700C.61/987: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 14—1:57 a.m.]
767. Department’s 484, September 5, noon.
1. In answer to a question as to the status of the Polish relief situation Lozovski65 stated in effect yesterday that there should be no difficulty as regards the providing of such relief since 190 Polish representatives with authority to act were distributed throughout the Soviet Union. He added that out of the 370 original representatives, 180 had been charged with subversive activities and arrested or deprived of their authority as representatives pending reply to these charges.
In view of this statement I did not inquire whether relief to Polish citizens in the Soviet Union might be handled by newly appointed delegates or by other competent agencies.
2. Immediately after my meeting with Lozovski, the Polish Minister and Chargé d’Affaires66 called on me at my request and we discussed the matter in the light of the statements made by Lozovski. [Page 185] The Minister, with unimportant exceptions, confirmed what Lozovski had said and added in brief the following.
The Polish authorities in their efforts to maintain contact with the Polish citizens who have been scattered all over Russia have set up an organization headed by the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev.
Under the Embassy there were 20 delegates (8 of whom had diplomatic immunity) who were distributed so as to cover the whole geographic area in which there were Polish citizens. Each of these dele gates had selected trustworthy men to contact the Polish citizens and to distribute relief supplies. There were all told 370 of these hommes de confiance and their organization was functioning fairly effectively when the Soviet authorities interfered.
First the 20 delegates were arrested and held in prison. The 8 who had diplomatic immunity were later released and sent out of the country. Then 180 of the agents were deprived of the authority to, function pending their reply to the charges of subversive activities. The Polish Minister stated that 84 of this number are still in prison.
As to the 190 representatives still authorized to act, the Polish Minister stated that they are impotent because the Soviet authorities, will not cooperate with them and will not even give them their food norm. Without the cooperation of the local Soviet authorities the representatives are not only helpless but fear Soviet reprisal and arrest if they take any action. Thus the entire effort of the Polish, Government to keep in touch with its people is nullified.
3. On several occasions acting under instructions I have taken up with the Soviet authorities various Polish problems such as relief, the, release of 5,000 to 8,000 officers, the evacuation of children, recruiting for the army, and the question of moving troops, with their families, out of Tashkent into Iran.
On each occasion I have been instructed to say and have said that my Government did not wish to interfere in Soviet-Polish relations. In my 241, July 5, 7 p.m., I reported that Molotov had shown considerable irritation when I refered to the Polish question. Yesterday when I again denied desire on the part of my Government to, interfere in Soviet-Polish relations Mr. Lozovski interposed the remark, “That is the best thing for it to do”.
This Polish question is not one of specific irritants which are only symptoms, but involves the broad issue of whether or not the Poles will be allowed to attain and maintain contact with their citizens throughout Russia. The Poles want to do this and had set up an effective organization for the purpose. The Russians oppose this effort and have taken steps not only to wreck the organization but to prevent, through lack of cooperation of local officials, the functioning of any of its parts. The lack of cooperation of local officials may result in the starvation of all Polish citizens.
[Page 186]As the Polish Minister said, it is a question of mental attitude on the part of the controlling government officials and as long as they are of their present state of mind intercession on specific issues is of no value, in fact it only serves to irritate. I am inclined to agree with him.
In view of the Soviet attitude as reflected in their treatment of the Poles and in the irritation displayed by Soviet officials when we have mentioned the Polish problems to them, I have reached the opinion that expressions by us of interest in the matter or of hope that the Russians and the Poles will be able to come to a mutually satisfactory understanding will serve merely to annoy the Russians, who of course have the upper hand, and to expose us to further rebuffs.
If it is felt that the situation merits action on our part and that Mr. Willkie or some other representative in my opinion should not approach Stalin in an apologetic manner but with firmness and frankness as an interested party.67
He might take the attitude that the American Government is distressed at the friction which has developed in the Soviet Union between Soviet and Polish officials; that friction of this kind between officials of the United Nations is certain, unless eliminated, eventually to work to the advantage of Hitler and to the detriment of the common cause; and that therefore the President of the United States has requested him to state frankly the hope of the American Government that both parties to the dispute, realizing what a valuable weapon knowledge with regard to it would be in the hands of our enemies, will make a sincere endeavor to settle it in a generous and friendly manner, and he might add that the President is, of course, unable and has no desire to judge the merits of the various points at issue. The President is confident, however, that if both parties to the dispute should review their differences in a spirit of good will and mutual confidence, an understanding can be reached which will yield just as much benefit to the common cause as a great military victory.
I have discussed this matter with Henderson and he fully agrees with me that it would do more harm than good for Mr. Willkie to approach Stalin or any other Soviet official except upon a basis similar to that outlined above. It would be helpful if he would be authorized to add that the President is instructing Mr. Biddle in London to discuss the matter in a similar vein with General Sikorski.
Mr. Willkie plans to arrive Kuibyshev about September 16 and will spend one day here.68
- Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.↩
- Henryk Sokolnicki.↩
- This sentence is apparently garbled. The substitution of a comma for the words “and that” after “our part” would make the passage intelligible in the light of the paragraphs following it.↩
- For correspondence concerning Willkie’s mission in the Soviet Union, see pp. 637–650, passim. ↩