740.0011 European War 1939/19953: Telegram
The Chargé in Spain (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 5—5:37 p.m.]
216. My 189 of February 22, 7 p.m.31 I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this noon and Asked him about the Seville meeting. [Page 282] He said that it was held in accordance with the terms of Spain’s Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression with Portugal.32 The possibility of such a meeting had been under consideration for some time. He said that Spain requested the meeting because there had been rumors circulating for some weeks that the United States was planning a military attempt against the Azores. Spain was concerned about these rumors because of its delicate international situation.
He said that Salazar had told Franco that he did not believe the rumors and had no fear of an attack by either the United States or England. He said, however, that Portugal would defend itself against any invader.
Salazar in turn expressed apprehension that Spain might be invaded by Germany. Franco replied that there was no danger of such an invasion, that Germany was interested particularly in protecting its peninsular flank and that so long as Spain maintained its present attitude of friendship towards Germany he believed that there was not the slightest danger of an invasion. He naturally could not respond for what would happen if an attempt were made by the democracies against Spain or Portugal.
Suñer said they talked also of their common difficulty in obtaining petroleum products and of the desirability of fixing identical prices for commodities produced in Spain and Portugal.
I Asked Suñer whether it would be correct to Say that it was agreed at Seville that both countries would resist aggression from either side. He said that Spain was so convinced that Germany would not invade it that discussion did not embrace Spain’s attitude in the event of a German invasion.
I expressed regret that Franco should have found it necessary to make his anti-communist speech in Seville immediately after the meeting (see my telegram 172 of February 1633). I pointed out the effect of such statements on public opinion in the United States and said they only made economic cooperation with Spain more difficult. He said that he hoped public opinion in the United States would appreciate what Spain’s position was. Spain had few aircraft, few cannon and slender economic resources. Germany had plenty aircraft and cannon and was sitting on Spain’s northern border. If Spain wanted to keep out of this war, there was no practical alternative to friendship with Germany which was in addition a natural development from Spain’s civil war.
Spain was not helping Germany in a military way. It was trading with Germany just as it was trading with the democracies.
[Page 283]With reference to Franco’s Seville speech, he said that Franco expressed precisely Spain’s well known public attitude-towards communism. Spain considered Germany a bulwark against communism. When Franca said that Spanish volunteers would go to Germany’s aid in case Germany was overrun by the Russians, he was being entirely consistent with Spain’s attitude towards communism; Spain quite realized it could not prevent Germany being overrun but Spaniards would be quite prepared to die in the attempt.
Until this contingency should arise, however, Spain had no desire to become more involved than at present in war against Russia or any either country and Spanish policy was directed against becoming involved.
I said that even if his thesis were fully accepted, he must still realize the effect on public opinion in the United States of the public utterances of Spanish officials and if Spain had no alternative to its policy towards Germany as described, it was likewise impossible to prevent American public opinion in the United States from reacting Unfavorably and suggested that he bear this in mind.
He offered no objection to this but said that despite Spain’s attitude towards Germany, the German Embassy frequently complained of lack of cooperation on the part of Spain and that Spain literally was between two fires. He said, however, that so long as Spain persisted in its attitude of public friendship to Germany, he believed there was no danger of a German invasion and he said again that Spain’s foreign policy was directed squarely at keeping out of war.
Repeated to Lisbon.