840.50/4122/62/6: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State

327. (a) At the second meeting of the Inter-Allied Council held in London on September 24, last, the Soviet Government made a reservation on the question of the organization of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Relief and also reserved its right to put forth its own proposals at a later date (see penultimate paragraph Embassy’s No. 4522, September 25, 1941.2)

(b) On January 13, Mr. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador, sent Mr. Eden3 a memorandum covering these proposals. According to Sir Frederick Leith-Ross4 copies were transmitted at that time to the representatives of the Dominions and Allied Governments now domiciled in London, but I received copy from Maisky only last night.

Unfortunately Maisky had not been informed by Leith-Ross of full American participation in work of Committee (Department’s telegram 6053, December 29)5 by January 13, the date Maisky sent his memorandum to Eden and above-mentioned representatives, despite the fact that Leith-Ross was advised by me on December 30 last.

(c) The text of the Russian memorandum is as follows:

“In view of the fact a number of important problems concerning the economic life saving of post-war Europe will have an international character, it is considered desirable at the present time to create an international organization, and deal with these problems including that of the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. With this aim in [Page 90] view it is necessary to build up an international organization in the form of an Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements.

1.
The organization of the Inter-Allied Committee. The Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Requirements shall consist of representatives of all the Allied countries on the basis of equality (Great Britain, Canada, Union of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, India, the U. S. S. R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Luxembourg, Free France). The delegates should be members of the respective governments or authorities to represent them on this Committee. The Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements shall have a bureau or secretariat for dealing with the day to day business and technicalities work, consisting of four–five persons appointed by the Committee, including one representative of Great Britain, one representative of the U. S. S. R. and two–three representatives of the other countries participating in the Committee.
To facilitate the work of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements two permanent commissions of experts shall be formed: (a) a commission of foodstuffs and raw materials, and (b) a commission on transport. The members of these commissions shall be experts of all the states concerned.
2.
The tasks of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements.
(1)
The preparation of estimates concerning the requirements in food and raw materials of all the countries occupied and robbed by Hitlerite Germany and her European accomplices.
(2)
The preparation of estimates of resources in food and raw materials of those countries united by the Inter-Allied Committee on Post War Requirements, the United States of America and other countries, which can be used to meet the requirements in food and raw materials of countries occupied and robbed by Hitlerite Germany and her European satellites.
(3)
The allocation of foodstuffs and raw materials among the various countries by the establishment of corresponding quotas.
(4)
The finding of ways and means to facilitate the purchase of foodstuffs and raw materials by the countries which experienced especially severe suffering from Hitler’s aggression and robbery, with the recommendation of credits, loans, et cetera.
(5)
The study of prices of foodstuffs and raw materials and the elaboration of various measures to bring into accord the policy of prices in the various countries in order to combat speculation on the post-war needs of those countries which have suffered from Hitler’s aggression. The purchase and sale of foodstuffs and raw materials, however, should not come within the province of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements.
3.
The legal status of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements and the procedure for taking decisions:
(1)
All decisions of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements shall be taken by the unanimous vote of all the representatives taking part in the proceedings.
(2)
All decisions taken by the Inter-Allied Committee shall come into force only after endorsement by the respective governments.”

[Page 91]

1. A careful study of this document forces one to the conclusion that the language delegating authority is not limited to exploration only, but might be interpreted as a grant of authority to act.

2. Representation under it was evidently based on the assumption that the United States was not officially a participant. The arrangement would give undue influence to Russia through military-geographical factors which might result in pressure on refugee governments. The only reference to the United States in the memorandum is as a source of food and raw materials.

3. Sections 1 and 2 cover larger problem of post-war reconstruction as well as provision for immediate post-war relief.

If this were undertaken it might lead to conflict with other longterm post-war planning and supply organizations and divert the committee from its present task of estimating post-war relief needs.

A danger, as Leith-Ross suggested, was that to establish permanent inter-allied commissions on foodstuffs, raw materials and transport as outlined in paragraph 1 (a) and 1 (b) might lead to such bodies trying “to obtain a vested interest as a result of their activities and to claim to constitute final form for inter-allied control in these fields.” He added that until some approximation has been made as to the magnitude of European requirements and there have been Anglo-American discussions about most appropriate lines of organization, it would be undesirable to set up permanent commissions.

Also it is quite possible that some Latin-American states will be able to make a substantial supply contribution. If so, they should be represented, and likewise China.

4. Section 2 (2) of the memorandum are restricted to countries occupied by Axis forces. This excludes entirely possible Far Eastern requirements, ignores any post-war needs of U. K. and neutral European states and enemy countries.

Not only do these omissions render problematical any comprehensive shipping plans and allocations but the omissions conflict with Prime Minister’s declaration of August 1940 (Embassy’s despatch 5828, August 21, 1940)6 and fourth article Atlantic Charter7 stipulating no difference with respect to relief between victor and vanquished.

A much more complete and critical analysis can be made of this document. I know that Maisky was not aware that we were represented on the Committee until after he had distributed the document. It falls in line with Eden’s suggestion made to the Russians sometime ago that they join in collaborating in the study of post-war planning. [Page 92] I feel it is rather characteristic of Russian policy to get a wider and more immediate approach to post-war problems and to maneuver to dominate a situation. It is my own opinion that the memorandum was prepared before the Eden–Stalin conversations.8 I have asked the Foreign Office to delay taking any action on this matter until the Department has had time to consider it. I would however appreciate an early reply indicating the Department’s position.

Winant
  1. Not printed; for text of the Soviet reservations, see British Cmd. 6315, Misc. No. 3 (1941): Inter-Allied Meeting Held in London at St. James’s Palace on September 24, 1941, Report of Proceedings, p. 29.
  2. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
  3. Director General, British Ministry of Economic Warfare; Chairman of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements; Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government since 1932.
  4. Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, p. 112.
  5. Despatch not printed; for text of Prime Minister Churchill’s declaration of August 20, 1940, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 364, col. 1159.
  6. Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1603; also printed in Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.
  7. See Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, pp. 192205, passim.