740.0011 European War 1939/24630: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Standley ) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 4—10:20 a.m.]
835. Your 448, September 14, 6 p.m.30
1. During the last 3 months the Soviet press has published numerous news items and articles regarding guerilla warfare in Yugoslavia. They contain, however, no reference to Mikhailovich. They discuss the activities only of the “Partisans” as the Communist guerillas are called here and do not mention the “Chetniks”, the term applied to the followers of Mikhailovich.
2. It would appear from conversations with the Yugoslav Minister and members of his staff that Soviet hostility to Mikhailovich is based primarily on the Soviet desire that the leadership of the guerillas remain in the hands of the Communists or at least of persons who look to the Soviet Union for direction and inspiration. The Soviet Government apparently desires to be in a position to direct the strategy of the guerilla warfare in Yugoslavia so that this warfare will be conducted in a manner which will facilitate the success of Soviet strategic military and foreign policy during the period of the war and will insure that on the conclusion of the war Communists or persons sympathetic to communism will have dominating positions in Yugoslavia.
The strategy of Mikhailovich, which has been approved by his Government, is to organize and conserve men and to accumulate supplies until it appears that an all-out attack on the occupying forces might yield important results. Both Mikhailovich and his Government [Page 820] feel that it would be wasteful of men and material and would lead to useless bloodshed and destruction of property if active and aggressive guerilla warfare should be carried on in present circumstances. The Partisans, however, as well as the Soviet Government, insist that now is the time for an all-out effort and are extremely bitter that Mikhailovich with his great influence is holding back large sections of the population who are willing to engage in guerilla warfare whenever called upon by him to do so. The difference in views between the Chetniks and the Partisans appears to compare somewhat to the difference in views between Allied leaders who do not think that now is the time for the second front and certain Communist-dominated groups who insist that regardless of other considerations a second front must be established at once in order to aid the Soviet Union. Mikhailovich apparently has been opposed to tendencies on the part of some of the Partisan groups to introduce a species of class warfare into the struggle against the foreign enemy. It would seem that some of Mikhailovich’s followers, on the other hand, have taken an active part in opposing various Partisan groups on the ground that they are Communists.
3. The Yugoslav Government has sent messages to Mikhailovich asking him to cooperate with the Partisans and he has expressed a desire so to do. The Yugoslav Government has informally suggested that the Soviet Government use its influence in order to prevail upon the Partisans to cooperate with Mikhailovich. According to a member of the Yugoslav Legation the Soviet Government has taken the attitude that the exertion of such influence would be an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.
4. Under date of August 5 the Soviet Foreign Office presented to the Yugoslav Legation in Kuibyshev a detailed memorandum charging that Mikhailovich and the Chetniks have been cooperating with the Italians against the Partisans in Yugoslavia and that documents have fallen into the hands of the Partisans which would prove these charges.
On August 19 the Yugoslav Legation delivered a memorandum to the Soviet Foreign Office repudiating these charges. The memorandum stated that the lack of cooperation between the Partisans and the Chetniks was due to the leaders of the Partisans who “not only refused to agree upon the action to be taken in the country, but also began to struggle against the forces of General Mikhailovich at the very moment when he asked London to intervene in order to bring about united action”. The memorandum further stated that General Mikhailovich had informed the Yugoslav Government that, “He had clear proof that the occupying troops were aiding the Partisans because they wished to see the two camps engage in mutual struggle [Page 821] in the spring.” Translations of these two memoranda will be sent to the Department under cover of despatch.31
The Soviet Government has not as yet replied to the Yugoslav memorandum. The Yugoslav Legation, however, has been informed that the secret organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has since August 19 carried an article denouncing General Mikhailovich as an ally of the Axis Powers.