Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume III

032 Willkie, Wendell/61½

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs

[Washington,] August 22, 1942.

Participants:

Mr. Wendell Willkie; Mr. Joseph Barnes, Chief of the Foreign Broadcasting Section of the Office of War Information; Mr. Gardner Cowles, Office of War Information; Mr. Hornbeck;34 Mr. Murray;35 Mr. Ailing;36 Mr. Hamilton;37 Mr. Atherton; Col. Ivan D. Yeaton, G–2, Eastern European Section, War Dep[artmen]t; Mr. Durbrow; and Mr. Bernhardt.38

After Mr. Willkie had discussed questions relative to the Near Eastern area with Mr. Murray and Mr. Ailing he asked Mr. Atherton to assist him in obtaining background and perspective regarding the Soviet Union. Mr. Willkie stated that he hoped that Mr. Atherton could approach the subject from the point of view of what he thought it would be best to tell a person with an ordinary layman’s knowledge of the Soviet Union in order to have proper perspective and background before going to that country.

Mr. Atherton replied that Colonel Yeaton and Mr. Bernhardt had recently returned from the Soviet Union and would be pleased to answer any questions. He added, however, that it might be useful before Mr. Willkie asked any questions to read to him a strictly confidential memorandum drawn up in the Department of State last autumn³⁹ for the purpose of outlining, for the strict guidance of the Department, the policy of the United States Government vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Mr. Atherton stated that although this memorandum had been drawn up last year it set forth, with, certain modifications, the basic policy now adhered to by the United States Government toward the Soviet Union. Before reading the memorandum Mr. Atherton suggested that because of its strictly confidential nature that it might be advisable not to take notes thereon.

Mr. Atherton then read, with certain modifications, the text of the Department’s telegram no. 5682 of December 5, 5 [6] p.m., 1941⁴⁰ to the American Embassy at London which was sent to the Ambassador to be read to Mr. Eden in order that he might have, prior to his proposed trip to Moscow, an expression of the policy of the United States Government regarding the Soviet Union. The slight revisions made by Mr. Atherton emphasized more particularly than in the original the role of the Atlantic Charter as the cornerstone of American policy and simplified paragraph 4 by stating the present Unwillingness of the United States Government to enter into commitments at this time regarding specific terms of the post war settlement.

Mr. Willkie then asked Mr. Reinhardt to give him such background information as he felt a person in his position should have when going to the Soviet Union. Mr. Reinhardt stated that he thought it was important to bear in mind the fact that it is often difficult to discuss matters with Soviet officials, who are, in general, not as amenable to an open and frank exchange of views as are officials of many other governments. At the same time they are realistic in the extreme in all matters involving Soviet foreign relations. For the past year the Soviets had received repeated assurances of our intentions to do everything possible to aid them in their struggle against Nazi aggression and although they had of course received substantial evidence of our sincerity in the form of the supplies and materials of war which had reached the Soviet Union, nevertheless, it would make a great difference in the impression made in the Soviet Union whether or not Mr. Willkie went to Moscow with something concrete for the Russians. Mr. Reinhardt said he feared that otherwise Mr. Willkie might not find the desired openness and frankness on the part of Soviet officials.

Mr. Willkie asked that this opinion, that it was important to take something “concrete” to the Soviet Union, be brought to the Secretary’s attention.

Mr. Atherton further emphasized the point by Mr. Reinhardt as to the very realistic attitude taken by Soviet officials regarding the present situation of their country and their dealings with the outside world. In stressing this point he remarked that officials who had talked with Mr. Molotov during his visit to Washington had been impressed with his frank and realistic approach to all problems. Mr. Atherton added that since very few Soviet officials had a full and complete picture and understanding of the various problems between the Soviet Union and the United States, and other United Nations, Mr. Willkie, in order to fully appreciate their attitude, should bear this in mind when talking to Soviet officials. Mr. Atherton further stated that he felt that Mr. Molotov, for instance, after discussing various problems in Washington had gone back to the Soviet Union with a fuller appreciation of the difficulties to be overcome before a complete and satisfactory solution of all problems confronting the two countries could be reached.

