Report by the Former Ambassador in Japan (Grew)1

Foreign Relations

After the outbreak of war, Japan’s foreign relations were for practical purposes confined to the countries of the Axis, Soviet Russia, and to Japan’s several Far Eastern satellites principally Thailand and the conquered territories.


Japan’s relations with the Axis may be described as correct but not cordial. There is no evidence that Germany and Italy had been consulted or were even apprised of Japan’s determination to attack on December 8, and it may therefore be assumed that Japan struck at the United States with no definite assurance of Axis support.

After the outbreak of war, Japan lost no time in concluding, on December 11, a pact binding the signatories of the Tripartite Pact of [Page 780] September 27, 1940,2 to a new pledge. By this pact it was agreed that Japan, Germany and Italy should prosecute the war until victory is won; that they should not conclude armistice or peace without complete understanding among them; and that they should cooperate for the purpose of establishing a new order in the meaning of the previous Tripartite Pact.

On January 18, there was signed at Berlin a pact which, according to official announcement, “formulates the basic principle for guidance of strategy against the common enemy of the three nations.” Although no details of this agreement were made public in Tokyo, it was announced that the pact was drawn up in line with the first item of the December 11 agreement, above mentioned. In commenting on the January 18 agreement, the Chugai Shogyo declared that it should serve to quiet Anglo-American propaganda that Japan was waging a racial war against the whites.

Relations with the Axis were discussed by the Foreign Minister3 in his message to the House of Peers on January 21, in the following words:

“Alignment of Japan, Germany and Italy is being further cemented, as you are already aware. Close cooperation among the three allied Powers is steadily taking definite form in military, diplomatic, economic, and various other fields. However frantically America and Britain may endeavor to alienate Japan, Germany and Italy and their allies, there is absolutely no room for such machinations. The iron solidarity of the Axis Powers is not to be compared with that of the so-called ‘Allies’, to whose camp America and Britain have recruited those exiled governments which exist only in name. Thus the cooperation of friendly nations is contributing materially to the prosecution of war especially to the execution of Japan’s policy in the southern regions.”

On the same occasion the Prime Minister4 declared:

“We are profoundly gratified that our Allies, especially Germany and Italy, are steadily winning victories along with Japan for the establishment of a new world order. Japan intends to strengthen further its solidarity with these allied Powers in military, diplomatic, economic and various other spheres and go forth toward the attainment of the common purpose.”

On January 31, the Foreign Minister declared in a meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives:

“The fall of Singapore would mark an important stage of the war. As regards measures to be taken by Japan when Singapore is in our hands, some of them are of a nature which require that we be in closer liaison with the European Axis Powers.

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“We have already reached an agreement with these Powers in regard to military measures we have decided to take when the battle for Singapore is at an end. There are sundry matters of a political and economic nature on which an agreement of views between Japan and its Axis Allies is necessary.

“There is no doubt that there will be a closer liaison between East Asia and Europe as a result of collaboration between Japan and its Axis Allies in working out the problem of dealing with the situation.”

In the extraordinary session of the Diet on May 27, the Prime Minister considered it necessary to comment on Japan’s relations with the Axis in the following manner:

“Even now, America and Britain are spreading mendacious propaganda in efforts to alienate Japan, Germany and Italy, but it is hardly necessary to mention that all such intrigues will be entirely wasted upon the iron alignment of the Axis Powers, which is based upon their common lofty aspirations, animated by their supreme mutual trust.”


Relations with the U.S.S.R., judging by the utterances of Government spokesmen and the press, were characterized by extreme caution and restraint. There was little of the blustering attitude which has been exhibited frequently in the past in dealing with Soviet affairs, and it is obvious from comments in the press that it has been the policy of Japan to avoid any entanglement with the U.S.S.R. which might make it necessary to create a second front in the north.

The statement on December 9 of the Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs announcing Soviet neutrality and declaring that relations with Japan would be regulated by the Pact of April 11 [13],5 was greeted with satisfaction in Japan. In the emergency session of the Diet on December 16, the Foreign Minister declared:

“In reference to Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union, there is no change in the Imperial Government’s attitude for ensuring security in the North, as already clarified at the previous session of the Diet. On the part of the Soviet Government, they, too, have repeatedly enunciated their intention to abide by the Neutrality Pact with Japan.”

