Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, General; the British Commonwealth; the Far East, Volume I

840.50/386

The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Matthews ) to the Secretary of State

No. 2954

London , February 26, 1942.
[Received March 12.]

Sir: Referring to certain material with respect to the British proposals for a post-war relief organization prepared by the Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau under the direction of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross—the original copies of which were personally delivered by the Ambassador to the Department—I have the honor to transmit six additional copies each of (a) an outline of the proposed post-war relief organization, (b) notes on the collection and distribution of relief supplies in the immediate post-war period,¹⁰ and (c) notes on the preparatory statistical work and estimates of post-war requirements submitted to the Bureau by the Allied Governments.¹⁰

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim:

Harold Shantz

First Secretary of Embassy

[Enclosure]

Suggested Outline of Post-War Relief Organization Prepared by the Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau

1. Post-war relief will afford the first opportunity for renewed international collaboration and will be a first vital step towards postwar reconstruction; therefore, the principles underlying it should derive from the Atlantic Charter of which it will be the first concrete exposition.

2. The problem to be faced will be one of vast dimensions. The greater part of Europe will emerge from the war denuded of stocks of foodstuffs and raw materials and with few financial resources. Unless steps can be taken rapidly to ensure at least minimum supplies to the the necessitous areas, a process of social disintegration may set in which will create further dangerous political strains. Nor will the problem be confined to Europe; it may equally be necessary to provide relief for countries in the Far East and this will have to be co-ordinated with relief for Europe. Supplies and shipping will require to be allocated on the basis of needs (involving, if necessary, some restriction of goods in short supply); arrangements made to procure the necessary resources and effect their transfer; and effective machinery for control over distribution organised. It appears essential that arrangements should not be left for settlement until an Armistice has been concluded and that plans should be worked out as soon as practicable, revised continually, and be ready for application as soon as hostilities cease.

3. In post-war relief, as in the war, a leading part will naturally and inevitably be taken by the U. S. A., the U. S. S. R. and the British Empire. The United States and the British Empire have a special responsibility in deciding how and in what degree the supplies which Europe is to get should be shared between the nations fairly and on deliberately formulated principles. This is true not solely because the nations of the world will look to them for leadership, nor because of their control of many of the primary resources, but also because with their control of the seas they have the final sanction which can secure an equitable distribution of supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials. But it is very desirable to avoid recourse to sanctions and to secure agreed arrangements on the basis of free co-operation. Moreover, it will be necessary to take full account of political susceptibilities of all the Governments concerned, and particularly of the Soviet Government, which will undoubtedly claim a position of equality with the United States and the British Empire. The different points of view of supplying countries and of countries requiring supplies will also have to be reconciled and a practical plan of action evolved. This is the problem which faces the Governments of the United States and the British Commonwealth.

4. It is clearly desirable that before H. M. Government in the United Kingdom submit to the Allies any statement of policy on this matter, the views of the United States and British Commonwealth Governments on the general principles should be agreed, having regard to the views expressed in the Russian; memorandum, and it is hoped that the proposals made here will provide a basis for discussion between the United States and British Governments.

5. Any programme appears naturally to fall into three divisions (though the second and third may, in practice, have to be planned together), viz:—

(a) Estimation of requirements;

(b) Ascertainment of sources of supplies and of the conditions on which supplies can be made available;

(c) Arrangements for acquisition, transport and distribution to consuming countries.

6. Estimates of Requirements: The first step is clearly to obtain estimates of requirements. As the result of the Allied meeting on 24th September last, the preparation of these estimates, so far as the Allied Governments are concerned, is in hand. This work has to be done by the Allied authorities concerned and does not require any full-time inter-allied staff. The present small British Bureau will collect and tabulate the estimates of the different Allied Governments. These estimates will have to be completed by some tentative estimates of probable requirements of European neutrals and enemy countries, which are being prepared. The results will then require to be coordinated, where necessary, by the Inter-Allied Committee, which will be in the best position to examine the estimates from the interallied standpoint, so as to ensure that they are compiled on similar principles. Any estimates drawn up will, no doubt, require constant revision, but it may be hoped that the Allied Governments and Committee will soon be able to present a first estimate of requirements.

7. Sources of Supply: When this estimate is available, the next step will be to ascertain the potential sources of supplies and the conditions under which supplies can be made available. For this purpose, contact must be established with the supplying countries and insofar as these are not included among the Allied Powers, a broader organisation will be needed.

8. International Relief Council: It is suggested that the political control should be placed in the hands of an international Relief Council whose members would be of ministerial rank. This Council should be set up prior to the coming into force of a general armistice and should have sufficient authority effectively to control imports to and the relief of Europe, China and any other region in which it is decided that relief should be given. The Council would have general responsibility for organising both the procurement of necessary supplies, by gift or otherwise, and their distribution. At the outset, the Council would consist of representatives of the Allied nations and of such neutral nations as are prepared to contribute to relief and are invited to appoint representatives. It would be appropriate that the President should be an American representative, if the United States agree, and that there should be two vice-Presidents, one from the British Empire and one from the U. S. S. R.

9. Executive: This Council will obviously be an unduly large body for practical business and would have to deal only with broad questions of policy. The Council might appoint smaller Advisory Committees for particular purposes, but the detailed work would require to be done by a full-time executive. It is suggested that the Executive should consist of an American Director-General of Relief as Chairman and, say, six members to be in charge of the main branches of relief work. The Executive would be empowered by the Council to settle (subject to such limits as they may lay down) the detailed organisation for each branch. The expenses of administration would be borne jointly by the participating nations, in such proportions as may be agreed.

