Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume III

741.6111/51/7

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[Washington,] February 18, 1942.

The British Ambassador³⁴ called to see me today. The Ambassador told me that he had come particularly to discuss recent negotiations between the British and Soviet Governments. He said that he had touched upon some of the high spots of this question with the President yesterday and that the President had suggested that he confer with me and subsequently the President would have a small meeting composed of the Ambassador and myself and Admiral Standley before the latter left for Moscow.³⁵

The Ambassador told me that during the time that Mr. Eden was in Moscow last autumn, Stalin had brought up the desiderata of the Soviet Government. Stalin had stated that he desired to know whether the British would guarantee that in any peace terms which might finally be determined upon, the British would support the Soviet Government in its desire to obtain as the Soviet settlement in Europe the reestablishment of the Soviet’s 1941 boundaries.

Mr. Eden had replied that it was impossible for him at that time to give any formal assurances in as much as he would have to consult the British Government and likewise the Government of the United States.

During the time that Mr. Churchill was staying at the White House, Mr. Eden had telegraphed him from London saying that the matter was extremely urgent and that he thought Stalin’s wishes should be met. These wishes specifically were the reincorporation in the Soviet Union of the Baltic States, the incorporation in the Soviet Union of the Province of Bessarabia, and likewise that part of Finland which had been ceded to the Soviet Union in 1940.³⁶ The inclusion of any part of Poland was not mentioned by Stalin as an essential point.

Mr. Churchill had replied to Mr. Eden in a rather stiff telegram expressing indignant disapprobation of the points mentioned and saying that he felt that Mr. Eden should reply that a decision on questions of this character should wait until the war was over.

Lord Halifax, when he learned of this, had written a letter to Mr. Churchill dissenting from the attitude adopted by Mr. Churchill, insisting that Russian cooperation could not be assured during the course of the war unless Russia were given guarantees of this character, and suggesting further that continued Russian cooperation with Great Britain in Europe and with the United States after the war was over was necessary in order that a balance might be maintained as a safeguard on the east against German activity. Lord Halifax went on to say in this communication to Mr. Churchill that he believed that the British attitude with regard to the absorption by the Soviet Union of the Baltic States in 1939 had been one of the prime reasons for the breakdown in the British-Soviet negotiations, which breakdown had in large part been responsible, in his judgment, for the agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union.³⁷ He felt that the attitude of Great Britain with regard to the Baltic States had been the chief reason why the Soviet Union believed that the British policy was insincere and was demonstrating complete lack of appreciation of Russian need for security.

The Ambassador then handed me a copy of a telegram from the British Foreign Office to Lord Halifax on this general subject requesting the opinion of the United States. The text of the telegram is as follows:

“You are aware of what passed during the conversations in Moscow between Stalin and myself. The United States Government have also been kept informed of the situation through Mr. Winant and through yourself. Since my return from Moscow we have been considering ways and means of dealing with Stalin’s demand for recognition of his 1941 frontiers in Finland, the Baltic States and Roumania. The United States Government may well consider his demand difficult to understand, for if, at the end of the war, he occupies these territories it is not to be supposed we should turn him out and if he does not he cannot expect that we shall prolong hostilities to install him there. It is our belief however that his demand—an awkward one to satisfy—is put to us as a test of the sincerity of our avowed desire to work with him during and after the war. It is the fruit of a long period of suspicion and misunderstanding.

“A simple refusal to meet him would involve the risk that Anglo-Soviet relations will deteriorate and that cooperation between Great Britain and Russia and between the United States of America and Russia both during and after the war may be seriously endangered.

“In Moscow I had to tell Stalin that it was altogether beyond my power to accede to his request and I explained to him that this was due not only to our position but also to that of the United States to whom we were bound by certain undertakings apart from our joint promulgation of the Atlantic Charter. Under pressure from Stalin I could not refuse to consult with the United States Government and I therefore wish you now to put the whole situation before them so that we may determine our joint policy in the matter.

“Stalin’s attitude is that before Hitler forced him into the war by an unjustified aggression he was in possession of these territories. He would maintain that his title to them is not more open to question than was that of the Tsarist Government (with whom we were in Treaty and friendly relations). He asks whether frontier which Hitler violated shall be restored. (Note that Polish-Soviet frontier is not at the moment in question.) He says by implication if not in so many words that he would expect an ally to allow him who has been bearing the brunt of the war for seven months to expect to regain his own territory. I do not want to overstate his case: there are obvious answers which do not carry much weight with him.

“I used the Atlantic Charter as an argument against him. He pointed to ‘plebiscites’ in Baltic States. Our exchanges of views on this aspect of the subject would have been even less profitable than they were if I had suggested that those ‘plebiscites’ were faked.

