740.0011 European War 1939/23048: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
Kuibyshev (Moscow), July 22, 1942—7 p.m.
[Received July 23—6:15 p.m.]
[Received July 23—6:15 p.m.]
629. Personal for the Secretary. Your 351, July 17, 6 p.m.98
- 1.
- Molotov made no such remarks to me as he is reported to have made to Clark Kerr in the latter’s report to Eden. While it is, of course, quite possible that Molotov may have expressed himself “subjectively” to Clark Kerr at the luncheon on June 26 in the manner reported, I did not hear any such remarks.
- 2.
- In my telegram No. 201, June 22, 7 p.m., from Moscow, I endeavored to make clear the attitude with respect to a second front in Europe in 1942 which has been assumed by Molotov in our conversations. As was pointed out in that telegram and also in others (see in this connection Nos. 529, June 15, 2 p.m.,99 548, June 19, 5 p.m., and 551, June 20, noon),1 the confidence of the Soviet people in the early establishment of a second front, as well as their growing impatience at its failure to materialize, has been strongly reflected in the Soviet press, [and] has been a principal feature in such conversations as members of my staff have had with Soviet citizens in recent weeks.
- 3.
- I am prepared to believe, however, that both Molotov and Stalin are fully cognizant of the difficulties attendant upon the opening of a second front and of the specific reservations which the summary of Eden’s letter to Winant indicates were attached to the forecast of future possibilities. You will recall that as I reported at the time Stalin remarked in my conversation with him on July 2nd that wanting a second front and having one were two different things. The possibility [Page 613] should also not be excluded that although the limitations in regard to the establishment of a second front were clearly understood by the Soviet Government it nonetheless decided that it would be sound strategy to endeavor to create the impression at home and abroad that such a front would actually materialize in Europe in 1942. It may have reasoned further that should the second front not materialize it would thus find itself in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis England and the United States in any future political negotiations having to do with post-war problems and frontiers. Although Molotov has never given me any indications that this was the case I think it must be borne in mind.
- 4.
- I have been handicapped in my conversations with Stalin and Molotov and in my interpretation of their attitudes and policies by the fact that I have never been fully informed of what took place or of what commitments may have been made to Molotov while he was in London and Washington; There is no doubt, however, that popular, belief in the establishment of a second front in Europe in 1942 has been fostered by the joint communiqués then issued and by other public statements, irrespective of the intent behind them.
- 5.
- The British Ambassador called on me day before yesterday and informed me in general terms of his conversation with Molotov on July 4. What he said was in close agreement with the summary contained in the Department’s reference telegram. In response to my inquiry he stated that insofar as he was aware no steps had been taken by Molotov to correct any misunderstanding that may exist in regard to this matter.
- 6.
- I feel that I should recall to the notice of the Department at this time the fact that all the negotiations leading up to Molotov’s visit to London (in this respect see my telegram No. 374, May 8, 5 p.m.,2 and other related messages) were based on the firmly expressed intention of the Soviet Government to obtain recognition by Great Britain of the Soviet frontiers of 1941. The fact that Molotov returned from London with a treaty which ostensibly disregarded this formerly believed vital and almost sole demand of the Soviet Government obviously lends itself to the interpretation that in return for its reliquishment some other equally desirable objective was obtained. In the light of the communiqués issued and in the absence of information to the contrary the assumption was logical that this objective was the establishment of a second front in 1942.
- 7.
- If there is little possibility of the opening of the second front this year I believe that any public disavowal in that sense would be extremely unwise, having in mind the inevitable and potentially far-reaching repercussions of such a course now, not only in the Soviet [Page 614] Union but also elsewhere. Should it be desired to correct any false impression which may have been created I consider that this should only be done directly and privately to Molotov or Stalin.
Standley