861.24/815: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:17 p.m.]
102. Department’s 40, January 30 [31], 5 p.m.50
1. Thompson states that he forwarded Harriman’s message to Stalin in a note addressed to Molotov.
2. I have read Michela’s telegrams to the War Department. He says that the opinions as reported by him were based upon the attitude and statements of Soviet officiate following (a) the Shipment to Russia of defective Tomahawk planes, (b) the failure to expedite the supply of urgently requested spare parts for those planes, (c) the confusing and obstructive division of responsibility as between the British and ourselves with regard to those planes, (d) the failure to profit by experience as reflected in the later shipment of Aircobras without spare parts, and (e) the Kazvin51 question (discussed below). While no statement or obvious insinuation was made that these deficiencies were the result of political considerations it is not improbable that such an interpretation may have been placed upon them by the Russians.
3. It has been regarded as axiomatic in Soviet doctrine that the capitalist world desires the destruction of the Soviet State. American newspapers since the outbreak of the German-Soviet war contain much to substantiate the opinion that some part of American public opinion cherishes the hope that it will result in the reciprocal destruction of the two participants. It is, therefore, an easy assumption on the part of a Soviet official that the capitalist states finding themselves fortuitous associates of the Soviet Union in the war against Germany will supply only enough aid to keep the Soviet Union fighting Germany as long as possible.
4. With respect to the Department’s statement that it is hoped that steps can be taken to eliminate suspicions of this kind, I venture to comment as follows trusting that in doing so, I am not transgressing:
If we have made our own vital decision to help the Soviet Union defeat Germany without reservations based upon fear of a victorious and powerful Russia, it should be possible to reduce the suspicions mentioned by the following two processes: First—positively—by exerting convincing efforts to supply the war needs [Page 689] of the Soviet Union to the satisfaction of the Soviet military observers and purchasing agents in the United States, who presumably should be given status and facilities comparable to those enjoyed by their British counterparts in so far as access to information is concerned; and second—negatively—by avoiding action which might be construed by the Russians to indicate that we are holding back, or are seeking some ulterior advantage. As examples of perhaps unwitting actions of the latter sort, I may say that it is probable that the Soviets believe we really wanted information that would be of use to us in a war with Japan when we made such persistent efforts to obtain data regarding flying routes (Department’s 1193, November 652) although we alleged that the information was for use in connection with the delivery of American planes; that we were either reluctant to provide oil refinery equipment to the Soviet Union or desired to introduce observers into the hinterland Soviet oil areas when we said (Department’s 1189, November 553) that such equipment could not be supplied until American experts had actually visited the sites of the proposed plants; and that we either wanted to establish a foothold for ourselves in northern Iran or were supporting British efforts to keep the Russians out of southern Iran, when we proposed (Department’s 1317, December 3054) the establishment of an intermediate delivery point for American planes at Kazvin.
5. It is to be assumed that provided adequate American and British aid is forthcoming Russia will continue to exert every effort of which it is capable to encompass the defeat of the German armies, and that: it will eventually enter the war against Japan—especially should the Japanese succeed in their present operations at Singapore and at Burma and thus not only stop the flow of supplies into China but threaten the supply routes through the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Should we, however, permit suspicion of the sincerity of our promises of aid to arise and be maintained it would not be beyond the realm of possibility (although I have neither seen nor heard anything that would support any such supposition at this time) that the Soviet Government would consider that it had served the major purpose of survival should it succeed in driving the German forces sufficiently far to the westward to convince Hitler that he would not be warranted in undertaking the spring offensive which at the moment appears to be contemplated.
- Not printed; the Chargé was informed in this telegram that the War Department had obtained the impression, based upon certain reports made to it by Lt. Col. Joseph A. Michela, Military Attaché” in the Soviet Union, that certain Soviet officials suspected that political considerations were hampering American deliveries to the Soviet Union (861.24/808).↩
- Kazvin (Qazvin) is an important communications center about 90 miles northwest of Tehran.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 853.↩
- Ibid., vol. iii, p. 484.↩