“But there is another difficulty. Is it possible to comply with Stalin’s demand without doing violence to the Atlantic Charter and without raising a crop of other demands from other quarters? If so that is, from the point of view of relations of our two countries with the Soviet Government, the solution we should seek.

“If we cannot, is it wise to offer Stalin a part only, of what he wants? I am advised by Sir Stafford Cripps (and our experience of 1939 as you will remember would tend to confirm this) that any class of haggling may only increase his suspicions. But I am apprehensive of the effect of a flat negative.

“If the United States Government feel that it is impossible to grant his full demand despite its very real significance for cooperation with the Soviet Government now and in the future are there any other offers that we could make?

“I would hint two possible suggestions:

• “(a) We might say that while we cannot agree now to the restoration of the 1941 frontiers we and the United States could immediately give assurances that on grounds of Soviet security we would support, when the time comes, a demand by the Soviet Government to establish Soviet bases in territories contiguous to Russia and especially on the Baltic and Black Seas from which her security might be threatened. Acceptance by the Soviet Government of such assurances would not preclude them from putting forward at the Peace Conference their claim to absorb the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and parts of Finland. We and the United States Government for our part would remain free from any previous undertaking either to accept or reject such a claim if put forward at the Peace Settlement. (Idea of establishment of military bases by one country in the territory of another is one which the United States Government itself has put into operation. It is one which may be developed after the war by various countries and it is one which the Soviet Government in the case of Baltic States in 1939³⁸ was the first to put into practice. While giving Stalin substantial terms in respect of his security needs it does not derogate from the principles of the Atlantic Charter.)
• “(b) We might put forward a proposal based on the suggestion which you made in your letter to the Prime Minister of January 11th and reply to Stalin somewhat on the following lines:—

  ‘We have every desire and intention to work with you after the peace and think it is essential for both of us and for the peace of Europe that we should remain in close partnership.

  We realise the importance you attach for your own security reasons to your June, 1941, boundaries.

  We hold no particular brief for reopening the boundary that you had established with Finland because the Finns have allowed themselves to be the tools of Hitler and we certainly hold no brief for Roumania.

  But we are very much concerned, by reason of the Atlantic Charter, to which the Soviet Government have also subscribed, and of all that it means for our general position in the world of the question of the Baltic States. And in order to reconcile your security requirements and our common obligations under the Atlantic Charter we would undertake here and now to support you at the peace settlement if you demand that the foreign policy in defence of the Baltic States shall be entrusted to the Soviet Union who for this purpose shall be entitled to exercise such authority and to establish such control as may be necessary on the territory of the Baltic States.’

“These two offers are based as any offers clearly must be on the requirements of Russian ‘security’ for which the Soviet Union have been striving ever since the 1917 revolution in order that the Soviet Government may be enabled to complete unfinished social and economic experiment within Russia without the danger of foreign intervention or war.

“Of these two it seems to me there might be a possibility of the United States Government being prepared to agree to (a) and if they would associate themselves with it, it might be that this would satisfy Stalin. He might not accept any compromise offer from us alone, but it is possible that he might feel that a joint offer by ourselves and the United States Government was of real value and a step towards cooperation during and after the war with our two governments. Moreover (a) would not exclude the possibility of Stalin obtaining at the peace conference the frontiers he desires: it would be an instalment rather than an alternative.

“One point of difficulty is Lithuania, since the Polish Government who are anxious for a Polish-Lithuanian union after the war, have expressed to us the desire that no negotiations as regards the future disposal of Lithuanian territory should be entered into without consultation with them. The Polish views are of course incompatible with the Soviet plans to annex Lithuania and with proposal (b) though it might be reconciled with proposal (a). In any case Poland’s aim in regard to His Majesty’s Government is only practical from a geographical point of view if she obtained from the Soviet Government frontiers with Russia considerably east of Curzon line or permission to annex East Prussia, to which M. Stalin told me he would be prepared to agree. Poland has no rights in Lithuania on the basis of the Atlantic Charter and she will be unwise to show herself intransigent towards Russia in Lithuanian matters.

“It would not do to make any concessions to Stalin without requiring suitable quid pro quo and by insisting on any concessions made to him being part of the bargain. We should establish the rule that concession must be mutual, thus making it more difficult for the Soviet Government to press subsequently for yet further concessions. The demands we might make on the Soviet Government are: (1) Affirmation by Soviet Government that they will base their policy on principles contained in declaration by President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister that they ‘seek no aggrandisement, territorial or otherwise’ and M. Stalin’s statement on November 6th, 1941, that the Soviet Government had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of other people. (2) Formal Soviet approval of the principle of confederation as applied to the weaker countries of Europe especially in the Balkans and as regards Poland and Czechoslovakia. (3) Undertaking by the Soviet Government to collaborate with His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government and other countries of Europe in preparing for the reconstruction of Europe after the war ‘with full regard to each others’ interests and in accordance with the two principles (see two above) of no aggrandisement and no interference’. The objectives of reconstruction would include the safeguarding and strengthening of economic and political independence of all European countries, either as unitary or confederated States and the reconstruction of industrial and economic life of the countries whose territories have been overrun by Germany or her associates.

