860C.48/752
The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 3.]
Sir: Supplementing my Despatch Polish series No. 184, July 24, 1942, I have the honor to report receipt of a letter of July 25 from Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Count Raczynski, wherein he states that the crisis in Polish-Soviet relations, brought about three weeks ago by a series of arrests by the Soviet police of the Polish Embassy delegates, shows a tendency to worsen; that it threatens to assume a menacing character.
The Minister went on to draw my attention to an enclosed translation of a telegram (Annex 1 attached hereto32) which the Polish Government had received July 24 from the Polish Chargé d’Affaires in the USSR. He said he had just discussed the subject of this telegram with Sir Alexander Cadogan33 pointing out the “extreme gravity of the situation, not only from the Polish point of view, but also from that of the Allied interest as a whole”. Besides, he had left with Sir Alexander a short confidential memorandum (Annex 2 attached [Page 165] hereto34) as well as a copy of his most recent note of July 24 (Annex 3 attached hereto34) to Russian Ambassador Bogomolov. At the same time, he had emphasized to Sir Alexander the fact that he considered it essential that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden be apprised without delay of the situation which had arisen.
In closing his letter to me, the Minister wrote that Ambassador Ciechanowski had already received instructions “to appeal to the Department of State for immediate American intervention in the matter”. Ciechanowski’s instructions, the Minister said, were based upon the latest information received from Russia. Moreover the Ambassador would put forward arguments similar to those contained in the memorandum to Sir Alexander Cadogan (Annex 2, copies attached hereto).
In brief, the telegram from the Polish Chargé d’Affaires in Kuibyshev, contained in Annex 1, states that the last conversation between the Polish Chargé d’Affaires and Vishinsky regarding the arrest of Polish relief delegates had been inconclusive; that the Chargé d’Affaires suspected that the delay in settling the matter was affording the Soviet authorities time and opportunity not only to study the archives of the Polish delegates, but also to “plant” false documents in the raided offices, with a view to throwing unfavorable light on Polish activities. A serious threat arose from Soviet action, which was aimed at compromising the Polish Welfare Organization, the Polish Embassy, the Polish army, and perhaps even the Polish Government in the international field, in order not only to parry the Polish Government’s entreaties regarding the projected evacuation of Polish troops from Russia, but also to undermine the prestige of the Polish Government in the Anglo-Saxon world. The powerful propaganda machinery of the Comintern seemed already to have been set in motion; foreign press correspondents were being given mysterious hints concerning the alleged unmasking of a large spy ring. It was to be feared that, in the next stage, the Soviet authorities would attempt to justify the violation of the Polish Embassy’s immunity and sequestration of its archives, by invoking the necessity for investigation. The arrest of the Polish Embassy Attaché Slowikowski in front of the Embassy premises had to be considered an ominous warning in this respect.
In brief, the Polish Foreign Minister’s memorandum to Sir Alexander Cadogan, contained in Annex 2, states in effect the following: The bad faith with which the Soviet Government was dealing in the matter of the arrested welfare delegates, as prescribed in the telegram from Polish Embassy, (see Annex 1) was patent. Only a firm attitude on part both of the British and American Governments could bring the Soviet Government to release immediately the arrested [Page 166] Polish functionaries, and to desist from staging a provocative law suit, required perhaps as a diversion activity for internal political reasons. In this extremely dangerous situation, the Polish Government was otherwise left no other alternative save that of appealing openly and plainly to world public opinion, which, due to the Polish Government’s restraint, had hitherto learned nothing concerning (a) the appalling conditions to which the Polish deportees in Russia were being subjected; (b) the cruel exploitation of these deportees; (c) the efforts made by the Commissariat of the Interior, since the very first days of renewed relations with Poland, to recruit, amongst the Polish population deported to the USSR, a host of secret agents and other tools ready to work at the appointed time for a Communist upheaval in Poland. The Polish Government would be forced to give a warning to all institutions and persons contributing their aid to the Polish deportees in USSR—aid which henceforth could not reach these unfortunate people.
In brief, the Polish Foreign Minister’s note of July 24 to Russian Ambassador Bogomolov, contained in Annex 3, is a formal statement of the Polish Government’s case in connection with the arrests of the Polish delegates in Russia.
Respectfully yours,