740.0011 European War 1939/18674: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

276. Personal to the Secretary and for the President. Since this is-in sequence to recent messages I have sent on Great Britain’s relationship with Soviet Russia (my 6147, December 19,10 my 6166, December 21,11 my 6286, December 31,12 my 147, January 10, and my 187, January 13) I will try not to duplicate information in messages already forwarded but simply give additional data and supporting statements directly quoting from the transcript of Eden’s conversations with Stalin together with a summary documentation.

You will remember that on July 9 in my message No. 291113 I forwarded to you the proposed agreement between Great Britain and Russia. Eden showed me a copy of the proposed agreement before it had been presented to the British Cabinet. The official telegrams sent by Eden while in Moscow to the Foreign Office I again forwarded to you before they had been discussed by the Cabinet. The information I am now sending, although already placed before the War Cabinet, [Page 495] has not been seen by all the members of the Cabinet and Only in part was cabled to the Prime Minister. He has undoubtedly received the complete record of conversations since his return here Saturday.14 I cite these facts for two reasons, first, because I believe it is good evidence of Eden’s efforts to keep us currently informed and, secondly, because I feel that it places an obligation on me to limit my reporting to you and the President only because of the very limited circulation of the documentation here.

The discussions cited were between Stalin and Eden with Molotov interjecting only three statements in the 3 days’ discussions, and a question asked on one occasion by Sir Stafford Cripps. The latter took down the conversations and Maisky acted as an interpreter. During part of the conversations Sir Alexander Cadogan15 and Lieutenant General Nye, Assistant Chief of Staff, were present.

I shall limit the present message to political conversations and shall ask that General Nye’s report on the military situation be forwarded to the President. I have already sent you certain specific military information in my No. 6147, December 19, that I thought would be useful.

Eden went to Moscow with the hope of improving relations between the British Government and the U.S.S.R. Stalin himself had cabled to the Prime Minister that relationships were not good. Eden went there with the idea of working out an agreement on military collaboration and to establish general principles for the peace settlement and the ensuing period of reconstruction. He found himself pressed by Stalin to commit his Government to an agreement on western boundaries of Russia and to be ready to discuss general questions of European frontiers. Eden explained that he had “never heard of these western boundaries” until he had reached Moscow and stated that “I cannot agree to them without first putting them to my own Government and to the Dominions and to America.” Stalin replied “You were in general informed of the two questions of importance; military collaboration and post-war reconstruction including the question of frontiers. If the general question of European frontiers is a difficult one to decide upon, at least that of the Soviet frontiers is in a different category”.

He went on to say: “The Polish frontier remains an open question and I do not insist upon settling that now. What I am most interested in is the position in Finland and the Baltic States and in Rumania. With regard to Poland, I hope that we shall be able to come to an agreement between the three of us. Generally speaking, our idea is to keep [Page 496] to the Curzon line16 with certain modifications. It is very important for us to know whether we shall have to fight at the peace conference in order to get our western frontiers.”

These differences are implied in the draft agreement proposed by Eden, appended herewith as appendix A and in the two treaty drafts urged by Stalin, appended herewith respectively as appendices B and C.

Begin appendix A.

“Draft agreement.

The President of the [Council of] People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Anthony Eden, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, desiring to ensure the best cooperation between their respective Governments during the war for the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction hereby set out the following points which have been agreed between them:

1.
The two Governments jointly affirm their acceptance of the principles of the declaration made on the 14th August 1941 by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.17
2.
The two Governments undertake to collaborate in every possible way until the German military power has been so broken as to render it incapable of further threatening the peace of the world. They further undertake not to make peace with any government of Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions.
3.
The two Governments are resolved to collaborate in restoring peace at the end of the present war and in subsequently maintaining it. The peace settlement must include the establishment and maintenance of conditions which will ensure that Germany is not again in a position to disturb the peace of the world.
4.
The two Governments undertake to work together in the task of the reconstruction of Europe after the war with full regard to each other’s interests and with the object of:
a.
Safeguarding and strengthening the economic and political independence of all European countries either as unitary or federated states.
b.
Reconstructing the industrial and economic life of those countries whose territories have been overrun by the Axis Powers.
5.
As regards the territorial questions to be dealt with in the peace [Page 497] settlement the two Governments will base their policy on the principle laid down in the joint declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom that they ‘seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other’ and on that proclaimed by M. Stalin in his statement of the 6th November 194118 of no interference in the internal affairs of other people. They agree to work out the application of these principles in association with one another and with the United States of America and other Allied states concerned.
6.
Neither Government will enter into any secret agreement with any third power affecting or likely to affect the reconstruction of Europe after the war.
7.
The two Governments agree to render one another after the war all possible economic assistance, and for this purpose will exchange economic missions.
8.
The two Governments are convinced that the collaboration between them, both in war and peace, provided for in the present agreement, will be of benefit not only to their respective peoples, but to the future of the world. It is their earnest desire that all the countries now united in resistance to totalitarian aggression should participate in such collaboration.” (End appendix A)

