Shortly after the departure of the American Ambassador for Moscow on
August 6, the Polish Chargé d’Affaires presented a memorandum to Mr.
Thurston58 in Kuibyshev (copy attached) in regard to the
imprisonment in the Soviet Union of the personnel of the Polish relief
organizations in which the Chargé stated that Mr. Harriman had been
instructed by the President of the United States to intervene with
Stalin to obtain 1) the liberation of those members of the relief
organizations who have been arrested and their departure from the Soviet
Union, and 2) the resumption of the relief work on the grounds that the
supplies were of American origin and because of the interest in the
matter on the part of the United States.59
The American Ambassador inquired of Mr. Harriman whether or not he had
any instructions from the President to this effect to which Mr. Harriman
replied in the negative. He consequently declined to discuss the
question with Stalin.
The Ambassador was later informed that General Anders had arrived in
Moscow on August 14 for the purpose of taking up the matter with both
Messrs. Harriman and Churchill. It appears that Mr. Churchill had an
appointment to meet General Anders at dinner at 8 p.m. on Saturday,
August 15, but that since Mr. Churchill had an appointment with Mr.
Stalin at 7 p.m., which lasted until 3:30 the next morning, he was
unable to keep his appointment with General Anders. Upon the Prime
Minister’s return, he informed the General, who had waited for him, that
he was too tired to discuss the Polish question and that he was leaving
for Cairo almost immediately. He requested the General to come to Cairo
to discuss the question with him there. General Anders informed the
American Ambassador that he was leaving for Tashkent the following
morning and would thence proceed to Cairo.
Although Mr. Harriman endeavored to see General Anders Saturday night,
August 15, he was unable to arrange an appointment in view of the
circumstances described above. The General came to the airfield on the
morning of August 16 but in view of limitations in time he was unable to
exchange much more than pleasantries with Mr. Harriman.
In connection with the present status of Polish-Soviet relations, it is
important to note that at the Kremlin Dinner of August 14, Mr. Stalin,
in referring to the armed forces which were united against the Soviet
Union, included among these “even some of the Poles”. His mention of the
Poles in this connection caused considerable comment among many of the
guests present.
Memorandum From the Polish Chargé d’Affaires in
the Soviet Union (Sokolnicki) to the
American Minister Counselor of Embassy (Thurston)
Polish Citizens in the USSR: Organization of Relief
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Organization of help in the provinces.
It was absolutely impossible to distribute quick and efficient help
to such a large population in a centralized way, that is directly
through the Embassy. The Embassy thus suggested a very simple plan,
according to which representatives of the Embassy would take care of
smaller concentrations of population, and delegates were to be
assigned for larger districts or sometimes provinces.
As a result of numerous conferences of the Polish Embassy and the
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, a common text of
“Decisions concerning the limits of the activity of Delegates of the
Polish Embassy” (note of the Narkomindiel61 of December 23, 1941, and note of the
Embassy of December 24, 1941.) was established. This text gave the
status of Delegates and Representatives of the Embassy. In a further
exchange of notes, it was decided in common that twenty offices of
the Embassy would be established. These offices organized the relief
for the Polish population of 40 administrative districts, with
around 2600 concentrations of Polish citizens. 10 administrative
districts were not to be reached by the relief organization of the
Embassy, that is to say around 200 concentrations of Polish
citizens.
The offices of the Delegates of the Embassy started their work in the
middle of February, and gave, during the five months of their
[Page 180]
existence, enormous
results. 60 million rubles were distributed in individual and
collective allocations, as well as 2 thousand tons of food and
clothing, helping first of all numerous families.
At the same time, a number of welfare organizations came into being.
139 orphanages were created, for around 8 thousand children, 30
homes for invalids, 21 kitchens and 116 food stations for children.
Furthermore, 46 hospitals and 16 ambulances came into being, and
doctors were assigned to each office of a Delegate and to some of
the centers where representatives were acting.
The greatest energy and efforts of the Embassy were directed towards
the organization of a welfare action for children. Orphanages were
created and food centers for the feeding of children. According to a
plan worked out by the Embassy, 30 thousand children were taken care
of in April. At the same time, it made all efforts in order to
evacuate 50 thousand children, who could not be taken care of on the
territory of the USSR. The Soviet Government, in a note of November
12, 1942 [1941], assured the Embassy that all
welfare institutions, and in the first place orphanages, would
obtain special food rations. Unfortunately, the Embassy had
continually great difficulties in obtaining the necessary buildings
and rations. Finally, in the first days of July, the People’s
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs retracted its first promise,
stating that only orphans striate senso could
be taken care of at all. Furthermore it notified the Embassy that it
was not necessary to create orphanages there where Soviet ones
already existed. The Embassy replied to that that it was not only
the question of a material care but also the fact that these
children had to be educated in the Polish language.
