123 Hayes, Carlton J. H./27
The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 25.]
Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s telegrams Nos. 674 and 681 of June 8 and 9 respectively,46 I have the honor to report that yesterday I presented to the Chief of State the official Letter of Recall of Ambassador Weddell and my own Letter of Credence.
Full ceremonial was used. With the Embassy staff and Attachés I was escorted by the Moorish Guard to and from the Palace. The car in which I rode was decorated with an American flag, and on my arrival in the courtyard of the Palace the “Star Spangled Banner” was played. It was gratifying, too, that many groups along the way gave ample evidence of sympathy by their applause General Franco received me and my staff in the throne room, in the presence of his entire cabinet and many other dignitaries including the Archbishop of Madrid.
After the delivery of my address and General Franco’s response—copies of both of which are enclosed46—the Caudillo conducted me with his Foreign Minister, Serrano Suñer, and Baron de las Torres47 (who acted as interpreter) to an adjoining room, where he engaged me in conversation with great cordiality for a surprisingly long period (some twenty-five minutes).
The conversation with the Caudillo, to which the Foreign Minister was only a listener, seemed to me very significant. He began by expressing the hope that the war would be over before long and by stating that it was the peoples of occupied territories rather than; the Germans who were facing starvation. He referred especially to the Greeks, Dutch, Belgians, and French. He then asked whether I thought the war would be terminated soon. I replied that I hoped so but I did not know; I was sure only that whether the war was long or short the United States was in it, totally, to the finish and that while Germany had already passed the maximum of her military effort we were just beginning to attain ours. He said he thought there were two distinct wars; one in Europe against Russia, and the other in the Pacific against Japan. I said I could not see the situation thus—that Japan would never have attacked us if she had not been incited by Germany, and that, after all, the central issue of the war was whether one Power (namely Germany) would dominate the whole world politically and economically or whether the independence of the several nations and peoples would be reestablished on traditional bases with mutual respect for different forms of government and [Page 291] free commercial intercourse. I said I had no doubt of our ability to take care of Japan once Hitlerian Germany was rendered impotent.
How do we propose to defeat Germany? the Caudillo Asked. I replied, through an endurance test between morales and, by taking the offensive with all the armed forces of the United Nations—on sea, in the air, and on the land. He said it would be necessary for us to land large forces on the Continent, probably in France, and he wondered if we would have the shipping facilities for such an enterprise. I told him we had already successfully transported sizeable contingents of men, as well as vast quantities of stores and munitions, to the British Isles, and this was only a foretaste of what we could and would do. I remarked that air superiority had now passed from Germany to us, and I reminded him of the British pounding of Cologne and the Ruhr and of our own exploit at Midway;
He then switched the conversation to the topic of “freedom of the press”. Was not popular morale lowered by such freedom? And did it not give free rein to Communist propaganda? I said I could not speak for his country, but I could say quite, positively for my own that the free press was a major bulwark of enlightened popular morale, that the great bulk of the press had no sympathy whatever with Communism, and that the exceptions served more as a safetyvalve for emotion than as any real controller of public policy.
The Caudillo repeated and emphasized the cliché that victory for the democracies means victory for Russian Communism. I tried my best to disabuse him of this notion by pointing out that Russia as well as Germany would be pretty well exhausted by the current struggle, and that the United States and England, which would be strong at the finish are not Communist or Communistically-included. He admitted that according to reports reaching him there was little danger of Communism in the United States, but he expressed some doubt about the future situation in England. Was not the Labor Party in England Communist? I said no, and explained that there was a great difference, traditionally and temperamentally, between “labor” on the Continent and in English-speaking countries, referring to the continuing hold of religion on the latter.
He asked, rather: abruptly, if Great Britain and the United States really had the same peace-aims or if in the eventual peace settlement serious divergence was not likely to appear between them. I answered that both countries were committed to the Atlantic Charter48 and both would undoubtedly stick loyally to it as the guiding principle of the peace settlement, although there probably would be need of Considerable future negotiation over details. He expressed the hope that the United States rather than Britain would take the lead in settling such details and in guaranteeing the peace.
[Page 292]General Franco next spoke of his desire to promote, as soon as possible, more normal commercial relations between Spain and the United States. He said Spain was in a peculiarly difficult position, being at once a European country and a maritime and semi-American country, with the result that it was pressed, as in a vise, between the strongest Power in Europe and the strongest Power in America, and that consequently he had been unable to effect the very needful material reconstruction of his country after its Civil War. He urged me to do everything in my power specifically to forward the oil program and generally to help Spain to obtain necessary foodstuffs and machinery. I told him I would to the utmost of my ability, with the clear, and I hoped to him, understandable reservations that the United States, being at war, had to put certain restrictions on exports and that we must take all possible precautions against any of our goods being of aid, directly or indirectly, to our enemies, the Axis. He said he quite understood our position, and in conclusion assured me of his sincere and earnest desire to maintain, along with Spanish neutrality, the best possible economic relations with us. My thanks ended the conversation.
In connection with General Franco’s observations about commercial relations, I would especially invite your attention to the paragraph in my formal address and to that in his formal response bearing on the subject. He definitely disavowed in the latter the totalitarian tenet of economic autarchy and affirmed the adherence of himself and his government to the liberal principle of international trade.
Enclosed, in addition to copies of the address and the response, are newspaper clippings and photographs relating to the presentation of my credentials and attendant ceremonies.49 It will be noted that on this occasion we have had a “good press” in Spain.
Respectfully yours,