740.0011 European War 1939/26811½: Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

464. For President Roosevelt from General Hurley:

Part One

Arrived at Tehran from Caucasus last night. During a 10-day reconnaissance trip to this Southern Russian front I was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Park, Jr., United States Army, Acting Military Attaché at Moscow, and Major John C. Henry of the Air Corps, United States Army, as aides. As in the case of earliest trip to Don–Stalingrad front I am asking Colonel Park and Major Henry to prepare a detailed report for submission directly to G–2 of the War Department.27

For our trip the Soviets furnished us with a plane and crew from Moscow to the Caucasus28 and thence to Tehran. While in air combat areas we Were provided with a fighter escort of 4 to 8 planes. Officers of the Red Army and civilian officials were uniformly courteous, frank and helpful.

We entered the Caucasus by plane at Baku and flew up the Kura River Valley to Tiflis. General Tulanyev, commanding all the Soviet forces in the Caucasus, has his headquarters in Tiflis.

We were told by General Rozhdestvyenski, Chief of General Tulanyev’s staff that there are 7 Russian Armies, between 56 and 60 divisions, in this area. The enemy we were told consists of 28 divisions, about 7 of these being Rumanian, 1 a motorized Italian division, 1 a Slovak division and the remainder German. Three tank divisions and two motorized divisions are included in this total.

We were advised by General Rozhdestvyenski that Russian air superiority is complete and overwhelming. He said that the Soviet air command could order 1,000 flights daily as compared to 50 German flights. On our flight from Baku to Tiflis, about 300 miles, we passed nine operating Soviet air fields. American A–20s were seen on several and two B–25s were on the field at Tiflis.

By automobile we traveled the Georgian military road through the Caucasus Mountains from Tiflis to Ordzhonikidze.

The Germans had recently attacked Ordzhonikidze and had succeeded in destroying or forcing evacuation of manufacturing establishments [Page 680] in that city that had been producing trench mortars and grenades. The attackers were driven back before we arrived and Soviet forces were conducting a counter-offensive. We were permitted to accompany units of the Red Army in the attack on the Germans in the town of Alagir. The Red Army occupied the town during the attack and drove units of the German Army westward.

The town of Ordzhonikidze had been poorly fortified at the time of the German attack. While we were there, the entire civilian population, both men and women, was engaged in digging tank traps by hand and constructing artillery emplacements and machine gun pillboxes. We were astonished by the amount and the nature of the work being done by the civilians. The entire civilian population of the area was as much engaged in defense work as the Army itself.

The town of Ordzhonikidze was formerly named Vladikavkaz, which means “Ruler of the Caucasus”. It is situated in a commanding position near the entrance to the pass through which runs the Georgian military road. The town is now well fortified, but all its fortifications are not well armed. The Russians are short of all classes of weapons except rifles. The pass likewise is well fortified but there are fortifications and emplacements along the military road that are not equipped with weapons. Both for the defense of Ordzhonikidze and the pass through the Caucasus, weapons have to be moved from emplacement to emplacement according to the direction and the nature of the attack.

We did not see the Armavir-Tuapse Pass but we were shown the situation on the map and were advised that it is as fully fortified and as amply defended as the Georgian military road. We were likewise assured that ample precautions have been taken to forestall any Axis effort to land forces from the Black Sea south of the Caucasus mountain range.

Eastward the Germans have launched a number of raids from bases at Yashkul and Mookh toward the Caspian Sea. These raids apparently were conducted by small parties which were driven back after succeeding in cutting the Kizlyar–Astrakhan Railroad briefly in two or three places.

The German line now extends roughly from the middle of Novorossisk southeastward to the vicinity of Alagir, then northward to the Kuma River. From that point there is a broken line northward through Yashkul to Ketcheneri. As of this date, the line was about 50 kilometers northeast of Tuapse. Mozdok was still in German hands. We were told that a Russian garrison has been holding out in the factory area of Novorossisk since the Germans occupied the remainder of the town. This garrison provides a pivotal point for the Russian left flank.

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It should be understood that the line described is not completely covered by Axis troops. The Red Army occupied areas through the full length of the line.

The burden of every Soviet officer’s comment was to the effect that the Russians now have a superiority in every element over the Axis in the Caucasus. The Red Army, they say, has sufficient manpower to drive the Axis from the Caucasus. They are short only of equipment. Continuously, Soviet officers told us that the Russians do not want any foreign military elements in the Caucasus area. Without hesitation they gave the Russian reasons for this attitude, all of which pointed to the same conclusion—the Russians do not trust any foreign power close to their oil resources. The Army officers explained to us with considerable detail and logic Russia’s experiences which have created this distrust of foreign powers in connection with her oil resources.

