Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Europe, Volume III

740.0011 European War 1939/26328½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[Washington,] December 4, 1942.

The Prime Minister of Poland, accompanied by the Polish Ambassador, called to see me this afternoon.

The final document which the Prime Minister handed me, attached herewith, is the draft of a letter which he has requested should be addressed by the President to him before his departure from the United States and which, in the judgment of General Sikorski, would be of the greatest assistance to him in any conversations or negotiations which he may have to undertake with the Soviet Union or with Chechoslovakia. The President on December 2 agreed in principle that he would hand General Sikorski a letter with reference to Poland based, on the President’s condition, upon the general principles of the Atlantic Charter.

I read the draft prepared by General Sikorski and then made the following observations. I stated that I desired it to be very clearly understood that any statements which I made during the course of our conversation today would be regarded as purely personal and as entirely preliminary. I said that I hadn’t had the opportunity of discussing the issues involved with the President or with the Secretary of State, and that until the President had had an opportunity of giving mature consideration to these exceedingly important questions, it must be emphasized that any views I expressed were wholly personal.

I said that I wished to raise various points with regard to portions of this letter as drafted by General Sikorski. I said that in the first paragraph it was suggested that the President say that he desired to assure General Sikorski “that Poland would issue from the war undiminished in her full territorial integrity as it existed on August 31, 1939”. I said that it seemed to me that the use by the President of a statement of that character would imply that Poland was to be reconstituted in her territorial limits within exactly the same boundaries as those which existed in 1939, and that this would seem therefore to inhibit any modifications of Polish frontiers which in the judgment of the United Nations and conceivably in the judgment of the Polish people themselves would be altogether desirable and destined to insure Polish stability and European stability. I said that, as the Prime Minister had discussed in a very brief and general way the day before yesterday with the President, consideration had been given to the possibility of the elimination of the Polish Corridor and of the incorporation of East Prussia into a new Poland provided the inhabitants of East Prussia were given the fullest right and liberty to determine whether they desired to live under Polish or under German jurisdiction, and that such inhabitants as desired to leave East Prussia would be afforded the freest opportunity of doing so and of taking with them their properties and belongings.

The Prime Minister immediately replied that this was correct, and then discussed at some length conditions in East Prussia. He said that East Prussia had long been like a “hail storm” looming over Poland, and that the greatest part of the military preparations made by the Germans against Poland had been concentrated in East Prussia. He stated that the total population of East Prussia was only 2,200,000 persons, not 3,000,000, as I had estimated, and that, of these, some 700,000 were Polish peasant proprietors. He said that he believed that the great majority of the Germans in East Prussia who would not wish to remain under Polish rule would of their own initiative immediately remove themselves from East Prussia during the last days of the war and before the final defeat of Germany.

With regard to Danzig,⁹¹ the Prime Minister said, the mistakes of 1919 must be corrected and Danzig must surely become a part of Poland. He was completely firm in the assertion that the Polish Corridor must be done away with. He discussed briefly rectifications in the western frontier of Poland and stated that Stalin had stated to him that the rectifications of the Polish eastern frontier which Russia desired would be “very slight.” He repeated in this connection that he had refused to discuss with Stalin any concessions of Polish territory to Russia.

I next brought up the reference in the second paragraph of the Prime Minister’s draft which related to the establishment of a confederation of Poland with Czechoslovakia. I Asked what the views of the Prime Minister were with regard to extending European federations, and specifically what he had in mind as the desirable type of federation in which Poland should take part. General Sikorski replied that he thought there should be two blocs in Eastern Europe, a Balkan bloc, to be created by Yugoslavia and Greece in which Bulgaria and Albania should be included. It was his conception that the northern bloc, of which Poland and Czechoslovakia should be the nucleus, should likewise be joined by Hungary and by what remained of Rumania at the end of the war. I inquired whether he desired that Austria likewise he included. He replied definitely that he did, and that under no conditions should Austria be incorporated in Germany, although this apparently was what President Beneš of Czechoslovakia desired. General Sikorski went on to say that he believed that there should be some working arrangement in the nature perhaps of an economic link, and one which perhaps would likewise involve joint management of communication facilities between the northern and southern federations.

