740.0011 European War 1939/20035: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 5—9:17 p.m.]
1058. I inquired this morning of Sir Alexander Gadogan50 whether there had been any developments since the Ambassador’s departure with respect to Russian post-war territorial ambitions (Ambassador’s telegram No. 805, February 20, 4 p.m.51). He replied in the negative but indicated that Russian insistence on some early reply is continuing although it has not in his opinion reached “the danger point”. He was eager to learn in this connection how soon the Ambassador will arrive in Washington. The British reply, he reiterated, would of course be contingent upon the views of our Government.
He said that he was somewhat puzzled as to the motive behind the presentation of the Russian territorial ambitions at this time since presumably if they are victorious, they will be able to seize the Baltic States of their own accord “and certainly the British would never go to war to take that region away from them”.
Hence why should they press their claims now “unless possibly Stalin is in search of a grievance”, i. e., rejection of these claims. I [Page 528] said that it seemed to me if the latter were the case the Russian demands would have been far more extensive than they are, to which he agreed. He feels he said that the Russians can build quite a strong case for incorporation of the Baltic State territories within the Soviet Union: Stalin can assert “that he is merely taking back what Hitler stole”, that the territories were acquired by “plebiscite”—and Cadogan added that it is “a little delicate to question the procedure of plebiscite held by one’s ally” and further that the territories were Russian under the Czarist regime to which the British were allied in the last war. He likewise seems acutely conscious of the dangers of freezing Stalin’s existing suspicions with regard to British intentions with a possibly resultant modification of his attitude toward the prosecution of the war.
Whether the recognition of Russian territorial claims at this time is unpalatable and whether it opens up a vista of future complications, failure, he feels, to accept such risks now may produce the one development which might render unattainable the objectives for which we are fighting, namely, some separate peace (or at least a truce) by Russia. Thus by making a concession now which is quite defendable, we may be insuring ourselves against the loss of vastly more important war aims.
I inquired as to how in his opinion, acceptance of the Russian claims would be received in Great Britain. He replied that soundings in the House of Commons indicated that sentiment there would be largely favorable and that certainly in the country’s present enthusiastically pro-Russia mood acceptance would be welcomed by the public at large. There would, of course, be some questions raised in the House and presumably a few letters to the Times but that would necessarily be the case in any solution.52
He said that there is anxiety in some quarters as to the proper interpretation to be put upon Stalin’s famous order of the day of February 23.53 There is a tendency to treat his references to the German people and the distinction between them and the “Hitler clique” as something of a veiled warning intended for the British and ourselves that unless some prompt and favorable reply to Russia’s post-war territorial claims is soon forthcoming Stalin’s enthusiasm for his British and American allies may cool considerably, with all that this would imply. Cadogan is not inclined, however, he said, to concur with this reading into the order of the day.
- British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Not printed.↩
- In a memorandum of March 6 (ante, p. 114) Acting Secretary of State Welles recorded the anxiety of the Polish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Edward Raczynski, and of the Polish Ambassador in the United States, Jan Ciechanowski, at the possibility that Great Britain would conclude a treaty recognizing the frontiers of the Soviet Union as they had come to be in 1941.↩
- See telegram No. 163, February 24, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 416.↩