With relation to the “wasted effort” which I agree is prevalent
throughout Soviet activities, I am more inclined to ascribe this
condition to a lack of adequate and sufficient standardized equipment,
and consequently of spare parts, rather than the “historical inability
of the Russian people to work in close harmony and cooperation”. In a
recent trip across the Volga I visited a wheat field of a collective
farm where some thirty-three women were harvesting the grain. Their men
had all gone to the front. With the exception of the thresher the work
was all being done by hand. There were machines but they were all broken
down and there were no spare parts available, but there was no lack of
harmony or cooperation on the part of this group who were doing their
best, in the absence of their men folk, to meet the Government’s
requirements set for normal conditions.
The comments as to military and naval matters (pp. 6 to 10
inclusive)22 should be of interest to the
War and Navy Departments.
The report in its entirety shows an intelligent and comprehensive
perspective of Consul General Ward and much of it, had it been
available, might have helped the mission in its efforts to keep the
Department informed of the general situation.
The Consul General has been instructed to submit hereafter to the mission
a monthly report and to use the telegraph to communicate with the
Department when urgency is indicated.
[Enclosure—Extracts]
Memorandum by the Consul General at
Vladivostok (Ward)
Kuibyshev, September 10,
1942.
Information obtainable by a foreign consular officer at Vladivostok
is in general limited to those conditions and happenings which the
[Page 455]
officer is able to
observe with his own eyes or to experience in his day to day life.
The local press is practically devoid of news of local happenings
and the local authorities take all possible precautions toward
suppressing the escape of information regarding the local armed
forces and the local war effort, with the result that rumors,
fantastic as well as reasonable, are current at all times and must
be assumed as the basis of almost all “information” received from
unofficial sources. Soviet officials with whom the foreign consular
officer comes in contact seemingly make all possible effort to limit
their conversations to the discussion of happenings and conditions
which have been discussed in the press or on the radio. This
situation explains why it is so difficult to obtain information of
proved or even assumed reliability at Vladivostok.
The German-Soviet war stunned the people of the Primorsk23 and at no time has there been any visible
enthusiasm for the war. This outward lack of enthusiasm, however,
and the absence of any spontaneous (or sponsored) patriotic
demonstrations have been more than overbalanced by a stolid and
stubborn determination to win the war. It has been a great
revelation of the Russian character to me to observe that the will
to win the war as well as to make sacrifices, both financial and
physical, for the war effort grows as the people learn of the loss
of relatives and friends and as the progress of the war makes
inroads on their meager standard of living. They are becoming or
have already become convinced that this is not an ordinary war and
that on its outcome depends their national existence. They remember
the sufferings and privations of 1917–1937 and as they see the
consumer goods (inadequate in quantity and poor in quality as they
were) which they enjoyed in increasing volume from 1937 to 1941
disappear from the market they come to the belief that if they are
to spare their children from the hardships they themselves underwent
after the October Revolution they must sacrifice themselves
today.
Notwithstanding the Will and determination of the Primorsk people to
win the war a foreigner in that area can not but be impressed by the
wasted effort in industry, agriculture and distribution encountered
on all sides. This phase of the economy of the country is not, as my
observations during my travel from Vladivostok to Kuibyshev have
shown, confined to the Primorsk and is seemingly nation-wide, and
may be explained as contemporary evidence of the historical
inability of the Russian people to work in close harmony and
cooperation.
Although I have no statistics to confirm my opinion, it occurs to me
that conscription of men for the Soviet armed forces has not been as
widespread to the east of Lake Baikal as in the European part of the
R. S. F. S. R. (particularly at Moscow and Kuibyshev where I have
[Page 456]
more opportunity to
observe conditions than at other points visited). Men are still
performing work in the Soviet Far East which was formerly performed
by men in European R. S. F. S. R. but is now being performed by
women in this latter area. My assumption is that the Soviet
Government is keeping a great well of unconscripted man power in the
Soviet Far East for possible conscription and use on short notice in
the event of a Soviet-Japanese conflict. Numerous unconscripted men
up to 50 years of age at Vladivostok have informed me during the
past six to eight months that they have to report to their
mobilization centers not less than once a month, and some have even
stated that they must keep their family or upravdom (house manager) informed at all times of their
whereabouts and that at their mobilization centers they are always
reminded that they must hold themselves in instant readiness for a
call to military duty.
Travel to points outside of a person’s town or city of residence is
prohibited in the Primorsk unless the traveler first obtains
permission from the police (militsiya) but
this control I am informed is common to whole Soviet Union.
