860C.2221/30
The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 8.]
For the President, the Secretary and the Under-Secretary.
Sir: I have the honor to report that in recent conversations with General Sikorski, he spoke of M. Molotov’s visit to the United States and said that he earnestly hoped that you might find your way clear “to bring gentle pressure to bear” for the resumption of recruiting Polish forces in Russia. He was very grateful for efforts which our Ambassador in Moscow had already made on this score. Unfortunately, however, beyond assurances to the Ambassador that everything possible was being done in this connection, the Russian authorities concerned had done nothing to further the recruiting. The General therefore felt confident that if you were to express your interest in this matter, the Russians would lend a receptive ear.
The question of permitting the Polish authorities to resume recruiting, he said, depended on the goodwill of the Soviet Government. The Polish Government had already resorted to all available measures, but with mediocre results, namely partial evacuation into Iran. The only hope for a solution lay in the hands of the British and our Governments. The British Government had already interested itself in this [Page 149] matter, but it was doubtful whether British pressure alone could bring about a positive settlement. It would, therefore, seem that the only practicable possibility of effecting a change in the policy of the Soviet Government in regard to this recruiting question might arise during the pending conversations in Washington. M. Molotov would be requesting the assistance of the United States in many questions of vital importance, and it would only be natural that the Soviet Government would feel under an obligation to comply with a request for a change of policy regarding the fate of many thousands of Polish officers and men, whose presence in the Middle East would be a valuable contribution on Poland’s part towards the common cause of the United Nations.
The General thereupon said, in effect, the following:
Polish Forces. In December last Stalin and General Sikorski agreed to the formation of a Polish Army in Russia 96,000 strong. Furthermore 25,000 men were to be sent to Scotland and the Middle East in order to bring the Polish units stationed there to their full strength.
In March last Stalin summoned General Anders and told him that food shortage compelled him to limit the strength of the Polish Forces in Russia to 44,000 and that the remainder were to be evacuated immediately to Persia. Recruiting was to continue. In actual fact 30,000 men were evacuated to Persia but recruiting was stopped.
In April General Sikorski sent a message to Stalin asking him to continue the recruitment and subsequent evacuation of men. A similar request was made by Ambassador Kot. Stalin replied that conditions were unchanged and that he was unable to alter his policy. His message included a hint that should the present Polish Forces be sent to the front-line, he might be willing to recruit more of them but that he felt unable to provide food for troops not actually fighting. He overlooked the fact that Polish soldiers in the camps have not yet been adequately armed and equipped.
On May 14th Molotov replied to Kot confirming Stalin’s message and adding that Stalin had made no promise to General Anders to continue recruitment and that the agreed evacuation was considered as altogether completed.
Thus the Polish Forces in Russia have been limited to 44,000 men in military camps and 30,000 evacuated to Persia. This limitation is contrary to the figures agreed upon on several occasions between the Polish and Soviet Governments, as well as to the spirit and the very premises of the agreements binding the two countries. There are in Russia many thousands more able Polish men of military age (at least 60,000) most of whom have had military training and who should obviously be enlisted in the military forces. It is in the common interest of the Allies that they should form part of the military formations in the Middle East and not be dispersed, as they are, throughout [Page 150] the Russian East and in many cases idle and suffering from shortage of food.
The Polish Government’s desire is to restart recruitment and, while leaving 44,000 organised forces in Russia, evacuate the remaining men of military age to Persia, where they would join the Polish Army under formation, unless, in view of a real food shortage in Russia, a solution could be found to supply the newly recruited men in Russia from other countries.
In response to my inquiry, the General said that he had already instructed Ambassador Ciechanowski to bring the foregoing to your attention, and he had disclosed the facts to me in order on the one hand to keep me informed, and on the other hand in the hope that I might support his appeal.
Respectfully yours,