(Begin appendix B).

“Treaty of alliance and mutual military assistance between the Soviet Union and Great Britain in the war against Germany.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R., on the one hand, and His Majesty’s Government of Great Britain on the other,

Being inspired by an unswerving determination to carry to a victorious conclusion the war which has been forced upon them by Hitlerite Germany, and

Being of the opinion that this object can best of all be achieved by the creation of an alliance and by mutual military assistance between them,

Have agreed—in amplification of the agreement concluded on the 12th July of this year19 concerning the common activities of the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of His Majesty in the United Kingdom in the war against Germany—to conclude the present treaty, and have appointed as their fully empowered representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union:

His Majesty, the King of Great Britain:

[Page 498]

Who, after presentation of their full powers, found to be in due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I.

An alliance is formed between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and both the Allied powers mutually undertake to afford one another military assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Hitlerite dismemberment and against those who take part in Hitlerite aggression in Europe.

Article II.

Both parties undertake not to enter into negotiations with the Hitlerite Government of Germany or with any other German Government ‘representing the Nazi Imperialist regime, and not to conclude an armistice or a peace treaty with Germany except by mutual consent.

Article III.

Both contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliances and not to take part in coalitions directed against one of the contracting parties.

Article IV.

The present treaty enters into force immediately after its signature, and is subject to ratification at the earliest possible date.

The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place in London.” End appendix B.

Begin appendix C.

“Treaty concerning the creation of a mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and Great Britain in regard to the solution of postwar questions, and concerning their common action to ensure security in Europe after the termination of the war with Germany.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, on the other [one] hand, and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, on the other,

Being anxious to direct their common efforts towards the better organization of the cause of peace and towards insuring security in Europe after the victory over Hitlerite Germany, have agreed to conclude the present treaty and have appointed as their fully empowered representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain:

Who, after presentation of their full powers, found to be in due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I.

Both parties mutually undertake that, in the solution of postwar questions connected with the organization of the cause of peace and security in Europe, they will act by mutual agreement.

Article II.

[Page 499]

Both parties are agreed that upon the termination of the war they will take all steps to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany.

Article III.

The present treaty enters into force immediately after its signature, and is subject to ratification at the earliest possible date.

The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place in London.” End appendix C.

Stalin further suggested the establishment of a secret protocol relating to Soviet frontiers. Again Eden explained that he could not “sign such a document without consulting my colleagues and we have not as yet applied our minds to these problems.”

There was at another point in the conversation a discussion as to form, Stalin asking for a treaty in preference to an agreement and Eden explaining a treaty would require the consent of the Dominions.

The differences of opinion largely evolved around these questions cited and resulted in failure to sign either an agreement or a treaty. A joint communiqué, however, was approved (see my No. 6251, December 2920).

The following summary which appears as a preface to the conversations in Mr. Eden’s report to the War Cabinet gives a concise version of the proceedings:

Begin summary.

“At my first conversation with M. Stalin, M. Stalin set out in some detail what he considered should be the postwar territorial frontiers in Europe; and in particular his ideas regarding the treatment of Germany. He proposed the restoration of Austria as an independent state, the detachment of the Rhineland from Prussia as an independent state or protectorate, and possibly the constitution of an independent state of Bavaria. He also proposed that East Prussia should be transferred to Poland and the Sudetenland returned to Czechoslovakia. He suggested that Yugoslavia should be restored and even receive certain additional territories from Italy, that Albania should be reconstituted as an independent state, and that Turkey should receive the Dodecanese, with possibly readjustments in favour of Greece as regards islands in the Aegean important to Greece. Turkey might also receive certain districts in Bulgaria, and possibly also in Northern Syria.