Similarly, on January 21, the Foreign Minister declared in the House of Peers:

“The relations between Japan and the Soviet Union have since witnessed no change. Their relations are still regulated by the Neutrality Pact. The rumors of various kinds emanating as a result of the Soviet Union’s conversations with America and Britain, should not have any effect at all upon the present relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.”

[Page 782]

In reply to an interpellation in the House of Peers, the Foreign Minister stated on February 8:

“Negotiations for a fishery pact with Soviet Russia, which were broken off by the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, were resumed last December and efforts are being directed toward obtaining at least a provisional agreement for the time being.

“Japanese petroleum enterprises in north Saghalien, which operations were suspended several months ago, are now being resumed although there are still many obstacles in the way of normal oil production there by Japanese industrialists.”

This reference to difficulties in Saghalien appears to have aroused the interest of the newspaper correspondents who on the following day, February 9, put several questions to the spokesman of the Board of Information. The following is an excerpt from the Times and Advertiser:

“‘It is reported that the Japanese companies in the north of Saghalien are encountering difficulties in their work’, said one foreign correspondent. ‘Can you tell us what sort of difficulties these are?’

“‘I am not informed about the matter’, replied the spokesman. ‘Probably the companies are having labor difficulties, which, though they may not be trivial to the companies concerned, have nothing to do with politics. There is nothing political about their difficulties.’”

Announcement of the successful conclusion of a fisheries modus vivendi was made by the Board of Information on March 23, as follows:

“The negotiation for the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Convention continued to be held last year but was in abeyance on account of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war and consequently the negotiation could not reach a conclusion by the end of the previous year. Conversations, therefore, have been conducted since December last for a conclusion of a modus vivendi to extend the validity of the existing Fisheries Convention to the end of this year. These negotiations having now reached a satisfactory conclusion, a modus vivendi was signed on March 20 at Kuibishev between the Japanese Ambassador, Lieutenant-General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, and the Soviet Acting Foreign Commissar, A. J. Vyschinsky.”

Comment by the Japanese press in regard to this agreement carried an undercurrent of disappointment and distrust. The Yomiuri’s comment is typical:

“As long as the present agreement remains a modus vivendi, we cannot expect cessation even temporarily, of the Anglo-American maneuvers for the alienation of Japanese-Soviet relations. In view of the importance of the so-called northern route particularly as the [Page 783] result of the wholesale losses of Pacific bases, the United States will desperately try to work toward the Soviet Union for the use of this route.”

In a speech at the Japan Industrial Club on April 22, the Foreign Minister declared:

“Japan-Soviet relations at present are fast becoming the cynosure of the world, and the enemy countries are trying feverishly to give rise to various groundless rumors in this connection.

“Competent authorities of the Soviet Union, however, have clarified time and again their intention of adhering strictly to the clauses stipulated in the Neutrality Pact existing between the two countries. Consequently, it is only too clear that their sagacity will keep them from taking such a rash step as to ‘pick the chestnut out of the fire’ for America and Britain despite their machinations.”

In his address before the Diet on May 27, the Foreign Minister declared:

“The relations between Japan and the Soviet Union have undergone no change even after the outbreak of the War of Greater East Asia. It has been reaffirmed quite recently that the Soviet Union intends to regulate her relations with Japan by the Neutrality Pact and that, accordingly, she has no intention whatever to place her territory as military bases at the disposal of our enemy countries. With the progress of the war, the enemy countries will, I presume, intensify their insidious maneuvers to alienate Japan and the Soviet Union but there is no chance for such intrigues to bear fruit so long as the Soviet Union firmly maintains the attitude mentioned above. Meanwhile, we, on our part, will continue to watch the situation with a calm attitude from the standpoint of preserving security in the North.”

Outer Mongolia

A communiqué issued on May 15 by the “Manchukuo” Government, reads as follows:

“The comprehensive protocol and its annexe concerning the work of the Mixed Border Delimitation Committee organized for settling the border disputes which arose in the year 1938 between Manchoukuo and the Republic of Outer Mongolia,6 which documents were signed between the authorized representatives of the two countries on October 15 last year in Harbin, having been formally ratified by the Governments of the two nations, they notified each other in writing on May 5, of the ratification of the said protocol and its annexe.”

French Indo-China

Relations with French Indo-China were characterized by steady Japanese encroachment on French authority and by more complete domination by Japan of that hapless country.

