and Slovene quarters that Minister Nincić is first and foremost a Pan-Serbian at heart who cannot be shaken loose from his dream of a post-war Greater Serbia; that at the crucial moment Nincić would be reluctant that the Government should commit itself to any form of post-war program envisaging federation or any system which would not render the Serbs the preponderance of power. Monsignor Kuhar has the same impression.
(2) The opinion of Minister Grol (Serb Democrat) that a declaration along the lines I suggested, would be effective in terms of the long-pull outlook, provided the Government, as a whole, agreed to put the principles involved into practical application. He was not optimistic, moreover, either as to the Government’s making such a declaration, or as to its enforcing the practical application of the principles involved, unless pressure were brought upon the Government from the outside. He conscientiously felt, moreover, that this pressure should be brought by us. In fact, he went so far as to appeal to me in strongest terms to urge my government to bring appropriate pressure to bear on his Government in this connection. When I told him that it was against the principles of my Government to become involved in the internal affairs of another government, he said he [Page 829] could assure me in this case that all that was needed was the moral “push” in the right direction from us. He added, that even if Nincić and the rest of the Government would come around to accept my suggestion (which he only wished I would make again, but this time in insistent terms) he could not be optimistic as to the prospects of the government’s agreeing on the application of the principles involved in the declaration.
(3) Although the Serb Democrats as a group: Ministers Grol, Vlajić and Marković, are strongly in favor of a post-war Yugoslavia, based on liberal lines, and in this respect, parallel to the forward-looking hopes of the Croatian and Slovene elements, they have not yet given me any ground to be optimistic as to the effectiveness of their stand. Either it is a case of a lack of “punch” in seeing through their aims, or a case of apprehension lest in pressing their case too strongly, they provoke suspicion, as to their Serb patriotism, on part of the Serb Extremists. Their tendency to look for support from us as illustrated by Minister Grol’s aforementioned appeal to me, would seem to point to the latter case.
(4) The tendency on part of the aggressive elements among the Serb Extremists to exploit to the advantage of their own ends, the division of opinion among the Cabinet members. This element is composed of a group of army officers around King Peter. Assuming credit for a large part of the responsibility for the March 27 coup d’état,44 these officers have “muscled in” to the political arena and are attempting to take things into their own hands. This group consists of Major Knezević, Chief of Prime Minister Jovanović’s War Cabinet, and brother of Minister Knezević, Master of the King’s Household; Major Rozdjalovski and Major Vohoska, both Aides-de-Camp to the King. These officers, moreover, throw their support behind the activities of the Serbian Extremists: the Agrarians under the direction of the Minister of Justice Gavrilović, and the Radicals under the direction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nincić.
Against these elements are the following Serbian elements which favor a post-war Yugoslavia, based on liberal lines: Serb Democrats: Minister Grol, Minister Vlajić and Minister Marković; Serbian Independent Democrats: Minister Budisavljević; Minister Vilder; Yugoslav Nationalists: Ministers Jeftić and Banjanin.
(4) The tendency on the part of Prime Minister Jovanović to stand aloof from these quarrels. Jovanović is a man of long experience in the study, practice and teaching of international law. A man of charming personality and brilliant intellect, he usually gives me the impression of possessing a clear grasp not only of the affairs of his government, but also of the activities of his associates. I have the [Page 830] impression, however, that he tends to stand aloof from the quarrels, and that he avoids taking a positive position in regard thereto.
At this writing, I am of the opinion that if the King were willing to issue a declaration, such as I have outlined above, and if the Government were to endorse it as well as to agree as to the form of its practical application, an important step forward would have been accomplished towards solving outstanding difficulties However, I am apprehensive lest the matter of a declaration be permitted to drift indefinitely, unless it were indicated from friendly outside sources that such a move was considered of great importance in the interest of Yugoslavia’s future.
Respectfully yours,
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- For correspondence concerning the coup d’état of March 27, 1941, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, pp. 968–973.↩