The Polish Ambassador called at his request. He proceeded to say that his
Government and other interested governments and officials had been
greatly interested in the work that the President and I and my
associates had done to prevent the insertion in the British-Soviet
agreement3 of any territorial provision, referring
especially to the Baltic States and the area thereabouts, and that he
desired especially to thank me for my part in this matter. He added that
it looked like it would be impossible to prevent this territorial
provision being inserted in the treaty and that he and his associates
are all the more grateful for what the President and my associates did
to prevent it. He further discussed the subjects enumerated in the
attached memoranda.
[Annex]
Subjects raised by the Polish Ambassador in
conversation with Secretary of State Cordell Hull on June
13, 1942
I —The Polish Ambassador informed the Secretary of State that General
Sikorski, Prime Minister of Poland, had made a statement on June
11th, in London, defining the attitude of the Polish Government to
the British-Soviet Treaty of Alliance signed in London on the
[Page 154]
26th of May, 1942, and
published on June 11th, 1942. The most important sentences of this
statement are hereto attached.4
On behalf of General Sikorski the Polish Ambassador Asked the
Secretary of State to be kind enough to convey to The President, and
to accept for himself and his collaborators at the Department of
State General Sikorski’s warmest thanks for the invaluable support
given to Poland in the course of the discussions leading to the
conclusion of this Treaty. The Ambassador assured the Secretary of
State that the Polish Government fully realized that American
statesmanship and guidance had most effectively contributed to
eliminate from its text the territorial clauses liable to endanger
the indispensable solidarity of the United Nations.
II —The Polish Ambassador referred to his conversation with the Under
Secretary of State on June 2nd,5 in
the course of which he had the honor to ask for the intervention of
The President and the Secretary of State during their conversations
with Mr. Molotov concerning the outstanding and difficult problems
pending between the Polish Government and the Government of the
USSR., in regard to the continuation of recruitment of Polish
military in Russia and of their evacuation to Iran, to the
liberation of some 8,300 Polish officers who, according to lists in
possession of the Polish Government, have not yet been released by
the Soviet Government, as well as to the evacuation of 50,000 Polish
children at present suffering near famine conditions in the USSR.
The Ambassador expressed regret that it had not been possible to
raise these problems during the visit of Mr. Molotov in
Washington.6
Further recruiting of Polish soldiers in Russia and their speedy
evacuation to Iran, where they could be reconditioned, equipped and
armed and added to the contingent of some 30,000 Polish military
already evacuated from the USSR., is a problem of great importance
and urgency not only to Poland, but at this stage of the war it is
also of considerable importance to the joint effort of the United
Nations. It is certainly of direct importance to Soviet Russia whose
Government is so justifiably insistent on the speedy opening up of a
second front in order to divert some of the enemy’s forces at
present concentrating their main effort against Soviet Russia. It
would be most regrettable if in this situation the United Nations,
including Soviet Russia, were willingly to forego an increase of
some 35,000 to 50,000 additional troops composed of keen Polish
soliders, or even unduly to delay their formation into additional
units available as a reserve army in the Middle East.
[Page 155]
The details of the situation as it now exists in this matter between
the Polish and the USSR. Government have been explained in the
memorandum handed by the Polish Ambassador on June 2nd to the Under
Secretary of State.7
In view of the importance of this question, and of the fact that The
President has on several previous occasions shown so much kindly
understanding of the situation and lent the weight of his valuable
and decisive support to the endeavors of the Polish Government,—the
Polish Ambassador would be most grateful if the Secretary of State
could obtain The President’s consent once more to take this matter
under consideration and to intervene in Moscow in order to obtain
its satisfactory solution in the interests of Poland, of Soviet
Russia, and, in fact, of the joint effort of the United Nations.
The Polish Ambassador would also be most grateful if the USSR.
Government could be made aware that the U.S. Government is
interested in the fate of the Polish officers still detained in
Russia, probably on the islands of the Arctic Ocean or in the
farthest northeastern region of Siberia. The details of this
question are described in the aforementioned memorandum of June
2nd.
The Polish Ambassador expressed the thanks of the Polish Government
for the active way in which the question of the evacuation of Polish
children from Soviet Russia was being handled on the kind initiative
of The President by the Department of State and the American Red
Cross, and expressed the hope that its realization could be speedily
reached on account of the growing mortality among the Polish
children in Russia and its consequent urgency.