In turning to the Soviet-Japanese situation it is worthy of note that
in so far as I have been able to determine all maritime trade
between Vladivostok and Japan ceased many months ago. The last
Japanese vessel to call at Vladivostok cleared from that port on or
about November 4, 1941, and I have learned of no Soviet vessels
carrying cargo between Japan and Vladivostok since the outbreak of
the war in the Pacific.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notwithstanding that in so far as I am aware the Soviet Government is
doing all possible to cause the general public both in the Soviet
Union and abroad to believe that present Soviet-Japanese relations
are the cause of no grave concern, people, in Primorsk are
expecting, as mentioned above, a war with Japan.24 I do not believe that it would be a misstatement
to state that a war with Japan would be popular with these people.
The Japanese armed forces occupied eastern Siberia only twenty years
ago, in consequence of which there are large numbers of residents in
that area who, or whose parents, felt the heavy hand of the Japanese
“interventionist”, as he was then called. There were other
“interventionist” troops, among which were the; American Forces in
Siberia,25 but it is only
against the Japanese troops, who
[Page 457]
were then as lawless and barbaric in Siberia
as they have been during the past five years in China, that one
hears expressed today in Vladivostok the desire for revenge. If I am
to believe, as I do, the numerous tales which I heard from as many
sources during the past winter and early spring of the Japanese
provocative acts and frontier incidents which were of almost daily
occurrence along the Soviet-Manchurian boundary (none of which, as I
now recall, were mentioned in the press or on the radio), it is
positive proof of the desire of the Soviet Government to avoid at
that time a conflict with the Japanese. Recent information, however,
is to the effect that the Japanese frontier guards adopted a very
conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet frontier forces with the
approach of summer and that the past few months have passed without
any acts on the part of the Japanese guards which may be considered
as inspired provocation.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Since the Soviet Union and the United States are now allies in the
war in Europe it would seem appropriate to add a word in concluding
this memorandum with regard to the attitude of the people of
Primorsk toward the United States. I have found no resentment, at
least among the common people, against the United States for having
sent “interventionist” troops into Siberia—on the contrary, I have
been surprised on numerous occasions by hearing some simple peasant
or workman with whom I have managed to strike up a casual
conversation make a remark to the effect that the Soviet Union has a
debt to the United States for the help given by Americans in
preventing the Japanese from seizing the eastern portion of Siberia
when Russia was weak from the October Revolution,26 The people in general do not
seem to harbor the thought that the United States entertains any
imperialistic ambitions against Siberia. The people consider: the
United States a country of progress and enlightenment and one sooner
or later hears the phrase “America is a country of culture and
technic” in any discussion of the United States. The crews of the
numerous Soviet vessels plying between Vladivostok and United States
ports in recent months are perhaps the best propagandists the United
States can have in the Soviet Union in that they are Soviet citizens
and are not regarded as propagandists by other Soviet citizens as;
they return to the Soviet Union, with good clothing and shoes (the
most cherished desiderata of the poorly clad people of this country)
and with tales of the
[Page 458]
comforts of American life, the wholesome food available to all in
the United States, the well-stocked shops of American cities, and
above all the hospitality and generosity of the Americans. The
appearance of American flour, sugar and lard on the Vladivostok
market several months ago evoked many gratifying expressions made to
me by local people. They had read in the Soviet press and heard over
the Soviet radio of aid from the United States in the form of
military supplies, which most of them had no opportunity to see, but
it remained for the arrival of food without any preliminary fanfare
to arouse their gratitude and their realization that the United
States was really helping the Soviet Union. It became not uncommon
for casual Soviet acquaintances to remark to me, upon learning that
I am an American, to the effect that they had become convinced that
the American food they were enjoying was but an earnest of the
support, economic as well as military, the Soviet people will in
their present struggle and trying times receive from the American
people. I regret that I have not heard any such gratifying remarks
from the Soviet officials with whom I have come in contact, but it
must be borne in mind that Soviet officials in general are given to
ultra-caution when dealing with foreign officials, and, as stated in
the first paragraph of this memorandum, are prone to limit their
conversations in such instances to the discussion of happenings and
conditions which have been given official sanction through having
been discussed in the press or on the radio. While the sentiment of
the people of Primorsk in general toward the United States has
become increasingly friendly as the war progresses I have found
little if any change in the attitude of the local officials toward
the United States. These officials have at no time been unfriendly,
their attitude toward the Consulate General being one of formal
cordiality. No member of the staff of the Consulate General has been
tendered an invitation by any Soviet official to a social function,
formal or informal, of any kind and the only instances in which I
have met any local Soviet official socially have been at social
functions given by myself or one of my consular Colleagues. In so
far as giving assistance to the foreign consular corps at
Vladivostok is concerned, it is my opinion that upon the opening of
the Consulate General in January 194127 the
local authorities gave the most active assistance to and facilitated
the performing of its consular functions by the German Consulate
General, followed in lessening degree by the American, Japanese and
Chinese respectively whereas today the order is probably American
first, Chinese second and Japanese last.