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On December 12, soon after the outbreak of war, the Imperial Headquarters announced:

“A military agreement was concluded between Japan and French Indo-China. It was signed at 8:30 p.m. Monday (presumably December 8) between the Highest Commanders of the Japanese Army and Navy Forces in French Indo-China and the Government of French Indo-China. This agreement was based on the Japanese-French Indo-Chinese Common Defense Agreement concluded in July.”

In a speech of December 16, before the Diet the Foreign Minister stated:

“With respect to French Indo-China, France has manifested her complete understanding of our position and has been strengthening further the cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China, rendering all facilities for the execution of the joint defense. Our position for breaking through the encircling front has thus been rapidly augmented in scope and strength through our peaceful cooperation with friendly nations.…”8

Notwithstanding the amiable utterances of the Foreign Minister there appears to have been some dissatisfaction with the attitude of the French authorities on the part of Japan. It appears that the Indo-Chinese Government had not shown sufficient resolution in extirpating De Gaullist9 sympathy in Indo-China, for in an editorial of January 29, entitled “Warning to the French Government Authorities and People in East Asia”, the Japan Times and Advertiser declared threateningly:

“In defiance of this express proclamation of Governor-General Decoux (of French Indo-China) in behalf of the Vichy Government, the De Gaullists’ anti-Japanese activities are still going on …8 and are playing the part of puppets on the palm of Britain.…8

“If the present situation continues in French Indo-China and in the French territories in the Pacific, Japan will have to adopt necessary steps to eliminate it by haying recourse to force. It is well for the French Government authorities to bear in mind the fact that if things come to such a pass, the strenuous efforts of the Vichy Government, of Governor-General Decoux and of other authorities on the spot to maintain the security of French Indo-China and other French territories in coordination with Japan, will be nullified with the result that all French territories in East Asia will face a wholesale collapse. This is the best opportunity for them to reconsider their attitude.”

The press reported on June 4 that an economic agreement had been reached between the Japanese and French authorities in Indo-China [Page 785] and would shortly thereafter be signed. The principal purpose of the agreement appears to have been the supplying of rice to Japan, but mention is also made of bauxite, jute, tannin, charcoal and other materials for export to Japan, payment therefor presumably to be made in yen.


The Board of Information made public on December 8 the following announcement:

“Concerning the affording of facilities by the Thai side for the passage of Japanese troops through that country, an agreement was concluded at 12:30 p.m. today between Japan and Thailand.”

As far as can be determined from the press, this agreement between Japan and Thailand was solely a verbal understanding reached in a conversation between the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok10 and the Thai Prime Minister,11 which took place on the morning of the 8th.

A statement issued by the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok on December 10 contains the following somewhat sinister expression of appreciation.

“It is highly congratulatory that Thailand should not have followed the example of Jugoslavia and Greece. And we congratulate Thai leaders on their wisdom.

“It is promised in the agreement to respect the sovereignty, independence and honor of Thailand. This means that the passage of the Japanese troops through Thailand is a tentative measure and that Japan aims at Britain and not Thailand. The friendly and cooperative spirit on the Japanese part toward Thailand is unshakable in nature and will be further cemented.”

A formal treaty of alliance between Thailand and Japan was signed at Bangkok on December 21. It is reported that the signature took place in the presence of 25 high Buddhist priests, who stood a little way from the desk where the signing took place and chanted sutras. It may be mentioned in this connection that Japan is placing heavy emphasis on the religious bond between the people of Japan and those of the occupied countries where Buddhism is the principal religion, obviously with the purpose of posing as the champion of Buddhist peoples.

In accordance with the terms of the defensive alliance between Japan and Thailand, the Government of Thailand officially declared war on the United States and Great Britain on January 25.12 No explanation was given for the fact that more than a month intervened between the signing of the alliance and the declaration of war.

[Page 786]

In line with Japan’s determination to set up a yen bloc in the Far East and to make the economic systems of the occupied territories subsidiary to that of Japan, an agreement was concluded on April 21 in Tokyo with the head of the visiting Thai Economic Mission, fixing the value of the baht at par with the yen. Editorial comment in the Japanese press indicated that Thailand offered some resistance to the depreciation of its currency which, previous to the agreement, was worth about one yen fifty-five sen, in the fear of adverse effect upon prices in Thailand. The advantage to Japan is, of course, that shipments of Thai rice, which are sorely needed in Japan because of the poor crops in recent years, can be paid for in yen at a low rate of exchange. An official statement issued by the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok declared:

“An understanding has been reached between the two nations to make efforts to prevent sudden disadvantageous effects upon Thailand by raising the value of exports from Thailand to Japan by a reasonable amount.

