Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume III

Aide-Mémoire by the British Foreign Office⁴⁵

Aide Mémoire

Lord Halifax has told us that the President, after full consideration of the suggestions which His Majesty’s Government have put forward for dealing with M. Stalin’s demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers in Finland, the Baltic States and Roumania, as a condition for signing an agreement for co-operation with us in post-war problems, did not feel able to approve either the acceptance of these demands or the two alternative proposals submitted to him. We understand that the President felt that both of these alternative proposals were difficult to reconcile with the Atlantic Charter and that it was premature to attempt detailed treatment of the problem.

2. Lord Halifax has also told us that the President feels confident of being able to reach agreement direct with M. Stalin and proposes to set about doing so, through M. Litvinov in the first instance, supporting his action later through Admiral Standley. We understand that the line the President might propose to take is that he entirely recognises the justice of M. Stalin’s claim for security and that this can be met in a variety of ways in regard to which it is difficult for the moment to take a final decision.

3. As Lord Halifax stated to Mr. Sumner Welles, when the latter informed him of the President’s attitude, His Majesty’s Government would naturally feel nothing but satisfaction if the President could in fact reach agreement with M. Stalin. At the same time His Majesty’s Government feel that they should, in the light of their own experiences in the Moscow talks and elsewhere, put before the United States Government their own view of the problem and some suggestions as to how it might be handled. Admittedly no easy solution is at hand.

4. It is true enough that one of the chief aims of Soviet policy has been and no doubt still is to obtain the maximum guarantees of Russia’s “security” so that the Soviet Government can work out their own social and economic experiment without danger of foreign intervention or war. But this is by no means the chief motive which lies behind M. Stalin’s present demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers. We cannot therefore help feeling that the President is unduly optimistic in supposing that some other form of security in lieu of the reoccupation of the Baltic States will prove acceptable to M. Stalin. Since M. Stalin has decided that the Soviet Union’s security requires that the Baltic States should be in the Union, he will not be willing to discuss the rights and wrongs of this decision.

5. M. Stalin’s view undoubtedly is that having taken this decision, he is merely asking us to assist him to recover these territories at the Peace Settlement, if the need arises—ancient Russian territories which had been regained by the Soviet Union before Hitler’s attack on Russia. As for the Atlantic Charter, he would argue that the frontier which he wishes us to recognise in Finland was one that was settled in due form by a treaty between the Soviet and Finnish Governments, that tha Baltic States voted for inclusion in the Soviet Union by means of plebiscites, thus fulfilling the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were handed back to Russia by Eoumania in accordance with the provisions of a treaty concluded between the Soviet and Roumanian Governments.⁴⁶ Moreover, M. Stalin signed the Atlantic Charter on the assumption that it only became effective for the Soviet Union on the basis of the frontiers of 1941.

6. It is true that we have suggested two alternative proposals to the President based on Russia’s security needs, but we doubt whether they would satisfy M. Stalin even if they could be shown to have the support of the United States of America and were accepted as a contribution towards sincere co-operation between our three countries at the peacemaking and after the war. But these alternative proposals contained concrete offers, whereas the President would appear to be of the opinion that it is premature to attempt a detailed treatment of the problem.

7. As to the procedure which should now be followed, clearly it would be to the common advantage if conversations between President Roosevelt and M. Stalin were to result in agreement being reached between all three powers. The way would then be open for us to sign a treaty with M. Stalin. We think, however, that we should put to President Roosevelt some of the difficulties which we see in this procedure. As it is with His Majesty’s Government and not with the United States Government that M. Stalin wishes to conclude a treaty and as it is from His Majesty’s Government that he wishes to obtain recognition of his territorial claim, it would seem inappropriate to him that we should not be a party to these exchanges. We fear that if the President were to argue this matter alone with M. Stalin, the latter might suspect that we had agreed to this procedure in order that the United States Government might bring pressure to bear upon him, and he might resent it accordingly. Moreover, as we have not ourselves expressed any opinion to M. Stalin on this subject since the Moscow meeting, if he were now to learn the result of our exchanges of views with the United States Government through the President and not through us he might misinterpret this procedure as indicating that His Majesty’s Government had disinterested themselves in this European problem.

8. An alternative method has therefore occurred to us, and we should like to suggest it to President Roosevelt. M. Stalin, by putting forward his condition, has touched upon an issue which is of equal interest to the United States and ourselves, and therefore it would seem that all three Powers should get together to discuss this difficulty. The virtue in this procedure is that such consultation would not only help to overcome this particular difficulty, but might lead in the future to close co-operation, both for the conduct of the war and in the period after the war, between the three principal Powers. We believe that such a prospect, would be welcomed by M. Stalin. If the President would consider the proposal favourably, we should therefore like to propose that tripartite conversations should ensue in London on Mr. Winant’s return.⁴⁷

[ London ,] 25 February, 1942.

45. Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. There is no information available to indicate when this aide-mémoire was received at the Department of State or by President Roosevelt.
46. For correspondence regarding the Soviet ultimatum to Rumania of June 26, 1940, leading to the taking by the Soviet Union of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, pp. 479–490, passim.
47. Ambassador Winant was temporarily in the United States on leave.