740.0011 European War 1939/25722½: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 16—7:54 a.m.]
464. Personal for the President from Hurley. I have had conferences with Molotov and Stalin. (Syllabus).
- 1.
- Stalin expressed his understanding of the desire for an all out attack against Japan now. He definitely disapproved that strategy at this time as it would divert matériel and force from this theater. He denied Japan’s ability to exploit within the ensuing year or 18 months the war resources of the territories she has occupied.
- 2.
- Stalin stressed the paramount importance of the defeat of Hitler first, and maintained that the defeat of Japan would be logical consequence. He completely agreed with strategy indicated in your letter and amplified to him by me.
- 3.
- Stalin made clear the necessity of accumulating in Russia as quickly as possible the matériel essential to enable Russia to assume the offensive. Such an offensive, he considered, a proper implementation of the strategy outlined by you.
- 4.
- Stalin stated that eventually we would need an additional front in Asia from which to attack Japan simultaneously with an attack from the Pacific.
- 5.
- Stalin repeated his commendation already expressed through the press of the operations in North Africa.
- 6.
- Stalin agreed to afford me the means of a complete understanding of Russian strategy in Russia. He proposed that this be done through contact with proper military authorities and personal reconnaissance of the vital fighting front. (End syllabus).
My discussion with Stalin of the foregoing subjects began at 11 p.m. on November 14 and continued to 12:30 a.m. on November 15. Molotov, whom I had visited several days before, but with whom I had not discussed the purpose of my mission, sat through the entire conference. He did not participate in the discussions. Pavlov interpreted.
I opened the conference by extending your greetings and expressing your admiration for the fortitude and the intelligence with which Russia is conducting her great fight. I then assured Stalin that any statement he might make to me would be transmitted directly and secretly to President Roosevelt alone. I handed him your letter of October 5 addressed to him.93 On his direction it was read and interpreted to him at once. Before commenting on the letter he asked if I had anything to say in regard to the subject matter or if I wished to amplify the contents.
I reviewed briefly my recent service in the Pacific area, explained the present situation in that theater, and presented the argument that has heretofore been made by Australians, New Zealanders, and some Americans—including myself—to the effect that we should attack, defeat and destroy the autocracy of Japan before she had time to exploit the great resources of the territory she had occupied. I concluded by pointing out that the defeat of Japan would remove a formidable enemy from our rear and would permit the full utilization of our resources in the Western theater; that likewise, the defeat of Japan would release the war resources of Russia now in the Asiatic [Page 657] area. This would enable the United States and Russia to bring their full force to bear on the paramount objective—the defeat of Hitler.
I then told him that contrary to these views you had decided that the most effective plan in which the United Nations could join for defeating Hitler was through rendering all possible support to the Russian armies and that the defeat of Japan would naturally follow the defeat of Germany. I told Stalin that it was now my purpose to help make your strategy effective.
Mr. Stalin then began talking—slowly, quietly, deliberatively. He expressed his greetings to you and his appreciation of your splendid leadership. His first sentence on the subject under discussion was to the effect that you had adopted the correct and the most effective strategy. He stressed the imperative need of creating a reserve in Russia to justify Russia in assuming the offensive. He referred again to the necessity for a second front in Europe eventually, but agreed fully on the effectiveness of the opening of what he referred to as another front in Africa.
Up to this time he had made no reference to Japan. I then referred to his recent anniversary address94 and expressed appreciation for his outline of the objectives of the Soviet-American-Anglo coalition. I referred with commendation to his letter to Mr. Cassidy of the Associated Press95 on the American-British achievements in North Africa.96 I then started to suggest that in all his public discussion he had made no mention of the Eastern theater. Before I completed the sentence he laughed and interrupted me to say, “I know. You are going to say that I failed to mention your enemy—Japan.”
In this statement I cheerfully acquiesced. He then began a clear analysis of what he termed the war in Asia. His first comment was that I had placed too much stress on Japan’s ability to exploit the war resources now within her line. He said that Japan had only such tooling as she had received from the United States before the war and was now receiving from Germany. He described this as absolutely insufficient.
He said that Japan did not possess trained workers in sufficient numbers in Japan or in the area she had occupied. His whole argument on this subject led to the conclusion that there was no danger whatever of Japan being able to exploit the captured resources to any appreciable extent within the next year or 18 months. At one point [Page 658] this discussion indicated that Russia intended in due course to cooperate in the establishment of a mainland front against Japan, but further discussion of that subject so modified his statement that it should not be taken as a commitment.
I asked him if it were not a fact that Japan’s role was not that of a selfish opportunist, watching Germany’s progress and holding herself in position to take advantage of any success that might come to Germany in the Western theater. This he answered in the negative. He said that the cooperation between Japan and Germany was complete. He knew that recently Japan had made increased demands on Germany for surface ships and airplane engines. He said that Japan was incapable of constructing first class airplanes without the aid of Germany. Great traffic was taking place between Germany and Japan at the present.
The surface craft and the airplanes which Japan had lost were irreplaceable by Japan alone. The number of Japanese seacraft sunk by the United States and airplanes destroyed had greatly increased Japan’s demands upon Germany. He was positive in his conclusion that Japan would be unable to sustain herself in the war without the aid of Germany.
All of this led him to agree completely with you that the defeat of Japan would be a logical consequence of the defeat of Germany.
At this point Stalin stopped me to ask if he had made clear his position on all the questions I had presented. I told him he had, but he had not yet given me a clear statement of Russia’s strategy in Russia and that I would like to know, for instance, what Russia now had between her enemy and her oil, how much matériel Russia would require before she could take the offensive, and where, how, and when she contemplated the offensive. Here I expected to be thrown out of the Kremlin.
He replied that heretofore he had steadfastly declined to permit any but Russians to have the opportunity of seeing and understanding Russia’s manner of contact with the enemy and her present and future strategy. Much to my surprise he then said it would take about 3 days for him to make arrangements for proper officers to consult with me on strategy, and a personal reconnaissance trip by me to the vital fighting areas.
Stalin’s attitude was uniformly good-natured, his expressions were always clear, direct and concise. His attitude toward you and the United States was always friendly and respectful. [Hurley.]