“For instance, the export price of Thai rice to Japan shall be raised to a reasonable level, while Japan agrees not to raise the prices of her exports to Thailand beyond the prices at which they were exported to Thailand prior to the revision of the exchange rate.

“It was also agreed that after April 22, the gold to be purchased in Bangkok by Japan shall contain 0.25974 grams of pure gold per baht.”

A further agreement signed in Tokyo on May 2, provides for the settlement of payments between the two countries on the basis of the Japanese yen instead of in sterling or dollars as in the past. The official announcement said that it had also been agreed that Thailand is to adopt yen as the medium for the settlement of all payments between Thailand and Manchukuo and the Nanking regime in China, as well as the territories under Japanese occupation.


On March 27, the Foreign Office spokesman announced that the Japanese Government had decided to send a Minister to the Vatican. The announcement read:

“In view of the present world situation as well as the presence in Greater East Asia of numerous adherents of the Roman Catholic faith, the sign of promoting the friendly relations and mutual contact between Japan and the Holy See hardly requires an explanation.”

In reply to questions the spokesman is reported to have stated that the sending of a Minister did not signify the formal or technical opening of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Holy See. “It is a kind of de facto diplomatic relationship”, declared the spokesman. It will be remembered that the Vatican has been represented in Tokyo [Page 787] for about ten years by an Apostolic Delegate who has had diplomatic status. Comment in the press suggests that the Japanese move is designed to make a favorable impression on the very considerable number of Catholic peoples now under the control of Japan in occupied territories. It will also be recalled that in 1921 the Government included in the budget a sum to defray the cost of establishing a diplomatic mission at the Vatican. As the result of strong protests by Buddhist organizations, the project was finally dropped.

The Philippines

No effort will be made in this report to recount military events in the Philippine Islands. The following items have been selected at random from the press as having possible interest.

On January 20, the Foreign Minister stated in the course of a speech in the Diet:

“As regards the Philippines, if the people of those islands will hereafter understand the real intentions of Japan and offer to cooperate with us as one of the partners for the establishment of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan will gladly enable them to enjoy the honor of independence.”

The Commander of the Japanese forces in the Philippine area13 is reported to have declared in a statement issued on February 11 to the Philippine people:

“You must remember how you have been treated up to now by your American leaders, who robbed you of your much-aspired independence and did all to place you under relentless exploitation. The time has come, however, when you now can do everything yourselves to realize the desire of independence, through our support which is based on the glorious principle of Jimmu Tenno.”

On February 13, the spokesman of the Board of Information is reported to have been asked by a correspondent to clarify the alleged declaration of the Japanese Army spokesman in the Philippines that the aid given by the Viscayans and the Mindanaonese to the Americans would have grave consequences on the future independence of the Philippines. This declaration, which was not reported in the Japanese press, is said to have been made at a mass meeting of Japanese in the Philippines on February 11. The spokesman replied, “I have no official information about the matter, but it is natural that differentiation should be made between those tribes who will, and who will not, cooperate with the Japanese.”

Some interesting remarks in regard to Philippine independence are attributed by the Japan Times and Advertiser of June 5, to Mr. Shozo Murata, former Railway Minister and now supreme advisor to the Imperial Army of Occupation in the Philippines. Mr. Murata [Page 788] declared flatly to a representative of the Nichi Nichi that the Filipinos would have to lift themselves to a higher plane of culture if they wished to have Japan give them independence:

“There seems to be something in the attitude of the Filipinos on the question of their future national status, which I want to see righted at the earliest opportunity. With the commander of the forces occupying the islands, I regret profoundly that the insular people have a tendency to neglect the cultivation of those qualities, which they are expected to display before they can convince Japan that the time is ripe for them to manage their affairs in their own way. To do nothing but stand on their rights is not the way in which Japan expects them to do things.14

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“Independence would not come the way of the Filipinos by simply talking of an independent national life for them. There is a lot of things they have to do before they can convince Japan that the affairs of the islands will be safe in their hands.”

