740.00116 European War 1939/561

The Minister to the Yugoslav Government in Exile ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State

No. 24

Sir: Referring to Despatches Yugoslav Series Nos. 22 and 23 of September 9 and 10 respectively, I have the honor to report that in very recent conversation with Alexander Bogomolov, Russian Ambassador to the Allied Governments established here, concerning continued resistance against the invaders inside Yugoslavia, he said he wanted to make his Government’s views clear in regard to these activities. Accordingly, he continued, it was felt that under conditions, such as existed in Yugoslavia today, it was useless to attempt to “appoint heroes”; that they created themselves; that they came to the fore by the sheer weight of their own qualities of leadership. Hence, if Mihailović himself failed to rally the forces of resistance Behind his own banners, attempts from the outside to build him up as a leader would hardly be effectual. The very fact that he was not [Page 815] able to consolidate the various factions behind him would seem to be ample proof that he did not enjoy the full support of the Yugoslav people. Thus, consequently, other leaders were coming to the fore to direct the energies of those who were reluctant to follow his leadership.

He went on to say that he wanted me to know these views, since the Yugoslav Government had adopted the position that Moscow should take steps to urge all the forces in Yugoslavia to get in behind Mihailović. While there was little doubt as to the wisdom and advantages of consolidated action on the part of the resistant forces, attempts from the outside to influence people in the question as to who or who should not lead them, could hardly be expected to prove effective.

While Nincić seems to have gained the impression that Moscow is showing more comprehension, and that Russian authorities might be more than hitherto ready to lend a helping hand, I did not gain the same impression from Bogomolov’s foregoing statements to me. It is conceivable that Moscow has come to feel that Mihailović’s forces have gained the upper hand vis-à-vis the Communist leaders of Guerilla bands in Yugoslavia, and it would be useless for the latter to continue their independent efforts; that it would, therefore, be wiser to join forces with Mihailović. In this case, Russian authorities might possibly have instructed Bogomolov to appease the Yugoslav Government by holding out hope that they might take some positive steps towards effecting a consolidation of resistant forces. In this case, I should be inclined to interpret Bogomolov’s remarks to me in the nature of an explanation of Moscow’s past refusal to cooperate with Mihailović. Were this not the case, however, I should then be inclined to take Bogomolov’s remarks as an indication of Moscow’s decision to continue encouraging the Communist leaders.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.