Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, General; the British Commonwealth; the Far East, Volume I

390.1115A/1407a

Memorandum by the Assistant Chiefs of the Special Division (Keeley and Clattenburg) to President Roosevelt

[Washington,] December 16, 1942.

Status of the Negotiations With Japan for a Second Exchange of American and Japanese Nationals

Basic Agreement

The Japanese Government’s proposal for an all-out exchange of the nationals of each country temporarily resident in the other, as well as of certain permanent residents, without regard to their possible usefulness in the war effort, was accepted by this Government without reservation. A similar exchange agreement with Germany has provided that each party thereto might Withhold from the exchange anyone whose repatriation might be considered inimical to the national interests. An all-out exchange without this exception was considered to be necessary with respect to Japan because of the uncivilized treatment to which American nationals left in Japan and Japanese-occupied areas might be expected to be exposed as the intensity of the war would increase.

First Exchange

The first exchange was facilitated by reason of the fact that it was largely composed of officials of the two Governments concerning whose exchange there was no question. Even so, the first exchange was temporarily held up at the last minute by the Japanese Government’s insistence upon the inclusion of certain non-official nationals tardily designated by it for that exchange. Some few of these could not be produced at the moment, and rather than hold up the departure of the vessel were promised for the next exchange.

Negotiations for a Second Exchange

As soon as the Gripsholm left on its first voyage, late in June, the Department of State began to prepare a tentative passenger list for the second exchange. It included the few Japanese nationals promised for the second exchange and the remainder of those until then designated by the Japanese Government for repatriation, but it was largely made up of Japanese nationals not so designated who had voluntarily expressed their desire to be repatriated. Just as this list was about to be presented early in August to the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the United States, the Swiss Government in charge of American interests in Japan informed the Department that the Japanese Government wished included in the second exchange only those Japanese nationals designated by it. The list was accordingly revised to include all those designated by the Japanese Government then ready for departure, some 580 persons, the remainder of the list being made up of Japanese nationals seeking repatriation but not named by the Japanese Government. This tentative sailing list was submitted to the Japanese Government through the Spanish Embassy on September 1, 1942 with the statement that those named thereupon could be delivered immediately, whereas to repatriate in the second exchange only those named by the Japanese Government would indefinitely delay the sailing of the exchange vessel. On September 21 the Spanish Embassy informed the Department that the tentative sailing list as submitted was not acceptable and that the Japanese Government insisted upon a sailing list composed of Japanese nationals named by it, and that any delay incidental to compliance with its wishes was immaterial. The Japanese Government insisted that certain persons numbering approximately 1,000 be included in the second exchange and that the remaining number necessary to fill the vessel be chosen in specified order from another larger group named by the Japanese Government.

Difficulties Encountered in Meeting the Japanese Government’s Demands

1. Of the approximately 6,000 persons designated by the Japanese Government for repatriation the protective agencies of this Government (Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Military and Naval Intelligence) have objected to the repatriation of heads of families who, with their dependents, number approximately 2,000. These objections are based on the contention of those agencies that the repatriation of those objected to would be inimical to the national safety in that the individuals concerned are either Japanese agents, Japanese sympathizers, or have technical qualifications or associations of possible or probable value to the Japanese war effort, such as fishermen, seamen, newspaper editors and publishers, priests, members of secret societies, etc., including Army and Navy reserve officers.

2. Of the remaining Japanese nationals designated by the Japanese Government for repatriation, a large percentage (about 75 percent according to present information) decline the opportunity of repatriation when offered. The Department of Justice and certain other agencies, such as the War Relocation Authority (which is responsible for the resettlement of all persons of Japanese origin evacuated from the West Coast), object to the repatriation of any Japanese subjects against their will.

3. The Japanese Government has itself refused to consider for repatriation those Japanese nationals not named by it who have voluntarily sought repatriation (about 5,000).

Other Difficulties Delaying the Carrying-Out of the Second Exchange

1. In addition to the foregoing fundamental difficulties in the way of the second exchange, the Department of State has recently been informed by the Swiss Government that lack of organization in the Japanese Foreign Office has delayed and complicated negotiations. This situation is expected to be improved as a result of the recent setting up of a special section in the Japanese Foreign Office to handle questions of internment and the exchange of nationals.

2. Actual slowness in the transmission of communications has consumed considerable time. For instance, the Department’s communication transmitting the most recent proposed sailing list, which was sent to the Spanish Embassy on November 3 and forwarded by it to Madrid the following day, is stated not to have reached the Japanese Foreign Office until November 21. A reply is still awaited.

3. The necessity of carrying on negotiations through two protecting powers not only delays negotiations but because of language difficulties results in numerous errors which lead to misunderstandings and delay a meeting of the minds.

4. Once both Governments approve the passenger lists of their respective nationals a delay of at least two weeks must be expected to obtain the necessary safe conducts, which cannot be sought until the sailing date of each vessel is fixed.

Outlook for the Second Exchange

There is now pending before the Japanese Government this Government’s suggestion for a sailing list for the second exchange. This list, as stated above, was submitted to the Spanish Embassy on November 3 and received by the Japanese Foreign Office on November 21. It is composed entirely of Japanese nationals designated by the Japanese Government for repatriation. It does not, however, include a substantial number specifically designated by the Japanese Government for the second exchange. These could not be included because their repatriation was objected to by the protective agencies. It is anticipated, therefore, that the Japanese Government’s reply when received will be unfavorable. The Japanese Government will probably insist upon the inclusion in the exchange of those designated for that exchange. Failure to comply with such a request might result in one of two things:

I. The withholding from the American exchange of a number of American nationals equivalent to the number of those Japanese nationals withheld by us. If this first probable alternative is chosen by the Japanese Government, that Government will probably withhold from the exchange those Americans in whose repatriation we are most interested, such as

(a) The American Foreign Service Officers in Manila numbering with their dependents 25;

(b) Those incarcerated in Japanese prisons (including President Stuart of Yenching University, and Drs. Bowen and Houghton of the Peking Union Medical College);

(c) Other Americans recently interned, among whom are persons with important technical qualifications and knowledge of the Japanese war machine which would be useful to this country’s war effort;

(d) Heads of American business concerns who in 1940 cooperated with the Department in its Far Eastern policy by sending their families to the United States and themselves remaining at their posts of duty; and

(e) Other Americans whose repatriation is considered highly desirable, including at least half a dozen to be explained orally.

II. Refusal to carry on the exchange.