740.0011 European War 1939/21211½: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Standley ) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 25—12:05 p.m.]
126. For the President and the Secretary. I was received by Stalin yesterday in Kremlin. Molotov was present. I informed Stalin that I brought him a special message of greetings from the President; that the President wishes me to express to him his admiration of the magnificent courage, fortitude and bravery shown by the Red Army and the Russian people in meeting and turning back the German attack. I stated that although misunderstandings had at times arisen between the United States and the Soviet Union, the President felt sure that if he and Stalin could sit down together and talk matters over there would never be any lack of understanding. To this end I stated that the President wished me to suggest that he and Stalin meet somewhere in Alaskan or Siberian waters sometime this summer to discuss the whole problem of world affairs. Stalin expressed gratitude to the President for his greetings and stated that the question of the meeting had been the subject of “messages” and that he still had hopes that it could be brought about.
I stated that the President regretted the delays which had occurred in the delivery of supplies to Russia and hoped and believed that the United States could be up to schedule by the end of April; that the President was determined and had so ordered that the highest priority be given to the delivery of such supplies and that any obstacles to the flow thereof must be removed.85 I added that it would be my purpose as Ambassador not only to foster the traditional friendly relations existing between our two countries but also to further in every way possible the policy of the President as expressed [Page 546] above. Stalin stated that he too would help in every way to eliminate such obstacles.
I continued that I would like to discuss certain difficulties which I thought could be removed and brought up the question of communications, mentioned specifically the Ferry Command Service from the United States to Basra. I stated that if there were a shuttle line connecting Moscow or Kuibyshev with Basra, communications would be vastly improved and many small spare parts might be sent to Russia via this route. As an example I pointed out the delay in obtaining spare parts and replacements for the 35 bombers held up several weeks at Basra and the time it takes to transmit specifications and books of instructions necessary to production and maintenance. I also referred to the Alaskan-Siberian route and stated that there was no reason why both routes should not be used. Stalin thereupon inquired whether we had investigated the practicability of an air line from Canada to Archangel via Greenland and Iceland. He said that this line would be much shorter and more practicable than the Basra line, that the Alaskan-Siberian route was not only much longer but also impracticable because of weather conditions. I replied that I felt sure that we had investigated the North Atlantic route and that if it had been rejected it must have been due to weather conditions, whereas the African route could be used the year round. I also referred to the delivery of military planes via Alaska, stated that adequate air installations existed up to Nome and added that if air fields were made available in Siberia bombers could be delivered to the German front ready for action and fighters could be sent to the Siberian area thus relieving Soviet fighters for use in the West. I pointed out that these suggestions were only in the interest of furthering and expediting the delivery of supplies and planes to Russia. Stalin again referred to the practicability of the North Atlantic route but added that he would have the Alaskan plane delivery route and the question of through communications looked into.86 He remarked that possible Japanese objections to the Alaskan route would not be an insurmountable obstacle.
In commenting upon the delays encountered in the delivery of Soviet supplies which had been caused at times by special Soviet specifications and nomenclature and the difficulties of straightening matters out by cable, I stated that direct air communications between the two countries would greatly aid in removing these difficulties and delays. I also referred to the advisability of giving to Soviet technicians in the United States greater discretionary authority in negotiating with American agencies. Stalin replied that if these [Page 547] technicians were given greater authority only about half of the goods obtained could be usable; that American contractors at times induced Russian technicians to accept material more or less at variance with specifications and which was found upon delivery to be unsatisfactory.
I touched upon past misunderstandings and expressed the opinion that if the newly arrived Russian Purchasing Commission87 were given sufficient authority all major difficulties would be eliminated, especially in view of the President’s order giving the Soviet Union highest priority. Stalin remarked that the main obstacle in the supply question appeared to be the unwillingness of American contractors to accept Russian orders and that this condition was much better in England; He added that the second main obstacle was the lack of shipping and the fact that ships from America were not convoyed. He stated that more satisfactory flow of British supplies was principally due to the better protection of British ships. I lacked information as to these points.
I then expressed the hope that the shipment from the Soviet Union of certain raw materials urgently needed in the United States; namely, chrome, manganese, et cetera, would be increased. Stalin stated that there has been quite an increase in such shipments but that the ships carrying these materials have been sunk by the Germans.
Stalin then inquired why we had not commenced the construction of cargo submarines and stated that his experts had been instructed to take up the matter. I then asked Stalin if he had any information about the coming spring offensive which might be of interest to the President. Stalin stated that he desired to inform the President that large reinforcements were being brought up on both sides of the front, that although the Russians had ceased temporarily offensive ground operations their aviation was breaking up German concentrations and attacking their supply lines with certain success. He did not know when or where the spring attack would take place.
In reply to my request for information regarding the Far East, Stalin stated that there was apparently no effort on the part of Japan to create a crisis. He said that Japan was increasing its forces in the North and that the Russians were doing likewise. To my remark that we must not forget Port Arthur88 or Pearl Harbor, Stalin stated that the Soviet Union was not being fooled that it remembered these incidents and that it did not trust the Japanese and was ready for them. I remarked that although we had the same knowledge and mistrust, we had been surprised at Pearl Harbor.
[Page 548]Stalin then referred to the American bomber which had landed in Siberia.89 He said that the crew was safe and would be well cared for and that he regretted that it was necessary to intern them. He said that the pilot of the bomber had stated that the bombers which had participated in the air raid on Japan had taken off at a greater distance from Japan than originally planned and for this reason the plane in question had run out of gasoline and had been forced to land in Siberia. I told Stalin that I understood that the other planes had landed in China where I was sure they had orders to land and that this one must have been unable to reach Chinese territory. Stalin displayed no annoyance at the incident which was reported in the Soviet press today.
I then expressed my appreciation for the interview and stated that if I found other obstacles to the flow of Soviet supplies which I felt should be brought to his attention, I would ask for the privilege of doing so. Stalin replied that the privilege would be granted. In departing I stated that if at any time I might be of use in helping him kill Germans I wished that he would let me know. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union was killing many, many Germans at the front, that the “poor German” had received orders not to retreat an inch and that as a result they were being killed like pigs. He added regretfully that there was nothing to do but kill them.
Stalin was most cordial during the entire interview. He showed evidence of considerable strain and fatigue.
- See telegram No. 1116, March 18, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 698.↩
- In telegram No. 220, May 11 (post, p. 702), the Department urged the Ambassador to impress upon the Soviet Government at every opportunity the importance of these routes and of preparations to make use of them.↩
- See memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, March 2, 1942, p. 696.↩
- The allusion is to the surprise Japanese attack upon Port Arthur on February 8, 1904, two days before the formal declaration of the Russo-Japanese war.↩
- A two-motored American bomber which had taken part in the air raid on Japan on April 18, 1942, had been forced to land because of insufficient fuel at a Soviet air field in the Maritime kray (region). The crew of five was at first interned at Khabarovsk.↩