These remarks led to a general discussion of the reasons why it was difficult for Soviet officials and the Soviet people in general to have an appreciation of the outside world in as much as for over 25 years they have been almost completely isolated from any contact with other countries, and have been led by intensive propaganda to reach a warped picture of the situation outside the Soviet Union, which facts prevent them from having in their possession a mental yardstick on which to base their judgment.

In connection with Mr. Willkie’s proposed trip Mr. Atherton remarked that he felt that since Mr. Willkie represented the “opposition” party in the United States his trip would undoubtedly impress the Soviet officials with the fact that American opinion is united in its desire to assist Russia in its struggle in every practical way.

When Mr. Willkie asked Colonel Yeaton for any background information on the Soviet Union the Colonel replied that he naturally was not qualified to speak on political matters but made the following suggestion relative to the technicalities of the flight into the Soviet Union. He stated that he felt that the arrangements would work more smoothly if Mr. Willkie and his party put themselves entirely at the complete disposal of the Soviet Government as to the route to be followed from Tehran on. Colonel Yeaton stated that he had recently been able to assist General Bradley in connection with his flight and had learned that the Soviet authorities preferred to have foreign planes entering the country put in charge of Soviet pilots at Tehran who would either fly the ship in on a route chosen by them or act as navigators for the regular pilot of the plane. If such a proposal were made to the Soviet authorities, indicating that Mr. Willkie and his party were at the complete disposal of the Soviet military authorities as to their route, there should be a minimum of difficulty and delay in continuing the flight from Tehran to Moscow. It was agreed that the State Department would undertake to follow up this matter.

Colonel Yeaton when asked for any personal remarks which he might care to make stated that speaking purely from a personal point of view and giving his own personal reaction, he could not help but feel that when the Harriman Mission was in Moscow and subsequent to that time there was a feeling of suspicion on the part of the Soviet Government as regards to the real intentions of the United States and other of the United Nations to come to the assistance of the Soviet Union. He added that he had gained the impression that Soviet officials felt that the majority of American officials and at least a good part of the public desired primarily to have the Soviet and German regimes consumed in a death struggle and that, therefore, our proffered aid was not completely sincere.

In this connection, it was explained to Mr. Willkie why, in view of the anti-Capitalist propaganda for the last 25 years it was natural that these suspicions should obtain and why it would be difficult to hope for, expect, or bring about any sudden change in this suspicious attitude. In reply to Mr. Willkie’s question as to whether these suspicions are based partly on the fact of unfulfilled promises Colonel Yeaton replied in the negative. Colonel Yeaton added by way of personal advice that it had been his observation that Soviet officials showed greater respect for persons who were and admitted they were capitalists rather than for those who professed to be Soviet sympathizers.

Mr. Joseph Barnes of the Office of War Information and former Foreign Editor of the Herald Tribune as well as the Herald Tribune correspondent in Moscow from 1936 to 1939, who is accompanying Mr. Willkie to Moscow, stated that he would call at the Department on August 24 to obtain copies of any memoranda which it was felt might be given to Mr. Willkie as further background for his trip to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Barnes was informed that a memorandum had been prepared (copy attached)⁴¹ giving an outline of the public statements made by American officials on United States policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and also a second memorandum (copy attached)⁴¹ was in the process of preparation indicating, in a general way, the various routes by which aid can be sent to the Soviet Union. He was informed that these would be turned over to him on Monday.⁴²

34. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Relations.
35. Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations.
36. Paul H. Ailing, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
37. Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
38. G. Frederick Reinhardt, of the Division of European Affairs; Vice Consul and Third Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union until April 20, 1942.
39. Not found in Department files.
40. Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 194.
41. Not attached to file copy of this document.
41. Not attached to file copy of this document.
42. August 24.