740.0011 European War 1939/25996
The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 24.]
For the President, the Secretary and the Under-Secretary.
Sir: I have the honor to report that in a very recent talk with General Sikorski, he informed me he had just received two notes from the Soviet Embassy.
The first Note had stated in effect that the Soviet Government considered the further recruiting of Polish soldiers in Russia out of the question, on the grounds that the Polish troops in Russia had [Page 198] demonstrated not only their unwillingness to fight alongside the Russians, but also their desire to leave the country.
In imparting the foregoing, the General said that these grounds, as stated in the Soviet Government’s Note, were erroneous, in that previous to the period refered to the Polish Government had already requested equipment for the Polish troops in Russia, in order that they might continue the struggle at the side of the Russian forces. It had been only later that the Polish Government had decided to ask the Soviet Government to permit the evacuation of the Polish forces.
The second Note, the General continued, had stated that the 16 welfare delegates of the Polish Embassy in Russia, who were still under arrest, were now awaiting trial on the grounds of spying in behalf both of Britain and of the United States.
Immediately following the receipt of these two Notes, the General said, he had been invited to attend a showing of a moving picture at the Soviet Embassy. Feeling it would be undignified under the circumstances to attend, he had invented a pretext to absent himself. However, several of his Ministers had attended the showing of the picture. They had subsequently imparted to him their surprise at finding that, in depicting several scenes in Lwow, the picture had reflected marked credit on the Polish citizens.
In taking into consideration the inconsistency of this friendly gesture with the numerous unfriendly acts which Poland had been suffering at the hands of Russia, the General was inclined at the moment to feel that Poland might expect Russia to pursue two policies: one a “small policy” entailing annoyances; the other, a “big policy” entailing an effort to show Poland and the rest of the world that Russia was Poland’s friend. Contributing towards his feeling on this score was his own appraisal as to Russia’s position after her struggle with the Germans: he expected Russia to become so weakened by this struggle that it would be more likely to give way to Western influence than the West to yield to Russian penetration.
Respectfully yours,