741.6111/33: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 25—7 a.m.]
2897. To the President and the Secretary. The British-Russian negotiations have continued almost without respite since my message to you announcing Molotov’s arrival. There were three major points: of difference which at first appeared to block possible agreement.
[Page 559]- 1.
- There was a reference to Poland which Eden refused to accept because it ran counter to the British understanding with the Poles. (Agreement signed August 25, 1939).13
- 2.
- The complete rejection by the Russians of the clause suggested by us to the British to protect the inhabitants of the Baltic States in their persons and in their property and permitting migration.
- 3.
- The Russians wanted a secret agreement with the British in which the latter were to promise to support claims relating to the Finnish and Rumanian frontiers.
Up to noon yesterday both parties to the negotiations had apparently come to the conclusion that agreement was improbable. The Russians had explained that even if a treaty was not arrived at, good had come of the negotiations, and Eden had suggested a substitute treaty which made no reference to frontiers. Late yesterday afternoon, however, the Russians began to recede from their original position, and Eden called me at 6 o’clock tonight to say that the negotiations had gone so far that he would have a proposal to make to the Cabinet tomorrow afternoon. He went on to say that:
- (1)
- The Russians had withdrawn their demands affecting Poland.
- (2)
- They had compromised on the protective clause but only to the extent of allowing minorities to withdraw, i. e., Poles from Lithuania. This, Eden acknowledged, did not help much.
- (3)
- The idea of a secret agreement was abandoned but they asked that a clause be inserted in which the British would recognize that Russia had special interests in Finland and Rumania. Eden told me that he still hoped that this reference might be eliminated.
From the beginning Molotov has been interested in two things: First, a second front, and second, the treaty proposals. I understand that the British have told him that we (United States and Great Britain) stand together on the second front issue. I was also told that both the Prime Minister and Eden did their utmost to make Molotov understand our opposition to the Russian frontier proposals.
I was to meet with the Russians on Friday14 but it could not be arranged. Eden then asked them to have lunch with him yesterday, explaining that he was inviting me. They in turn asked him to have lunch with them at their Embassy in London. He said that he would be delighted to, and that he would bring me. The Saturday morning meeting, however, ran until late with many differences of opinion, so the Russians asked to postpone their luncheon until Tuesday. I lunched alone with Eden at the Foreign Office. Maisky had previously told me that he wanted to arrange a meeting for me with Molotov, so I called him on the telephone. He called me back at 6 o’clock tonight (Sunday), inviting me to go to the Russian Embassy tomorrow [Page 560] at 4 o’clock, I called him back and told him that I thought it was unnecessary [necessary] that we meet sooner than that, and he made an appointment for me at 10 o’clock tonight at his Embassy. Both Molotov and he were most courteous and cordial. I explained to them that we were trying to cooperate with them, that we were both interested in a second front, and that within the last week the Department had informed me that we were arranging to discuss commercial policy with them (Department’s 2152, May 14, 7 p.m.15) and that we were trying to work out a program in the relief field that went a considerable distance toward meeting the suggestions in Maisky’s memorandum to me on that subject, but that both you and Mr. Hull were set against introducing frontier problems at this time and that that was true of other friends who were doing all that could be done to support our common war effort. I also told them very frankly that I did the best I could to present the Russian point of view to you and to Mr. Hull, but that you were both definitely opposed to a British-Russian treaty containing agreements on frontiers. They listened with great attention and Molotov told me that the President’s position on this question was a matter for their serious consideration. He then asked me if I had seen Eden’s draft treaty which eliminated any reference to frontiers. I told him that I had, because I had worked with Eden in an effort to find the formula for a treaty that might be satisfactory to them and at the same time eliminate any reference to frontiers which was opposed by my country. He told me that he would reconsider the draft treaty and perhaps refrain from making any decision until after he had talked with the President. This was a definite concession, as Molotov had intended to return directly to Moscow from Washington and up to this point they had shown no interest in the draft treaty. I had just gotten back to our Embassy when I got a call from Eden, saying that Molotov had called him in the interim asking for an appointment tomorrow morning to discuss the draft treaty. I am attaching a copy of this treaty to my message.
The Russians are deeply interested in establishing a second front. They feel that both the Prime Minister and Eden have great sympathy for their point of view, but that Brooke16 is reluctant to move and that they could get no definite commitments on action this year. I have felt myself that there has been less support for action than when I returned here. Maisky asked me if I would suggest a date when such a front might be established. I told him that I had no authority to speak on the subject and that I could not even discuss it with him, that it was a question that Molotov would have to take up when he reached Washington. They plainly do not want to make any [Page 561] commitment on the Japanese situation and Molotov told me that in speaking of a second front he was speaking of a Western Front. They feel that they are carrying their maximum load on the Eastern Front.
Maisky told me that he is very grateful for our promise to do everything in our power to keep Molotov’s visit secret until his return tomorrow [to Moscow] (Department’s 2297, May 22, 3 p.m.).17
The draft treaty follows:
“secret.
Draft Treaty
His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R.;
Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the Agreement between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. S. R. for joint action in the war against Germany, signed at Moscow on the 12th July, 1941 and to replace them by a formal treaty;
Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and to the prevention of further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in her acts of aggression in Europe;
Desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Declaration made on the 14th August, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to which the Government of the U. S. S. R. has adhered;
Desiring, finally, to provide for mutual assistance in the event of an attack upon either High Contracting Party by Germany or an [any] of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe,
Have decided to conclude a Treaty for that purpose and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries—
His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R.;
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—
part one
Article I. In virtue of the Alliance established between them the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.
Article II. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive [Page 562] intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.
part two
Article III. (1) The High Contacting Parties declare their desire to associate themselves with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression.
(2) Pending the adoption of such proposals, they will take all the measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.
Article IV. Should one of the High Contracting Parties become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III (2) in consequence of an attack: by that State against that Party, the other High Contracting Party will at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance in his power.
This Article shall remain in force until superseded by the adoption of the proposals contemplated in Article III (1). In default of the adoption of such proposals, it shall remain in force for a period of (20) years, and thereafter until terminated by either High Contracting Party, as provided in Article III [VIII].
Article V. The High Contracting Parties agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the reestablishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects, and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other peoples.
Article VI. The High Contracting Parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the War.
Article VII. Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.
Article VIII. The Present Treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in as soon as possible.
It comes into force immediately on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the Agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, signed at Moscow on the 12th July, 1941.
Part I of the present Treaty shall remain in force until the reestablishment of peace between the High Contracting Parties and Germany and the Powers associated with her acts of aggression in Europe.
Part II of the present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of 20 years. Thereafter unless 12 months’ notice has been given by either party to terminate the Treaty at the end of the said period of 20 years, it shall continue in force until 12 months after either High Contracting Party shall, have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.
In Witness Whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.
[Page 563]Done in Duplicate in . . . . . . . on the . . . . . day of . . . . . 1942, in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.”