740.00116 European War 1939/559
The Minister to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 22.]
Sir: Referring to my Despatch Yugoslav Series No. 20, dated August 20, 1942,19 I have the honor to report that in further conversation with Foreign Minister Nincić the subject of continued Guerilla resistance inside Yugoslavia, he said that reports from the “inside” indicated that in May, June and July about fifteen hundred Italians were killed and more than 2,500 were wounded in Yugoslavia; that the Yugoslav Guerillas had immobilised a number of enemy divisions. Unfortunately, however, the patriots of Yugoslavia had not been acting in unison. Among the various causes responsible for these conditions, Communist influences represented, as he had previously pointed out, an important factor. There had been two Partisan groups: one recognising General Draža Mihajlović as its leader, the other Lebedev* in Belgrade.
Dr. Nincić went on to say that the Yugoslav Government had full confidence in the leadership and loyalty of General Mihailović and his forces. As an expression of their confidence, they had, in early June, appointed him Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces resisting the enemy on Yugoslav soil. Moreover, the Government was maintaining constant contact with him (even though it was through British channels). The General, Nincić said, commanded an organised force composed, according to the nature of guerilla warfare, of between 80 and 150,000 Četniks; furthermore, these forces were under the direction of regular officers of the Yugoslav Army. The number of men to join Mihailović’s ranks daily was ever increasing. Indeed, it was only General Mihailović who had, under his command, a regular organised army in occupied Europe.
In consequence, it was not astonishing that enemies of Yugoslavia: the Germans, the Italians and all their satellites did their utmost to destroy General Mihailović and his army. The Germans had seized the wife and children of General Mihailović; they had condemned the [Page 811] General to death and promised a large reward to anyone who would kill him. By means of his strong and well organised army, General Mihailović was inflicting considerable losses on the common enemy. He had kept about 30 Axis Divisions pinned down for more than a year in occupied Yugoslavia: 17 Italian Divisions, 7 Bulgarian, 4 German, 4 Hungarian and four divisions of Pavelić’s troops, as well as 15 battalions of Ustashi. Thus General Mihailović was rendering a great service not only to his fatherland, but also to the Allies, and, at this moment especially to his Russian ally.
Minister Nincić went on to say that (a) in late July–early August, the Daily Worker in the United States had started a campaign against General Mihailović; (b) that on August 12, the Soviet War News, published by the Russian Embassy here, had carried in its edition No. 332, an article entitled “Who is leading Yugoslavia’s Guerilla Army?”; that the contents of this article declared that reports from Yugoslavia confirmed that the struggle against the Germans and Italians was being waged under the High Command of the Guerilla Army—and that not a single report indicated that the struggle was being led by Mihailović, or that he was even taking part in it; (for full text of this article see attached Memorandum No. 1);20 that (c) the same Soviet War News had published in its edition No. 337 of August 18, an article entitled “Yugoslav Četniks desert to Guerillas” wherein it was pointed out that every day saw an increase in the number of Četniks who passed over to the side of the Guerilla army, having convinced themselves of the treachery of their leaders, who had openly sold out to the Germans and Italians. (For full text see Memorandum 2).
Dr. Nincić said, furthermore, that in, connection with the aforementioned articles, the Yugoslav Minister at Kuibyshev21 had made a strong representation on August 3 to Monsieur Lozovski, Commissar for Foreign Affairs,22 setting forth certain details illustrating the relations between General Mihailović and the Partisans. In this representation, the Yugoslav Minister had pointed out that on October 19, 1941, General Mihailović had asked the Yugoslav Premier to approach the competent authorities with a view to bringing about arrangements whereby the fighting initiated by the Communists in Montenegro might be coordinated with the efforts of the Nationalist Forces. The General asked that the necessary instructions be given for united action.