Mr. Murata was then asked whether the Filipinos are in the state of mind in which a people agitating for independence should be. His reply was:

“These people are not independent, spiritually. This is a discovery which is never surprising. They have no culture of their own. How could a people, culturally bankrupt, be independent spiritually?

“They are clamoring for independence. But they have no power which will support them in their independence movement. The worst part of the matter is that they are not aware of the fact that they lack the spiritual power, which means a great deal for a popular movement.”

Much publicity was given in the Japanese press to a report from the Philippines that Mr. Quezon, President of the Philippine Common wealth, had been assassinated on the order of General MacArthur.15

A revealing item in the Advertiser of May 18, quoting a despatch in the Nichi Nichi, describes the formation and activities of a corps of vigilantes in the Philippines. This corps was secretly organized in September of last year at the time of increasing tension in Japanese-American relations, and developed into a volunteer corps of 560 young men. By virtue of their knowledge of the native languages and their acquaintance with the countryside these vigilantes are said to have proved to be a valuable asset to the Japanese Army. The newspapers [Page 789] frequently carry stories of the valuable services rendered to the invading Japanese armies by local Japanese residents of various regions.

Latin America

For some years past the Japanese Government has evinced increasing interest in Latin America, where Japanese commercial interests have rapidly developed and where Japanese immigrants now number more than 200,000. For these reasons, the attitude of Latin America toward the war was watched with the keenest interest in Tokyo, as was shown by the preoccupation of the press with developments at the Rio conference.16

In the Diet, on January 21, the Foreign Minister declared:

“It is Japan’s intention to maintain, as much as possible, cordial relations with all neutral powers in South America and Europe. We are prepared to respect fully the position of South American countries, so long as they are not misled by American machinations and do not adopt a hostile or unfriendly attitude toward Japan. The Japanese Government, however, are paying close attention to the Rio de Janeiro conference which is now in session. It is nothing but the Anglo-American design to dominate the whole world that Japan regards with hostility.”

Official chagrin at the result of the Rio conference was clearly manifested in utterances by officials. For example, on January 26, the spokesman of the Board of Information stated that the United States,

“in view of strong opposition by the leading South American Republics, have resorted to all sorts of tactics, political, economic, and military, to cajole or intimidate them in order to attain the egotistic purpose of the northern colossus. For example, Brazil is reported to have been intimidated by the United States by an economic boycott and oppression. Peru is reported to have been challenged by the forcing of an unfavorable decision of its pending border dispute. Argentina was intimidated by the United States even to the extent of being interfered with in its own internal affairs by a revolution planned by the United States …17 All these examples are an exposé of the highly touted good neighbor policy.”

In his report to the Diet on February 16, the Prime Minister stated:

“As regards South America and other neutral countries, it is my firm belief that they will understand our real intentions and will not commit the folly of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire under the pressure of the United States and Britain.”

[Here follow sections on internal affairs, the Diet and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, budget, bond issues, and food and clothing.]

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It is not easy for the foreign observer to estimate with confidence the state of mind of the average Japanese toward the war. More than four years of struggle in China, with its attendant losses and hardships, have rendered the Japanese less susceptible to officially inspired enthusiasm for further adventures but it has also inured them to stresses and made them more able to stand the strain of new sacrifices. Certainly, prior to the outbreak of war, Japanese of all classes regarded with dread the prospect of conflict with two of the most powerful nations in the world, and there can be no doubt that the outbreak of war brought little but dire forebodings to the majority of the Japanese.

Nevertheless, no people at war whose military forces can report continued successes, especially the breath-taking successes achieved by Japan during the first six months of war, need worry about morale. Despite the appalling dangers faced by their country; despite the belief among many thinking people that a decisive victory over the democracies is impossible of attainment; despite the increasing difficulty of obtaining the necessities of life; and despite the absence of almost all of the more pleasant features of life; it may safely be said that at the present time the average Japanese faces the war confidently, resolutely, and fairly cheerfully. What changes would take place in his attitude in the event of serious and visible losses can, of course, only be estimated, but it is the belief of those who have lived long in Japan that the Japanese people are easily capable of sustaining far greater privation and far more sacrifice than they have thus far been called on to undergo. Every Japanese has been thoroughly indoctrinated with the belief that this is a war of survival and that whereas winning the war would open to Japan a glorious vista of wealth and power, loss of the war would mean certain destruction of most of Japan’s proud achievements of the last half century.

