845.00/1263 ½

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State

Mr. Secretary: The Diplomatic Agent of the Indian Empire2 has taken up with me the Report on India’s War Effort, recently issued by the Indian Government.

This report traces the steps taken by India to increase her fighting forces and her services of supply; but it forecasts steps needed to increase still further and in greater volume her actual ability to resist the enemy and to supply forces for fighting the common enemy in the Near Eastern and Far Eastern areas.

The report makes it plain that any considerable increase of India’s war effort is dependent in considerable degree upon the United States; [Page 594] and the object of Sir Girja in taking it up was to ascertain whether the Government of the United States could be of active assistance in developing the added fighting resources of India.

The report says, among other things, that “she (India) relies and will continue to rely upon the United Kingdom and the United States of America for some key items of supply, but she has modernized and expanded her ordnance factories.”

It is also stated “she (India) looks first and always to her sisters, of the eastern group—South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and the smaller countries of the group, but they too are, for the main part, countries in which industrial enterprise is still young, and the whole group must go further afield for many of its needs. There is now a steady flow of the more modern types of equipment from the United Kingdom, but the releases have never been and cannot be equalled to India’s needs; which can, in fact, only be met by participation in the generous flow of help from the United States of America.”

The program set out in the report contemplates raising 124 Indian infantry battalions, raising the total strength of the Indian Army to approximately one and one-half million men. It is suggested that this might be increased. The potential effect of an army of that size in the Far East is obvious; and the value of Indian fighting troops is attested both by the history of the last war, and by the very great part which Indian troops have played in the fighting in the Middle East in the present war.

The limiting factors are stated as being:

(1)
A shortage of officer material—which is, of course, a strictly Indian and British problem;
(2)
A shortage of medical officers—and the report adds that it is very doubtful whether this shortage can be made up from the United Kingdom or British Empire resources;
(3)
A shortage of matériel listed in Appendix III of the report;
(4)
A shortage of instructional staff and trainer equipment for the air force; and
(5)
Shortages of non-ferrous metals, notably, tin, lead, zinc, tungsten and of aluminum manufactures.

She likewise needs certain general engineering stores, notably, generating sets and motors and machine tools. Her motor vehicles have been procured entirely from the United States.

It seems obvious that for a considerable period of time transport from the United States to the Far East will be limited, difficult and dangerous. Anything which can be produced in the Far East is, therefore, far more advantageous to the common effort than material” manufactured here which must abide the hazards of transport.

If, by technical assistance in India, plus limited quantities of machine tools and parts, the strength of the Indian Army can be considerably [Page 595] increased, we will effect a considerable economy in the war effort, will make more effective use of Indian man power, and will be building up a defensive and offensive striking power in a region where it is vitally necessary.

I propose accordingly:

(1)
That we send a capable representative to India, preferably someone chosen by OPM3 and Lend Lease, qualified to make a rapid survey of the possibility of increasing Indian supply along the lines indicated in the report on India’s War Effort;
(2)
That he be directed to report by cable through our diplomatic agent as to the type of assistance which would best contribute to India’s ability to equip herself and the best method of localizing and planning the work;
(3)
That through OPM, Lend Lease and ourselves we thereupon facilitate the execution of any plan agreed on between the British and ourselves as a result of the survey.

It would be advisable to take the matter up in London prior to attempting any steps in this direction.

A[dolf] A. B[erle], Jr.
  1. Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Agent General for India.
  2. Office of Production Management.