“Should the President agree to a basis of agreement he may have United States desiderata to put forward.

“My immediately following telegram contains the analysis of the wider issues involved which you may find useful in discussion with the President.”

Lord Halifax then interjected to say that in his discussion yesterday with the President³⁹ the President of his own initiative, without having read this message, had suggested with regard to the Baltic States that some sort of plan such as that outlined in alternative (b) as set forth above might be the answer to the problem. I said that the President had not mentioned the matter to me in any way.

The Ambassador then handed me a further telegram from his Foreign Office dated February 15 of which the text is as follows:

“On the assumption that Germany is defeated, that the German military strength is destroyed and that France remains for a considerable period at least a weak power, there will be no counter-weight to Russia in Europe, but cooperation with Russia will be desirable:

• “(a) Because she might otherwise be tempted to collaborate with Germany in view of historical tendency to, and economic urge for, these powers to work together;
• “(b) In order that we may recreate some reasonable balance of power in Europe, destroyed by the collapse of France against the possibility of revived Germany;
• “(c) In order that, militarily speaking, Germany should be encircled.

“The probable course of Soviet policy must depend upon the course of the war and its effect upon the U.S.S.R., condition in which the latter emerges from the war and the circumstances in which the war is terminated. We cannot be certain that Germany’s defeat may not be brought about in principle by Russian action before our own and American war potentiality is fully developed. In that event Russian prestige would be enormous and the Soviet Government would be tempted to work for the establishment of Communistic Governments in the majority of European countries. Russians might moreover be in a position to denude German factories of the equipment needed to restore Russian industry and becoming in this way to considerable extent independent of British-American assistance, might no longer desire to adapt themselves to the policies which we and the United States may wish to pursue. This possible development is in itself a powerful reason for establishing close relations with Russia while her policy is still in a fluid state in order to exercise as much influence as possible on her future course of action. It would be unsafe to gamble on Russia emerging so exhausted from the war that she will be forced to collaborate with us without our having to make any concessions to her. On the contrary common prudence requires us to lay our plans on the assumption that, if we want Russia’s collaboration after the war, we shall have to be prepared to make such a policy advantageous to her. The application of this policy will be laborious and lengthy process. If we are to adopt it we must start now and not wait until the war is over.

“We must therefore recognize that our refusal to satisfy Stalin’s demand may be the end of any prospect of fruitful cooperation with the Soviet Government in our mutual interests and might encourage Soviet policy to revert to the pursuit, of purely selfish aims with incalculable consequences for post-war period.

“There is also the important point of particular and immediate interest to the United States that our present answer to Stalin’s demand may later on affect the Russian decision whether or not to make war on Japan.

“There is little doubt that the Soviet Government is suspicious lest our policy of close collaboration with the United States Government will be pursued at the expense of Russian interests and that we aim at an Anglo-American peace and post-war world. The Soviet Government will therefore be likely to use our response to Stalin’s demand as touchstone of Anglo-American attitude towards them. It seems to us that the right method both of meeting this suspicion and of guarding so far as may be possible against the risk of Russia following entirety independent policy is to emphasize to the Soviet Government that, in the matter concerning the war and peace aims, we and the United States Government would wish to work for tri-partite consultations with them and to reach tri-partite solutions.

“It must be remembered that Stalin might have asked for much more, e. g., control of the Dardanelles, spheres of influence in the Balkans, one-sided imposition on Poland of Russo-Polish frontiers, access to the Persian Gulf, access to the Atlantic involving cession of Norwegian territory.

“Stalin’s present demand, it is true, may not be final but he may later be in a position to enforce a claim to some or all of these and we and the United States Government would be in a stronger position to assert our views if we have established the precedent of tri-partite agreements in regard to post-war arrangements and if the Soviet Government have not decided to go ahead without regard to our views owing to our giving entirely negative reply to the present demands. Moreover, from strategic point of view, it may well be sound that Russia should be established once again in the Baltic so as to be able better to dispute with Germany the naval command of that sea than was the case since 1918.

“Stalin would certainly not admit that his demands are in conflict with principles of the Atlantic Charter and he may well be satisfied by nothing short of complete acceptance of his demands.”

