840.50/1121
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)
| Participants: | Mr. Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador |
| Mr. Reinhardt72 | |
| Mr. Acheson |
The Russian Ambassador called at his request. He handed to me the attached memorandum,73 which constitutes the observations of the Soviet Government on Draft No. 2, Revised, of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The Ambassador stated that this memorandum had been delayed because of obscurities in the cable transmitting it.
After reading the memorandum, I said to the Ambassador that I felt sure that the proposed discussion by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the U. S. S. R. would be agreeable to the President and the Secretary; that the memorandum would be promptly laid before them and their views would be ascertained on the points raised. I said that the British and Chinese Governments had given us their comments and that I thought that [Page 161] before the discussions took place it might be desirable for each of the nations concerned to have before them the comments of the others.
Turning to the points raised by the Soviet Government, I said to the Ambassador that he had mentioned the first of the points to me before and that from a conversation which I had had yesterday with Ambassador Winant I knew that Ambassador Maisky had also mentioned this matter to Mr. Winant. I again pointed out to the Ambassador the difficulty of putting in the draft agreement the principle contained in the first point of the Russian memorandum; that is, that the activities of the Relief Administration under Article I should be based upon the consent of the government of the country receiving aid. I told the Ambassador that Mr. Maisky had, in discussing this point, referred to the methods used by the Hoover Mission in Russia after the last war, which were actually to administer the distribution of relief commodities within Russia. I assured the Ambassador that it had. not been the idea of any of the draftsmen of the proposed plan that this should be done in the case of Russia and that the document itself indicated that the Relief Administration should always act in consultation with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations in any area and should wherever practicable use the facilities of the United Nations. It would seem clear that the appropriate authority in the Soviet Union was the Soviet Government. I pointed out that the broad statement contained in the Russian memorandum seemed to imply that the Relief Administration would, for instance, have to obtain the consent of enemy governments in enemy territory. I pointed out that in some territories there might be doubt as to the proper governmental authority and that the draft agreement had attempted to avoid all of these difficulties by referring to the “appropriate United Nations authority” in the area. I asked the Ambassador whether the Soviet position was that this matter had to be cleared up in the draft agreement itself or whether some other satisfactory method might be found to meet the point which seemed to me to lie at the heart of the matter raised in point 1. The Ambassador appeared to think that the latter would be possible.
In regard to point 2, regarding the periodic confirming of the powers of the Director General, I said that we had given a good deal of thought to the question whether the Director General should have a fixed term and that this had seemed to us unwise, since it would make continuity of planning and policy difficult. I assumed, of course, that the Director General would make periodic and full reports to the Policy Committee and the Council—and, indeed, the draft provided for this. It also seemed clear that the tenure of the Director General would depend upon the decision of the four governments represented on the Policy Committee.
[Page 162]As to point 3 that all decisions of the Policy Committee should be unanimous, I said that this matter had also been the subject of a good deal of discussion. As a practical matter this was probably essential. There might be considerable doubt as to the wisdom of requiring it in the draft of the agreement.
As to point 4—extending the powers of the regional committees—I said this was a matter which should be very carefully and fully explored. In drafting the document, great care had been taken to preserve the executive functions in the central administration in order to permit prompt and effective action.
As to point 5 I did not make any comment.
The Ambassador referred to the British desire to enlarge the Policy Committee from four to seven members. He felt that this was a mistake. He particularly referred to the difficulty which would arise if one or more of the European countries were placed on the Policy Committee. This he thought would create jealousies and difficulties. I got the distinct impression that the Soviet Government is strongly opposed to this change.
Finally, I told the Ambassador that I would report our conversation and submit his memorandum to the Secretary at once and receive the Secretary’s instructions as to further procedure.