He stated that all of the Western European countries favored this concept and that there had been some discussion of Holland becoming a member of the Scandinavian federation in the future, with Belgium undertaking some type of federative arrangement with France. He added that, of course, the great incognito at the present time was France herself, and that what part France would play in the Europe of the future was necessarily an interrogation point.

I then stated that in the penultimate paragraph of the draft letter it is suggested that the President express his approval of a proposed Polish-Soviet military alliance which it was General Sikorski’s concept should be an alliance of an offensive and defensive nature and to last for at least twenty years. I Asked what the reason for the creation of such an alliance might be if the United Nations were able, at the termination of the war, to devise some form of international security which would be practical and effective and which would include the complete disarmament of Germany. I said that in my judgment the conclusion of military alliances of this character would have no valid basis if an effective international security were to be established, and certainly knowledge on the part of the American people at this time that military alliances of this character were being concluded would strongly prejudice them against the type of war aims for which the United Nations were striving, and most decidedly create a large body of public opinion which would be reluctant to have the United States undertake any measure of responsibility for the maintenance of any world order of which these military alliances formed a part.

General Sikorski said that, of course, if any practical form of international security were to be established there would be no reason for the negotiation of such alliances, and that he wished to make it clear that the initiative for the negotiation of an alliance of this character between Poland and Czechoslovakia had come from President Beneš and not from him. He said that any reference of this character could be omitted entirely from the letter which he had it in mind to receive from the President.

The Prime Minister said that he believed that if the President addressed a letter of this general character to him it should be made public. I said that that was my personal inclination, since I thought it was altogether desirable that any assurances from this Government to any other members of the United Nations should be public and not secret. I said that, for that very reason, however, it was obvious that we must give the greatest care to stay draft of this character, and that the suggestions which I had discussed with General Sikorski would be studied very carefully during the next few days in order that the views of the President might later be obtained.

It was agreed that after these various documents had been carefully considered, General Sikorski and I would have a further conversation, approximately the middle of next week.

S[umner] W[elles]

[Annex]

Draft of Letter Proposed by the Polish Prime minister (Sikorski) To Be Received by Him From President Roosevelt

My Dear General Sikorski: I wish to take this opportunity once more to express my high appreciation of the part hitherto played by Poland in this war, to acknowledge the high dynamic qualities of the Polish nation, and to assure you that Poland will issue from the war undiminished in her full territorial integrity as it existed on August 31, 1939. It would indeed not be consistent with the high moral principles for which the United Nations are fighting if Poland’s independence should not be thus restored. I regard this as consistent with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the Declaration signed by the United Nations on January 1, 1942.⁹² I do not exclude the possibility that the necessity will arise to widen the basis of Poland’s security in the West in relation to Germany and thus to strengthen her economic independence.

I have noted with satisfaction your constructive initiative towards the establishment of a Confederation of Poland with Czechoslovakia as a first step in the direction of a European policy of international cooperation, and I am pleased to hear that the development of this idea is progressing satisfactorily. I am looking forward to its further satisfactory development, considering that the establishment of durable peace and security in Central Eastern Europe largely depends on its successful completion. I have no doubt that the creation of such a close international understanding in that part of Europe will be generally appreciated and approved by all the United Nations.

The Polish nation has shown moral values and qualities which indicate that it destined once more to become a consolidating factor of European peace. I regard Poland as an active and reliable factor in the establishment of democratic law and order in Europe.

In my opinion, the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30th, 1941, and the Stalin-Sikorski Declaration of December 4th, 1941 constitute a most satisfactory basis for Polish-Russian collaborations. It is my hope that this basis will be duly enlarged and strengthened in view of the fact that a Polish-Soviet alliance, based upon the mutual loyalty and mutual respect of the sovereign rights of these two neighboring nations, must be regarded as one of the best guarantees of European peace.

Poland has suffered considerably and is still suffering great losses while further contributing all she has to the common cause. I can assure you that after the war the United States will assist Poland and help her economically.

91. See section XI on the Free City of Danzig in the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles June 28, 1919, Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp. 241–262.
92. Vol. i, p. 25.