Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of the President, to President Roosevelt 15
The Prime Minister had an extended meeting with Stalin last night. Molotov, Voroshilov,16 British Ambassador and myself were present. [Page 619] The discussion centered on British and American military strategic plans for 1942 and 1943 and their effect on the Russian front.
Under all the circumstances I believe the discussion could not have been developed better nor the conclusion more satisfactory. The Prime Minister explained in full detail the various possibilities of Sledgehammer17 and the reasons for its postponement. He told of the plans and strength of Roundup.18
Stalin took issue at every point with bluntness almost to the point of insult with such remarks as you can’t win wars if you aren’t willing to take risks and you mustn’t be so afraid of the Germans. This phase of the discussion ended by stating abruptly but with dignity that he could not force action but he did not agree with the arguments. He expressed the opinion too that grave difficulties confronted Round-up and showed little interest in it. So far there had been no agreement on any point and the atmosphere was tense.
The Prime Minister then described the bombing activity over Germany and his hopes for substantial increase with American participation. Here came the first agreement between the two men. Stalin took over the argument himself and said that homes as well as factories should be destroyed. The Prime Minister agreed that civil morale was a military objective but the bombing of workmen’s houses came as the by-product of near misses on factories. The tension began to ease and a certain understanding of common purpose began to grow. Between the two of them they soon destroyed most of the important industrial cities of Germany.
The Prime Minister with great adroitness took the occasion of the more friendly interchange to bring the discussion back to the second front. He explained the decision regarding Torch19 and its tactics emphasizing the need for secrecy. This gave an opportunity, which the Prime Minister seized, to relieve further the tension by saying he wished he had the power over the press which Stalin explained he exercised. Stalin however expressed considerable concern over the political repercussions from the operation and opinions regarding the political situation in the various countries affected were exchanged.
About this time the Prime Minister drew a picture of a crocodile and pointed out that it was as well to strike the belly as the snout. The plans for the offensive in Egypt were described as well as the battle for Malta with details of the present naval engagement all of which interested Stalin greatly.
[Page 620]At this point the Prime Minister brought the discussion back to the Russian front stating that you and he were exploring the possibility of sending an air force to the South Russia front but only after Rommel20 was defeated. He asked how such a suggestion if it were found possible would be received by Stalin. Stalin’s answer was brief and simple “I would gratefully accept it.”
The conversation then came back to Torch and Stalin summed up its strategic advantages with masterful grasp of its implications. He showed real enthusiasm for the operation but he specifically asks that the political angle be handled with the greatest delicacy and that it be started at the very earliest moment even earlier than you have in mind.
The meeting broke up early after some four hours and in spite of the early difficulties the relationship between the two men had reached a most friendly basis.
I came away with the conviction that although Stalin has been much disappointed in our inability to be of greater military assistance to him and although he was critical of us particularly the British he gave me the feeling throughout the evening that he considered he was dealing with two nations with whom he had binding ties and that with you and the Prime Minister he could personally interchange views in the frankest of manner without fear of breaking the personal relationship. At no time did he show any indication to me that action or lack of action on either of our parts might fundamentally affect this understanding.
The Prime Minister was at his best and could not have handled the discussion with greater brilliance.
On several occasions the Prime Minister turned to me for collaboration [corroboration?] and I believe he would tell you that my presence was of value to him and justified your sending me.
One of our planes carrying the British military staff had to turn back to Teheran and therefore they will not arrive until tonight. This will probably extend our stay a day or two longer than was expected.
I expect further discussions on the military situation here which Stalin indicated was extremely difficult. He had not realized he told us that the Germans could assemble the strength they had thrown at him.
- Copy obtained from the Franklin P. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. This telegram was sent through the Naval Attaché in Moscow in six sections between August 13, 6 p.m., and August 14, 2:10 a.m., and was all received in Washington by 12:19 p.m., August 14. The descriptions of all meetings with Stalin, based upon the telegrams sent by Prime Minister Churchill to the British War Cabinet and to President Roosevelt, are printed in Churchill, The Second World War, vol. iv: The Hinge of Fate (Boston, 1950), pp. 476–502 passim.↩
- Marshal Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Vice President of the Council of People’s Commissars, and member of the State Committee of Defense.↩
- Code name for a limited assault in 1942 in western Europe, as on Brest or Cherbourg.↩
- Code name for a major American and British invasion of western Europe against the German armies planned for 1943.↩
- Final code name for the Allied invasion of French North Africa in November 1942.↩
- Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commander of the German and Italian forces in northern Africa.↩