The Chinese Minister for Foreign
Affairs (Soong) to President
Roosevelt18
[Washington,] February 25,
1942.
My Dear Mr. President: General Chiang
Kai-shek has sent me a message from Kunming which he asked me to
deliver to you in person, and which I am enclosing herewith. As
you have been so generous to me in giving me your time in the
past, I forbear to impose myself further on you unless you
desire to discuss the message with me.
[Page 605]
The Canadian Government is making arrangements for me to make a
short visit to Canada, leaving tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m. and
returning in about three days. If necessary, however, I would of
course postpone my departure.
With high regard, I am,
Yours sincerely,
[Enclosure]
Telegram From General Chiang Kai-shek to Dr.
T. V. Soong, Dated
Kunming, February 24th
‘I have conveyed to Wellington Koo19 the following instructions:
“I presume you have seen my farewell message to
India.20 Please take this opportunity to
tell Churchill that I am personally shocked by the
Indian military and political situation which are in
such a state that I could never conceive of before I
arrived in India. I am afraid Churchill himself does
not know the real situation. It may be best to talk
to Cripps21 first and for him to
inform Churchill.
“I have tried to view the colonial problem most
objectively. I could not but speak frankly of what I
thought. But I feel strongly that if the Indian
political problem is not immediately and urgently
solved, the danger will be daily increasing. If the
British Government should wait until Japanese planes
begin to bomb India and the Indian morale collapses,
it would already be too late. If the solution is
postponed until after the Japanese armies enter
India, then it will be certainly too late. If the
Japanese should know of the real situation and
attack India, they would be virtually unopposed.
“If the political situation in India were to change
for the better, this may prevent the enemy from
having any ambitions to enter India.
“Please convey the above to Cripps. Also point out
that, in my opinion, if the British Government
should voluntarily give the Indians real power and
do not allow different parties in India to cause
confusion, the Indians would change their attitude
toward England, forget their hard feelings and
become loyal to the British Empire. Only such a
policy could halt the Indian trend to part from the
British Empire and make it obvious that it is
unpolitic and disadvantageous to secede from the
Empire.”
Please convey my views to the President. In a word the danger
is extreme. If the British Government does not fundamentally
change their policy toward India, it would be like
presenting India to the
[Page 606]
enemy and inviting them to quickly
occupy India. When I think of it I am both worried and
alarmed. Besides deluding themselves and deluding the people
with the belief that there is no immediate danger, there is
no realization that war is on and there is no determined
spirit to fight. The defeat in Malaya was so rapid, probably
for similar reasons, and as for military preparations, the
present Indian military preparedness very much behind even
of that the British had in Malaya.’
