701.0090/11½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)
Sir Ronald Campbell37 came in this afternoon at my request. I reverted to the memorandum he had handed me on Saturday38 which, referring to the exchange of American, British and Japanese officials, proposed to make the British safe conducts for the evacuation ships subject to the condition that the British and American officials leave Japanese controlled territory on the same date. I asked Sir Ronald if this had been indicated by his Government or whether it had been [Page 415] a proposal of the Embassy. He replied that his Government had instructed that it be delivered.
I asked Sir Ronald in what stage of development were the negotiations for the exchange between the British and Japanese Governments. He did not know. I suggested to him that they expedite as far as possible the conclusion of their agreements which we understood to be in an advanced stage, and stated that the American Government could not very well agree to the proposals made by the British Government for the implications of it were that the departure of the American officials from Tokyo, which had been long delayed, might even be further delayed. I advised the Minister that our arrangements with Japan had been completed with the possible exception of the inclusion of a few names of American officials who were in distant points but who were understood to be covered in, and that our program was so far advanced that we had had to postpone the suggestion of the Japanese that there be early departure because the American Government is not quite ready to begin the transportation owing to the lack of a vessel. As far as the agreement was concerned, it was practically in such shape that if we wanted to begin day after tomorrow, we could probably close the agreement tomorrow.
Sir Ronald said that he thought his Government would view with regret the decision of this Government because he felt that the two governments together were stronger than they were separately. I replied that I thought each of us was strong enough considering the officials of the enemy whom we had in our jurisdictions to insure the careful execution of the agreement on the part of Japan and assured him that there would be about four weeks before the American delegation could leave Tokyo and that we expected that they would put forth every effort to conclude their negotiations so that the British delegation could leave at the same time and on the same vessels but that we could not agree that the American officials should be delayed or that their departure should be made contingent upon the lack of an agreement between Great Britain and Japan.