845.01/176: Telegram
The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 4—6:09 p.m.]
263. For the President and Secretary. Congress resolutions followed Gandhi lead of non-resistance even to Japs. Defense of India will be most difficult, if not impossible, unless there is some agreement between Nehru elements in Congress, Jinnah of Muslim League and Rajagopalachari who resigned from Congress Working Committee but who favors resisting Japs. Rajagopalachari and Nehru really feel very much the same although Nehru remains in Congress to fight from within. I feel strongly that in our own interests one more effort should be made.
The following program would fit into Cripps’ remarks to me and come within the scope of his broadcasts:
The Congress has not accepted the view that major changes in the constitution are not possible during the war. Nevertheless in order to facilitate a settlement, it is prepared to agree to a declaration by the British Cabinet on the following lines: [Page 649]
Indian leaders attach the greatest importance to arrangements for the administration of India in the immediate future. The British Cabinet is willing to go to the farthest limits possible within the framework of the existing constitution to convert the Executive Council into a national government in practice.
For this purpose, the Viceroy is being authorized to invite small number of representative leaders to examine the constitution from this standpoint. The Cabinet accepts the view that minor changes in the act, alterations in the methods of functioning of the Executive Council and in the central legislature by resort to rule making powers, and the establishment of suitable conventions are permissible within the meaning of the formula contained in the last paragraph.
The Cabinet will accept the decisions of such a body and ask the Viceroy to proceed to the formation of a national government to replace the present Executive Council. He will discuss with that body the composition and personnel of the National Government which must necessarily include in adequate proportions representatives of the two main political organizations, namely the Congress and the Muslim League.
There have been apprehensions expressed in India about the Viceroy’s powers of veto. Under the constitution, he is bound by the decisions of the majority of the Executive Council, unless the adoption of such a course is likely, in his opinion, to imperil the safety or tranquillity of India or any part of India.
It is inconceivable that the Viceroy, to borrow the language in which he conveyed a similar assurance to the Congress Party in 1937, before it agreed to take office in the provinces, “will act against the advice of the Executive Council, until he has exhausted all methods of convincing the Council that his decision is the right one”. He will “do his utmost, before taking a final decision, to persuade his Council of the soundness of the reasons for which he is unable to accept its view”.
In the sphere of defence, it has already been agreed that the Indian defence member will take over all such functions as are not assigned to the Commander in Chief who as war member will continue to be a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council. There will naturally be the closest consultation and collaboration between the two. Moreover, the Commander in Chief as a member of the Executive Council will be responsible to the Executive Council for all measures and policies originating from his department. The precise allocation of subjects for administration by the defence and war members respectively will also be left to the Viceroy and the conference of leaders for settlement with the Commander in Chief invited to take part in the discussions. In the event of disagreement, the matter will be referred to the War Cabinet in London, whose decision will be final.
If Churchill and Cripps would approve above generally, then through Viceroy, at London’s direction, Nehru, Jinnah, and Rajagopalachari [Page 650] could be brought together here and if necessary taken to London for final agreement. I can persuade Nehru and Rajagopalachari to attend meeting. Viceroy can get Jinnah. Before meeting I would have G. D. Birla, most prominent industrialist and backer of Gandhi, talk with Gandhi.
Both Congress and Cripps have stated there will be no further approach by either; therefore outside move must be made if India is to defend herself and not be another France. At this distance, I believe no one but President can move successfully. Nehru writes me today of “fierce feeling against Britain”. America alone can save India for the United Nations cause and my suggestion ought not be disposed of on basis of meddling in internal affairs of a subject nation. I respectfully urge that saving India concerns America as much as Great Britain. The effort can not harm. It may be the miracle. I urge immediate consideration and being on the ground, pray for President’s aid. Time of essence.