Certainly, the Japanese leaders have not attempted to deceive the people into taking an unduly optimistic view of the difficulties faced. The contrary is true. A few quotations from the public utterances of Japanese leaders may be of interest in this connection:

On December 17, the Prime Minister declared, in the course of his speech in the Diet:

“We are prepared that the war will be a long one. We must, therefore, definitely bear in mind that our country will hereafter meet many difficulties.…18 The war remains rather to be fought hereafter. We should not be intoxicated with individual victories and worry about individual phenomena.”

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On February 16, the Prime Minister, in reporting on the Singapore victory, declared:

“Singapore has now fallen. But this means that it marks the completion of only the first stage in the prosecution of the war of Greater East Asia. There should be no relaxation of morale nor allowing themselves to be elated by victory on the part of our people. The war remains to be fought hereafter.”

On January 8, the President of the Industrial Corporation declared:

“It is natural that all Japan should now be exultant over the brilliant war results. However, if anyone should think that the time of hardships has passed away or the age of abundance will soon come, it is an enormous fallacy. We must tread a rough path for several years more before we can enjoy the abundant supplies of southern areas.”

On March 14, the Home Minister19 declared in the course of a public address:

“The decisive [engagement?] in the battle of the war of Greater East Asia has yet to be fought. Instead of being intoxicated by the brilliant victories achieved by the Japanese forces in the initial stages of the war, therefore, the nation must realize that the present war is destined to become protracted and must accordingly put forth its best endeavors to build up a high degree defense state to cope successfully with the war situation.”

On April 12, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Office declared in a public statement:

“Some people seem inclined to conclude from the remarkably favorable program of Japanese military operations in the War of Greater East Asia that the day is not far off when the United States and Britain will sue for peace and the war will come to an end, but such an idea is vastly mistaken. The harder part of the War of Greater East Asia is yet to be fought hereafter. Instead of being intoxicated with the brilliant successes so far achieved, the nation must form a firmer resolve and bend its entire energy to attain the object of southern construction and final victory in the war.”

[Here follow sections on shipping, propaganda atrocity stories, foreign clubs, enemy assets, gold, new Bank of Japan law, rumor law, and Chinese merchants in occupied territories.]

  1. Prepared aboard M. S. Gripsholm in response to Department’s telegram No. 64, July 2, 11 p.m., sent to the Consul at Lourenço Marques; transmitted to the Department by Mr. Grew in his unnumbered despatch dated August 19, 1942, received August 26. Mr. Grew noted in the despatch: “The present report was written at sea, and I trust that its limitations may be overlooked in view of the paucity of the reference materials available. It should also be borne in mind that after the outbreak of war my staff and I were confined strictly within the walls of the Embassy and almost completely cut off from the currents of Japanese life.” Mr. Grew also indicated in his despatch that this report supplemented an undated report on economic and financial developments in Japan from December 8, 1941, to June 1, 1942, which was prepared by the Commercial Attaché in Japan (Williams) and was transmitted to the Department in an unnumbered despatch dated June 3, 1942 (894.50/164).

    The Gripsholm was used in exchange of persons between the United States and Japan. For correspondence on exchange agreement with Japan, see pp. 377 ff.

  2. Signed at Berlin; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 386.
  3. Shigenori Togo.
  4. Gen. Hideki Tojo.
  5. For text, see telegram No. 763, April 13, 1941, 11 p.m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 944.
  6. For correspondence on the border disputes, see Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. iii, pp. 441 ff., passim.
  7. Omission indicated in the original report.
  8. Gen. Charles de Gaulle was President of the National Committee of the Free French at London.
  9. Omission indicated in the original report.
  10. Omission indicated in the original report.
  11. Teiji Tsubokami.
  12. Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram.
  13. See telegram No. 350, February 2, from the Chargé in Switzerland, p. 915.
  14. Gen. Masaharu Homma.
  15. The following omission indicated in the original report.
  16. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General of U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.
  17. Third meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, held at Rio de Janeiro, January 15–28, 1942; for correspondence, see vol. v.
  18. Omission indicated in the original report.
  19. Omission indicated in the original report.
  20. Michio Yuzawa.