The Ambassador then went on to say that the Soviet Ambassador in London, Mr. Maisky, had asked Mr. Eden on February 12 what reply the British Government intended to make to the Soviet demand for assurances as to the restoration of its 1941 frontiers. Mr. Eden had replied that the problem had been submitted to the United States Government in a favorable manner by the British Government. Ambassador Maisky had replied that the Soviet Government required a treaty with Great Britain covering this subject but that all that’ the United States was asked to do was not to object to the conclusion of such a treaty between the two powers. Ambassador Maisky had emphasized his fear of the effect of any continued delay of a satisfactory reply on the policy and attitude which would be displayed by the Soviet Government.

Lord Halifax requested my views with regard to these questions.

I stated that in as much as I had not had any opportunity of discussing the problem with the President and of ascertaining his views, it was impossible for me as yet to give the Ambassador any reply.

I said, however, that I had no reluctance in stating that in my judgment this was the most important issue of a political character which had come up for discussion between our two Governments since the United States had entered the war or, for that matter, since Great Britain herself had entered the war. I said that it appeared to me that our two Governments were at the crossroads. We had to determine whether the Atlantic Charter meant what it said and whether we were determined to uphold in fact as well as by word the principles set forth therein. I could not see that alternative (b) as set forth in the telegram above quoted was anything else than a complete repudiation of the principles for which this Government stood. I was prepared to agree that the Soviet Government in fairness as well as a matter of policy should be entitled to ensure its own security in the future against now unforeseen contingencies, but that the obtaining of such security could not in my judgment be admitted if that implied the placing of millions of human beings under Russian domination should those human beings desire to maintain their own independence and should they be bitterly opposed to Russian overlordship.

I said that I could not conceive of this war being fought in order to undertake once more the shoddy, inherently vicious, kind of patchwork world order which the European powers had attempted to construct during the years between 1919 and 1939. The Treaty of Versailles⁴⁰ was bad enough because of its inefficiency, but it had been worse because of the failure of the Covenant of the League of Nations⁴¹ to operate in adjusting from time to time territorial and political disputes as experience and circumstances showed them to be necessary from the standpoint of justice and equity. Could it be conceivable that any healthy and lasting world order could be created on a foundation which implied the utter ignoring of all of the principles of independence, liberty, and self-determination which were set forth in the Atlantic Charter? If that was the kind of world we had to look forward to, I did not believe that the people of the United States would wish to be parties thereto.

Lord Halifax in his reply evidenced the worst phase of the spirit of Munich. He spoke of the need of having Russia to constitute the balance of power against Germany in the years after the war.

I asked him if this meant that he foresaw the continuation of Germany as she was now constituted. I said that it had always seemed to me that a careful study of the German federation⁴² set up as a result of the Congress of Vienna⁴³ would be highly useful and appropriate when the need for a new European order arose. I said that the German federation had certainly lasted from 1815 to 1866 and that during that period, notwithstanding convulsions of one kind or another which had occasionally shaken the structure, the structure had lasted and Germany had been no menace to the rest of Europe or to the rest of the world. It had not been until Prussia had obtained a complete domination over all of the other German states that the danger to the world had arisen.

But leaving these points to one side, I said that we were face to face with a question of vital principle. I saw no hope for a stable and peaceful world in the future unless the new world order were built upon principles which could be maintained and to which adherence would be consistent. What peace could be envisaged if at this early stage in the war the British Government and ourselves agreed upon selling out millions of people who looked to us as their one hope in the future and if that new world order were based upon the domination of unwilling, resentful, and potent minorities by a state to which they would never give willing allegiance.

I said that there was no use in my going further into the question at this time since, as I had said before, the decision of the President would naturally first have to be obtained.

The Ambassador urged that an early reply was necessary. I said I would do everything I could to expedite a reply.

S[umner] W[elles]

34. Viscount Halifax.
35. William H. Standley had been appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union; see footnote 31, p. 415. No record that such a meeting was held has been found in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
36. The text of the treaty of Moscow, ending the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union, signed on March 12, 1940, is printed in Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Finnish Blue Book (Philadelphia, 1940), p. 115. A text as translated from Pravda of March 13, 1940, is in Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1940, p. 453.
37. Treaty of Nonaggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939; for text, see Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, pp. 76–78; or Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. vii, pp. 245–247.
38. The Soviet Union put pressure upon the Baltic States during 1939 to conclude pacts of mutual assistance; see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 934–984.
39. No record of this discussion found in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
40. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed on June 28, 1919, Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 57.
41. For text, see ibid., p. 69.
42. The Act of Constitution of the Germanic Confederation, signed at Vienna on June 8, 1815, by Austria, Prussia, and minor German states is printed in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. ii, p. 114, or Sir Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. i, p. 200.
43. The General Act was signed at Vienna on June 9, 1815, and is printed in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. ii, p. 3, or Sir Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. i, p. 208.