Soviet spokesmen did make clear that they consider it of utmost importance to their protection of the Caucasus oil: (1), That the Dardanelles remain closed to Axis naval transport movements; and (2), that the United Nations achieve and maintain air and naval superiority in the Mediterranean.

We were impressed by the Soviet defensive strength and preparations. We are of the opinion that Axis forces will not be able to force their way through the Caucasus mountains. The Grozny oilfields north of the mountains are more accessible to attack, however, and might still be endangered despite present Soviet counter-offensive successes.

General Rozhdestvyenski said that the Red forces in the Caucasus will drive the enemy northward to where they can be destroyed by Soviet Armies moving down from the Don–Stalingrad area, or will force them to the hazardous alternative of retreating into the Crimea by way of the Kerch Straits.

From our observations, however, we reached the conclusion that the Germans are not now operating in great force in the Caucasus. In fact, we saw little indication that there are as many as 28 Axis divisions there, nor were we convinced there are as many as 56 or 60 Russian divisions in that area.

Nevertheless, the initiative is clearly on the side of the Russians. Here, as on the Stalingrad front, there is the same feeling that the Axis is conserving its resources. The officers here, however, did not express the opinion that Germany is strengthening her inner defense lines or conserving her power for an attack. Their opinions led always to the conclusion that Germany no longer possesses the equipment nor manpower for a great offensive.

Notwithstanding this, there is still prevalent in the Caucasus the [Page 682] same question in regard to the enemy’s intention as we found on the other front, expressed in the same soldier slang “What’s cooking?”

Some Russian officers expressed apprehension that the Germans would use poison gas in the Caucasus in the near future. As a basis for this fear they stated that the Germans were manufacturing poison gas at Russian plant captured at Stalino in the Don Basin.

We heretofore reported to you that the Axis prisoners we saw on the Stalingrad front were Rumanians and others, not German. We were permitted to visit a prisoner evacuation station southeast of Tiflis. There were at this camp approximately 500 prisoners. Most of them were Rumanians. There were some Italian, Hungarian and Slovaks. About 125 were Germans, including a number of junior officers. We were permitted to converse freely with these prisoners From all the circumstances relating to prisoners we felt that possibly claims as to the number captured are somewhat overstated.

We reached the following conclusions during our trip:

1.
We agree with Russian opinion that they leave in the Caucasus sufficient manpower for defense of their oil resources.
2.
We were also convinced that the Russians do not possess sufficient equipment to guarantee safety of the Caucasus against an all-out Axis assault by way of the Caspian or Black Sea approaches.
3.
Equipment must come from the United States. It cannot be supplied in adequate quantities by Russia’s own productive facilities.
4.
It should not be overlooked that with the Russian Armies on the offensive without adequate reserve equipment the attrition factor in men and material may still be operating to Soviet disadvantage.
5.
The morale, the physical strength and the general attitude of the officers and soldiers of the Red Army under every condition was excellent.
6.
In coming out of the Caucasus, the overtone led to the conclusion already evident to many, namely, that this war is reaching a critical phase in this area in the struggle for control of petroleum.

Part Two

As I have heretofore wired you,29 Iraq and Iran are in my opinion, sore spots in Anglo-Soviet relations. The conflicts are grave but not insurmountable. Instead of cabling reports on this situation I think it more advisable to assemble the facts and present them to you verbally.

I request therefore, that instead of proceeding to India, Australia and New Zealand I be directed by you to return to Washington. Because of irregularity of transportation services on the Indian Ocean, I can go to Australia and New Zealand more quickly via the United States than by way of India. This latter schedule would give me opportunity of reporting to you in detail in person.

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May I suggest that it would be appropriate to thank Premier Stalin for the courtesy, helpfulness and facilities extended to me by him. [Hurley.]

Dreyfus
  1. General Hurley had informed General Marshall through telegram No. 1105, December 16, 1942, sent by the Chargé from Kuibyshev, that “on coming here I received no directive from the War Department.… It is clear that this reconnaissance, together with all information being furnished by Soviet staff and Field Commanders, is more military than diplomatic. I have reported regularly to the President.” (740.0011 European War 1939/26577)
  2. The Hurley Mission had left Moscow by plane on December 17.
  3. Telegram No. 1104, December 16, 11 p.m.; not printed.