711.61/853
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
I called on the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov, to pay my respects. I remarked that, while I did not come on any other business, I hoped I might be privileged to say that when I came to the State Department in 1933, I recommended recognition of the Soviet Government49 on several important grounds, probably the most important of which was the great need and opportunity for cooperation between our two Governments during the years ahead for the purpose of promoting and preserving conditions of peace in the world. I added that further grounds for recognition were the traditional friendship between the peoples of the two countries and the fact that it was contrary to the best interests of two great nations, such as the Soviets and ourselves, not to be on speaking terms diplomatically in view of the existing circumstances in the international situation. I said I mentioned this because this same need for cooperation in reorganizing and reconstituting international affairs on solid principles and sound policies calculated best to promote the welfare of our two countries, and at the same time the world, is very much on my mind today as I know it is on the mind of the President.
Mr. Molotov seemed pleased with this statement and expressed not only his interest in showing, but also his desire to show me a spirit of cooperation on the part of his Government.
[Page 586]The Commissar then inquired if I desired to take up further any of the small points which the President had taken up with him. I replied that it was intended that I should be present when these matters were considered, but through a misunderstanding I was absent and that it was my impression that they had been disposed of in one way or another by the President and the Commissar.
I then added that I did desire further to emphasize the extreme importance to both countries of a commercial and probably other air lines between Alaska and Siberia. I repeated several of the basic facts in support of this view and we reexamined the map which I had sent to him and his associates yesterday. The Commissar said the matter was deserving of most serious consideration and they would give it such consideration. I will not repeat the numerous points that were brought out in support of the proposed air line.
I then said that with no purpose to make any request of the Soviet Government, but only with the idea that his Government would be interested in what I was about to say, my despatches from Chungking during the past twenty-four hours were very disquieting. These reports indicated that Chiang Kai-shek, believing that he is not receiving anything like adequate consideration and cooperation, especially from the United States, is very much discouraged and in very low spirits. I stated that this Government has used every possible means, particularly by sending important persons to China, to reassure the Generalissimo that this Government is as much interested in the success of China in the war as in the success of other allied nations. Furthermore, we had constantly renewed our promise to send increased military supplies to China. On account of the Burma Road situation and the demands on the western front, however, we have not been able to furnish China with the supplies she has requested and insisted upon.50
Mr. Molotov talked briefly about the extreme preoccupation of Russia on the western battle front, et cetera, et cetera. I replied that it was not necessary for him to say that to me because I fully appreciated the situation and for that reason I made no request of the Soviet Government. I added that although this Government had exhausted all possible means of verbal assurances in its effort to keep Chiang Kai-shek from a state of dejection, I did not know but what the Soviet Government might still have some standing with Chiang Kai-shek and could extend its own verbal assurances to the Chinese Government even though the Soviets would be in no position to aid in any other way. I said that in any event this Government will do the best possible in the face of the fact that the principal reason that [Page 587] Chiang Kai-shek censured this Government arose from our efforts to come to the aid of Soviet Russia and Great Britain on the western front.
I remarked to Mr. Molotov that on yesterday I received in my office the highly trusted person who procured for me in January 1941 the information that Hitler would attack Russia in May or June,51 and then in an amused tone I said that when we have won the war, and he and I and others are sitting around the family table planning for world restoration on sound and healthy lines, I might then presume to inquire just when the Soviet Government decided that Hitler would attack later as he did, and Mr. Molotov came right back by saying that this decision was made in April or May, and added that, of course, most of the Russian people did not believe it until after the war was actually on.
Mr. Molotov then brought up the question of the form of the proposed communiqué for President Roosevelt and himself to give out when the latter returns to Moscow. He said that the draft submitted was in general all right but that he desired to offers few additions, and would be glad if I would express my opinion of them. He then said; that he would like to insert in the communiqué that there was a full and free discussion in regard to increased supplies to Russia, which was agreed to, and also in regard to the establishment of a second front, which also was agreed to. He further desired to insert that Admiral King and General Marshall, together with Mr. Hairy Hopkins and myself, were present. I replied that it was the President’s desire to have as few people present as possible for the sake of the fullest and freest conference and that, therefore, neither I nor the Secretaries of War and Navy52 were present when the military experts were discussing the purely military situation. For this reason I would not desire to say that I was present even a part of the time. Mr. Molotov understood this and did not press his request. I then added that, of course, the President was the only person who could answer his inquiry about reference to an agreement on the second front and that I had not had occasion to confer with the President since his conversation with Ambassador Litvinov and the military and naval experts. These were the main points suggested by Mr. Molotov.
He inquired if he might reduce a draft to writing and send it to me during the day for transmission to the Presided. I, of course, replied that I would submit any suggestions he desired to make to the President.
- Recognition by the United States of the Soviet Union was accorded on November 16, 1933; see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 1 ff.↩
- The Japanese invasion of Burma, and advance along the Burma Road, had reached the Chinese frontier by May 5, 1942. For correspondence regarding the wartime relations and United States efforts to give military, assistance to China, see Foreign Relations, 1942, China, pp. 1 ff.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 772, footnote 98.↩
- Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, respectively.↩