10. Bureau or Planning Section: The Bureau will continue, under the direction of the Inter-Allied Committee, to perform the functions given it by the Allied Resolution of September 24th, 1941, until the Council and Executive have been established. When such an executive his been appointed, it would appoint the Director of the Bureau. The Bureau should then be expanded by the addition of suitably qualified experts of the countries represented on the Council, who would be selected by the Executive and would become the Planning or Intelligence Section. The Bureau, with the present Allied Committee (if it is retained) would be responsible for investigating relief needs and supply possibilities and reporting to the Executive. Recommendations on measures immediately affecting relief should also be made by the Bureau.

11. Relief Fund: Since relief needs will outrun the resources of most European nations, the first task of the Executive will be to mobilise as large a flow of resources—in cash and in kind—as possible. It is suggested that it should establish a Relief Fund for this purpose under a Chairman (who might also be Chairman of the Finance Committee—see paragraph 12). The various Governments would have to be approached and asked what they would be prepared to contribute and on what conditions. It is very desirable that all such offers should be centralised through one authority.

12. Financial Committee: When information has been obtained as to the supplies likely to be available and the conditions on which they can be obtained, the Executive should set up a Financial Committee, consisting of representatives of the nations primarily concerned with the financing of relief. This Committee would investigate the claims of each country requiring relief and advise on the allocation of contributions received and estimate the extent of further requirements. It would also advise on the most suitable form of further aid if credits and similar support are to be made available.

13. Co-ordination of Purchases: The nations needing supplies will presumably be expected to finance their own requirements so far as possible. In that event, they will probably wish to undertake their own purchasing, and this is reasonable, provided always that their operations do not involve competitive bidding for short supplies. In the case of most, if not all, commodities, the co-ordination of purchasing or, if possible, joint purchasing, will be desirable. If appropriate machinery in the form of an Allied Purchasing Commission or Commissions exists for joint purchasing during the war, it would be preferable to adapt this machinery for co-ordinating relief purchasing under the control of the Relief Council. If adequate machinery is not available or if conditions of extreme scarcity prevail generally or in respect of particular groups of commodities, it will be necessary for the Executive to establish an Allied Food and Supplies Agency or Agencies through which purchasing and control of supplies would be directed. Such an Agency would co-ordinate purchases made by individual countries, which have the necessary resources or can obtain credits, with purchases made by the Relief Organisation on behalf of any countries for which it is acting as the supply authority. Some delicate questions will arise in border-line cases.

14. Relief Services (Field Organisation): The Executive should earmark during the war the nucleus of an administrative section which would be responsible for the organisation of the work in the field when the time comes. Allied relief missions will presumably have to be set up, in conjunction with the national committees of the local Governments, to supervise the distribution of supplies, the organisation of medical relief, the repatriation of displaced peoples, the restoration of communications, the assistance and co-ordination of the work of voluntary organisations and the promotion, as rapidly as possible, of increased production in Europe and the interchange of necessities which in the immediate relief period can only be achieved by an impartial body. It is suggested that there might be a Director of Relief Services, who would draw on the Relief Fund, in accordance with a programme agreed by the Finance Committee. He would also coordinate this programme with that of the Red Cross Societies and other voluntary organisations.

15. Shipping: Any programme of requirements for post-war Europe will presumably exceed the capacity of available shipping. Maintenance of some form of control over shipping will therefore be indispensable in order to carry the maximum amount of priority supplies and avoid waste of tonnage on inessentials. The problem of shipping control is, however, at a different stage from that of European supply. There has hitherto been no Allied organisation for programming (and at the right stage purchasing) essential supplies, for European territories now under Axis control. There is, however, already in existence an Allied pool of tonnage which in principle is; world-wide, and is allocated in consultation between representatives of all the main Allied maritime nations. This machinery, already highly developed, is constantly being improved, and could readily be adapted under Allied control from the service of war to post-war programmes, subject to political decisions in that sense. It will be necessary, in any armistice, to provide for the use under Allied control of enemy shipping.

Unless satisfactory arrangements can be made to control the distribution of supplies by freight allocations alone, it may be necessary to maintain in force, for a time at any rate, after the armistice, the machinery now being utilised to enforce the blockade. The machinery would, however, be operated under the control of the Belief Council in the common interest of all, and not as at present unilaterally.

16. Inland Transport and Communications: Apart from overseas shipping difficulties, the organisation of internal transport in Europe and in the Far East is likely to present many problems and special arrangements will have to be made (in conjunction with the Relief Services Section) to provide adequate communication with the Missions and to secure repaid [rapid?] transit of supplies to necessitous areas.

17. Publicity: The mobilisation of resources for relief and the successful progress of the relief action, on which the re-establishment of European co-operation will depend in large measure, will be greatly aided by the provision of full and accurate news of the needs of the situation in Europe, and by publicity for the plans and actions of the relief organisation. Within Europe the widest publication of this information will strengthen the hope that future international collaboration is realisable; beyond Europe, it will stimulate sympathetic interest and assistance and so will hasten the work of restoration. Therefore, the proposed organisation should provide for a Director of Publicity, who would be expected to make full use of the press, radio and film in order to present information on relief work.

18. The above is an outline of the completed Relief Organisation Naturally, it would not be either necessary or practicable to create it at once; it should be built up by stages as circumstances require. In the first place, there is the present Inter-Allied Committee and Bureau; if and when a broader organisation is agreed, some inter-allied Council and Executive should be created, the Bureau being then expanded into a Planning and Intelligence Section and a nucleus Relief Services and Financial Section being added; finally, the Purchasing, Shipping and Transport Sections would be built in, utilising existing inter-allied agencies, if possible. A skeleton plan of the organisation proposed is attached.¹¹

3 February, 1942.

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