Considering all these difficulties, the Embassy came out with the
proposition of evacuating 50 thousand children from the USSR. It
also asked the Allied and friendly nations to accept these Polish
children under their care during the time of the war. This appeal
was answered right away by the democracies of the world; the Soviet
Government having not yet given a favourable answer.
4. Liquidation of the relief organization.
The Embassy was very suddenly notified of the liquidation by the
Soviet authorities of 4 Delegations, which had apparently
accomplished their work for Polish citizens. Then news came in of
arrests of Delegates of the Embassy, not excluding members of the
diplomatic corps, as well as of the personnel of the offices. The
archives were partly taken, bank accounts blocked, only a few
unimportant clerks were left in the offices. Stores of the Embassy,
in which there are at the time more than 2 thousand tons of goods,
are also blocked.
In such a way, help for the Polish population has been made formally
and practically impossible. Nevertheless the Soviet Government
[Page 181]
states, that the
repressions were of an individual character and that the welfare
action of the Embassy can continue. The latest informations received
by the Embassy give a slightly different picture of the
situation.
As a matter of fact the Soviet Government has started the liquidation
of all welfare institutions of the Embassy. In Kustanaj the
authorities have ordered the liquidation of orphanages and food
stations. In Semipalatynsk an orphanage had to be closed. In
Southern Kazakstan the authorities ordered the closing of a small
hospital and an ambulance station. All this shows a planned action
against the welfare activities of the Embassy. It cannot be excused
by fictitious reproaches against this or the other person, and is
directed against the welfare institutions as such. All this action
is also contrary to the solemn assurances given by the Soviet
Government in Kuibyshev and London, to the effect that it was not
the desire of this Government to render impossible all assistance to
Polish citizens.
5. New suggestions of the Soviet Government.
Six weeks have passed since the first arrests, and the Soviet
Government must have realized that all this sudden action must have
been the result of the suspiciousness of certain factors. Finding no
plausible reason to stop completely the relief for Polish citizens,
the Soviet Government came out with a suggestion which might,
according to them, replace the former organization. On August 10,
the Soviet Government proposed the creation of 11 stores of the
Embassy, which would effect in a satisfactory manner a relief action
for the Polish population.
The Polish Government has adopted the attitude that one of the
conditions of the functioning of a welfare organization is the
release of around 70 employees of the Embassy, which would
reestablish a confidence necessary in mutual relations.
Independently of this attitude, the Embassy finds it impossible to
accept the last proposal of the Soviet Government, as it does not
comprise the whole of a relief action. It is rather difficult to
imagine that the manager of such a store, busy with the receiving
and distributing of supplies, could at the same time give medical
care, create and direct orphanages, homes for invalids, food
stations, etc.
On the other hand the Embassy cannot carry on such an action directly
on the territory of 56 provinces with 2800 concentrations of Polish
citizens. It is technically not to be carried out. Moreover, it
would not be advisable to give over to representatives hardly known
to the Embassy enormous sums of money and invaluable supplies. They
would have to work without being under the control of some
intermediary organ: acting between them and the Embassy.
[Page 182]
Trying to find a way out of the situation such as it is now, the
Embassy finds that the best solution would be the creation of a
certain number of consulates. If this suggestion were to be
rejected, the Embassy proposes the creation, alongside the stores,
(12 instead of 11), of an equal number of representatives of the
Embassy who would be entitled to:
-
a)
- inform the Embassy of the needs of the Polish
population;
-
b)
- distribute material help;
-
c)
- distribute relief goods sent from abroad;
-
d)
- give medical care;
-
e)
- create and direct welfare institutions;
-
f)
- help the people to find work;
-
g)
- control the activities of all the smaller
representatives.
If this proposal should also be rejected, then the only possibility
is to give over the entire problem to an organization such as the
Red Cross of one of the Allied countries.
6. Suggestions
In view of the above mentioned facts, it must be stated that the
Polish Government desires to resume the atmosphere of confidence
which reigned in its relations with the Soviet Government. It also
desires to find a mode of relief such that it would completely put
aside any possibilities of future misunderstandings. One of the
factors of such a relief is the evacuation from the USSR of children
who should not bear the tragic and cruel consequences of the war. AH
the joint efforts of both the Soviet and the Polish Government would
not make it possible for these children to stand another winter on
the territory of the Soviet Union.
In accordance with the above mentioned facts the Embassy finds it
absolutely necessary to:
- 1)
- restore the atmosphere of confidence through the release
of its arrested employees;
- 2)
- immediately put into function a relief organization based
on the solution given in par. 5;
- 3)
- establish the number and the manner in which to evacuate
Polish children to countries not in the war zone.
Kuibyshev,
August 12,
1942.