The Yugoslav Minister had gone on to cite to M. Lozovski numerous dates since October 19, 1941, whereon General Mihailović had [Page 812] communicated to his Government here his concern regarding the actions of the Communists in Yugoslavia, and his desire to bring them into united action with his forces against the common enemy. At the same time, the Yugoslav Minister had pointed out various steps taken by the Yugoslav Government in urging the Russian Embassy here and the Russian authorities in Kuibyshev, that Moscow exercise influence towards bringing the Communists in behind General Mihailović’s banners. In stating his case, the Yugoslav Minister had quoted the contents of the telegraphic communications between the General and his Government. The Minister had wound up his case, Minister Nincić said, by stating the following conclusions:—that all the evidence he had presented clearly pointed to the following conclusions: (a) that General Mihailović, through the Yugoslav Government in London had, since October 1941, continually requested that London and Moscow bring pressure to bear on the Partisans in Yugoslavia with a view to securing the united action of all patriotic forces against the common enemy and the traitors who served him; (b) that all the efforts made by the Yugoslav Government in London and Moscow and by General Mihailović on the spot, to secure united action in Yugoslavia had been unsuccessful; (c) that the Yugoslav Government had made every effort to stop the fratricidal warfare and had continually broadcast appeals to all the insurgent parties to work together under General Mihailović against their common enemy the invader; (d) that incompetent leadership and the atrocities committed by them upon the Serbian people had produced a popular reaction against the Communists, so that they had been persecuted and annihilated wherever they were found; that in the middle of the war, the Communists had forced a social war, had killed over 10,000 patriots, had brought about a revolt among the people, who had arisen against them entirely on their own initiative and without any encouragement from General Mihailović; (e) that Mihailović’s alleged collaboration with Nedić and with the other traitors was the malicious invention of those very traitors and servants of Germany, whom he had caused to be deprived of their rank, and to be branded as traitors by the B. B. C.,23 asking that the letter “Z” be applied to them; that the entire energies of General Mihailović and of the Yugoslav Government had been directed against the traitors Nedić, Ljotić and Pecanać; (f) that the bandit Pavelić’s Ustashi Press had Spread the news concerning General Mihailović’s alleged collaboration with the Italians, because the leader had protected the Serbians from the Ustashis in the coastal districts; that no telegram from General Mihailović, nor any evidence from a reliable source pointed to his collaboration with the Italians; (g) that the General’s collaboration with the Ustashis had been made altogether impossible by the atrocious [Page 813] massacres of Serbians in the so-called Croatian Free State, where, according to information which had been confirmed, about 600,000 Serbian men, women and children had been killed; that, as a consequence, moreover, of these Ustashis’ atrocities, more than 300,000 refugees had fled into Serbia; that the Ustashis were still carrying on with their massacres of the Serbians and with the destruction of everything Serbian in Bosnia; (h) that General Mihailović’s struggle against the Ustashis in Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav Government’s activities directed against them from London clearly proved that this alleged collaboration was altogether impossible. (For full text of the Yugoslav Minister’s representation of August 3 to Monsieur Lozovski see attached Memorandum 3).
Minister Nincić thereupon drew my attention to copies of extracts from the Yugoslav Military Broadcasts from early March to middle of July, directed towards the union of all patriotic forces in Yugoslavia. (For the full text of these see attached Memorandum 4).
The Minister, furthermore, drew my attention (a) to the contents of a broadcast from London at 20:45 hours on May 25 and 29—a similar appeal to the people of Yugoslavia; (for full text see attached Memorandum No. 5); (b) to contents of a reply to Milan Nedić’s broadcast from London on April 15 at 22 hours, by the Chief of the Military Section of the Yugoslav Prime Minister’s Office; (for full text set attached Memorandum 6.); (c) to extracts from the military Broadcasts denouncing Ustashis activities, ranging from mid-March to late July. (For full text see attached Memorandum 7).
In concluding his conversation on the foregoing, Minister Nincić said that until very recently Russian Ambassador Bogomolov had shown a lack of comprehension when discussing the situation with him, and when receiving his formal protests in the matter. In the past few days, however, he had gained the impression that Bogomolov was facing the problem with a greater degree of understanding. He, therefore, earnestly hoped that this might prove a turn for the better; that it might lead to some move by Moscow towards a consolidation of patriotic forces behind Mihailović.
Respectfully yours
- Not printed.↩
- My reports from all available channels leading into Yugoslavia indicate that while both Mihailović and Lebedev are opposed to the puppet governments of Pavelić in Zagreb and of Nedić in Belgrade they are in bitter conflict with each other. I understand, moreover, that the Soviet Radio Broadcasting Station “Free Yugoslavia” in a broadcast of July 16, accused Mihailović of “treason”. In this connection, the Yugoslav Government discreetly takes the position that the General is engaged in combatting the invader for the independence of his country. He was, moreover, equally bent upon seeing to it that his country not become a Soviet Republic incorporated in the U. S. S. R. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Enclosures mentioned in this despatch not printed.↩
- Stanoje Simich.↩
- Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs.↩
- British Broadcasting Company.↩