In general the occupied countries, including Czechoslovakia and Greece, should be restored to their prewar frontiers, and Mr. Stalin was prepared to support any special arrangements for securing bases, et cetera, for the United Kingdom in Western European countries, [Page 500] e. g., France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. As regards the special interests of the Soviet Union, Stalin desired the restoration of the position in 1941, prior to the German attack, in respect of the Baltic States; Finland and Bessarabia. The ‘Curzon Line’ should form the basis for the future Soviet-Polish frontier, and Rumania should give special facilities for bases, et cetera, to the Soviet Union, receiving compensation from territory now occupied by Hungary.

In the course of this first conversation, Stalin generally agreed with the principle of restitution in kind by Germany to the occupied countries, more particularly in regard to machine tools, et cetera, and ruled out money reparations as undesirable. He showed interest in a postwar military alliance between the ‘democratic countries,’ and stated that the Soviet Union had no objection to certain countries of Europe entering into a federal relationship, if they so desired.

In the second conversation, M. Stalin pressed for the immediate recognition by His Majesty’s Government of the future frontiers of the USSE, more particularly in regard to the inclusion within the USSR of the Baltic States and the restoration of the 1941 Finnish-Soviet frontier. He made the conclusion of any Anglo-Soviet agreement dependent on agreement on this point. I, for my part, explained to M. Stalin that in view of our prior undertakings to the United States Government it was quite impossible for His Majesty’s Government to commit themselves at this stage to any postwar frontiers in Europe, although I undertook to consult His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, the United States Government, and His Majesty’s Governments in the Dominions on my return.

At the fourth meeting, on the 20th December M. Stalin agreed to my proposal that I should consult His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, the Dominion Governments and the United States Government on my return to the United Kingdom. He suggested that meanwhile the signature of any Anglo-Soviet agreements should be postponed with a view to ‘signing a proper treaty, or two treaties’, after I had been able to consult the ‘Governments concerned (…)21 within the next 2 or 3 weeks’. M. Stalin said that he was sure that, whether the treaties were signed or not, Anglo-Soviet relations would improve with the progress of the war, which ‘compelled many countries to discard their prejudices and preconceived views’. He did not think that ‘failure to sign the treaties now (i. e. during my Moscow visit) should be regarded in too tragic a light. If the treaties were signed in London in 2 or 3 weeks time it would come to much the same thing. Our relations would meanwhile be based on the July agreement, and they would become closer’. [Page 501] At this meeting M. Stalin communicated the text of the draft communiqué which was eventually issued at midnight of the 28/29th December.

After this meeting M. Stalin was my host at a banquet attended by most of the leading political and military figures in the USSR, which lasted until 5 a.m. and was marked by the greatest cordiality.

As regards the Far East, M. Stalin did not consider that he was yet strong enough to continue the campaign against Germany and also to provoke hostilities with Japan. He said that he hoped by next spring to have restored his Far Eastern army to the strength which it had before he had been obliged to draw upon it for reinforcements in the West. He did not undertake to declare war on Japan next spring, but only to reconsider the matter then, although he would prefer that hostilities should be opened by the Japanese, as he seemed to expect might be the case.

M. Stalin expressed himself as satisfied with the course of developments in Persia, and agreed that it was in our joint interest that Turkey should remain outside the war as a buffer against further German penetration eastwards. He even advocated territorial offers to Turkey with a view to strengthening the determination of the Turkish Government to continue their present policy.”

End summary.

As I interpret the record of the conversations, Eden in no way committed his Government. He did agree to present Stalin’s position to seek a decision from his Government and also to consult the Americans upon it as soon as he got back to London, and in my opinion on the question of the Baltic States, Eden felt the force of the Russian point of view, having told Stalin that “if you wish for it and attach great importance to this point, then I shall try and get a favorable answer for you upon [it]”, but he further told Stalin that “Firstly, the Prime Minister has stated publicly that we could not accept any territorial changes made during the war. It may be that this particular change is an exceptional one and if you wish it I will consult the British Government on that basis and let you have their answer. Secondly, under the Atlantic Charter we have pledged ourselves to take into account the wishes of the inhabitants. It may be that in this case they have been taken into account but that is a matter we must check upon before we arrive at a decision.”

Stalin’s insistence may be culled from the following sentences taken from the script:

Stalin: “Is it really necessary on this question of the Baltic States to have a Government decision? Surely this is absolutely axiomatic. We are fighting our hardest and losing hundreds of thousands of men [Page 502] in the common cause with Great Britain as our ally, and I should have thought that such a question as the position of the Baltic States ought to be axiomatic and ought not to require any decision.”

Eden: “You mean the future of the Baltic States at the end of the war?”

Stalin: “Yes. Would you support the entry of these three States at the end of the war into the Soviet Union? All we ask for is to restore our country to its former frontiers. We must have these for our security and safety; for instance, at Leningrad. I want to emphasize the point that if you decline to do this, it looks as if you were creating a possibility for the dismemberment of the’ Soviet Union.”

He stated he was “surprised and amazed at Mr. Churchill’s Government taking up this position. It is practically the same as that of the Chamberlain Government.22 ‘And again’ this attitude of the British Government towards our frontiers is indeed a surprise to me so I think it will be better to postpone the proposed agreements.”

After repeatedly hammering on this subject and stating that he also was disappointed that an agreement could not be reached, he went on to say: “As regards your repeated references to the necessity for His Majesty’s Government to consult the United States Government, I must confess that I had overlooked this fact and believed your Government to have more freedom of action in these matters. That is perhaps why it is difficult now to reach an agreement”.

Mr. Eden reminded him during these conversations that: “You would not respect me if I were to go back upon my arrangement with President Roosevelt. I can get a decision upon this point before the Soviet troops occupy the Baltic States, even if they continue doing as well as they are now”.

There are two miscellaneous quotations which I feel necessary to include:

(a) Stalin: “I thought that the Atlantic Charter was directed against those people who were trying to establish world dominion. It now looks as if the Atlantic Charter was directed against the U.S.S.R.”

Eden: “No; that is certainly not so. It is merely a question of your putting forward certain views as to your frontiers, and of my being unable to give you an immediate reply and asking you to allow me time to get the answer.”

Stalin: “Why does the restoration of our frontiers come into conflict with Atlantic Charter?”

Eden: “I never said that it did.”

[Page 503]

(b) Eden: “As regards the Far East, I expect that, in view of the very serious situation, the Prime Minister will want to know your exact position.”

Stalin: “If the Soviet Union were to declare war on Japan, we should have to wage a real war by land, on sea and in the air. It would not be like the declaration of war on Japan by Belgium and Poland. Consequently, we have to make a careful estimate of the forces involved. At present we are not ready. A considerable number of our troops were removed from the Far East to the western front. New troops are being got ready but we shall require about 4 months before they are fully prepared. I think it would be far better for the Soviet Union if Japan were left to attack us. This would create a better political and psychological atmosphere amongst the Soviet people. War would be unpopular with our people if the Soviet Government were to make the first step. If, on the other hand, we were attacked, the feelings of the Soviet people would be very strong. We have seen this in the present war in the West. Hitler attacked us, and because we were attacked, the Soviet people have shown a wonderful unity and great heroism and readiness to sacrifice themselves. We would prefer that Japan should attack us, and I think it very probable that she will do so—not just yet, but later. If the Germans are hard pressed it is likely that they will urge the Japanese to attack us, in which case the attack may be expected about the middle of next year.”

In transmitting this information, I want it to be clearly understood that I have not attempted in any way to carry on conversations with the British Government. I have simply tried to keep informed in order that I might forward this information to you and the President.

Winant
  1. Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 199.
  2. Ibid., p. 201.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Not printed; but see the Ambassador’s telegram No. 2920, July 9, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 182.
  5. January 17.
  6. British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
  7. Regarding the Curzon line, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp. 793794; H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. vi, pp. 233–283, 317–322; and summary descriptions in S. Konovalov, Russo-Polish Relations: an Historical Survey, pp. 33–38, 57–63.
  8. For the text of this joint statement of the Atlantic Charter, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367. Regarding adherence to the Atlantic Charter by the Soviet Union, see ibid., p. 378.
  9. For a report on the speech made by Stalin on the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution, see telegram No. 1900, November 8, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 654.
  10. Agreement for joint Action and Mutual Assistance concluded in Moscow on July 12, 1941; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 277.
  11. Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 205.
  12. Omission indicated in the original telegram.
  13. Neville Chamberlain was British Prime Minister from May 28, 1937, until May 10, 1940. For correspondence regarding the efforts made by his Government and the French to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union against aggression, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, pp. 232 ff.