Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, General; the British Commonwealth; the Far East, Volume I

840.50/605: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, August 23, 1942—midnight.
[Received August 24—5:02 a.m.]

4712. Your airgram message of July 29, 5:45 p.m.³¹ and the memoranda of conversations between Mr. Acheson and the Soviet and Chinese Ambassadors³² together with Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Draft No. 1, July 10, 1942³³ (Department’s instruction no. 1614 of July 22, 1942³¹). These contain all the information which I have received on the progress of the conversations on this matter since Leith-Ross left for the United States.

I have assumed that the relief organization was to be concerned only with relief. This understanding is based on the following statement in the President’s last report to Congress on Lend-Lease which designated article 7 as the basis for reconstruction:³⁴

“The Lend-Lease agreements emerging as a factor in the combined effort of the United Nations weave a pattern for peace. These agreements are taking shape as key instruments of national policy, the first of our steps in the direction of an affirmative postwar reconstruction. It is hoped that plans will soon develop for a series of agreements and recommendations for legislation in the fields of commercial policy, money, finance, international investment, and reconstruction.”

It has been more recently reaffirmed in the Department’s message to me 3934, August 19³⁵ in which the following sentence appears: “As the Embassy is aware, article 7 includes substantially the entire subject of postwar economic arrangements”. I note, however, that the word “rehabilitation” is added to relief in the new draft of the relief agreement. I would be interested to know the definition given the word in this context.

Although I realize a great deal of thought has been given to this subject I would like to suggest that as a practical matter relief in all probability will be extended to gradually enlarging areas and that there must be coordination between the military authorities, the relief organization and the local authority. This in turn will present two problems which reach beyond the administrative functioning within the area. The first problem is the wider political implications involved in dealing with the local or national authority through which or in collaboration with which you supply the necessities of life to the population. This would apply whether the relief is extended in territory occupied by the armed forces of the United Nations or whether in territory which is not so occupied. You are aware of the misuse of the supplies sent through the Freedman’s Aid Society following the Civil War and the accusations made respecting the exertion of political influence in feeding peoples in Europe following the last war. The best safeguard in protecting the political integrity of communities lies in the character of the man you appoint as Director General of Relief. Given the powers and influence, he will inevitably have, the care with which he is selected seems to me of the highest importance.

The second problem is the impact of the authority of the relief organization on other existing Allied control boards. It is fair to assume that the freeing of areas will be gradual and therefore that the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Combined Food Board, the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and other wartime agencies will still be operating and responsible for war measures, allocation of materials and transport to meet military and civilian needs as well as relief needs. Therefore, there must be a recognized procedure through which the Director General of Relief can effectively obtain his needs through these existing agencies.

In considering this procedure, the Russian situation presents a difficulty since under the plan proposed they are to be given a place on the Council and yet have no representation on the United States-British Control Boards. It well may be that they would prefer this situation than to accept for example membership on the Combined Raw Materials Board and thereby be required to pool their raw materials with the British and ourselves.

As I explained in the opening paragraph of my message, I am not fully informed on the developments of your planning in the relief field and you may have considered all these questions which occur to me as being an essential part of an effective relief program. I would appreciate your showing this message to the President unless these matters have already been considered, and I would like very much to be kept informed on your thinking on these problems.

Winant

31. Not printed.
32. Memorandum of conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on July 14 printed on p. 117; that with the Chinese Ambassador not printed.
33. See p. 120.
31. Not printed.
34. H. Doc. 799, 77th Cong., 2d sess., Fifth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for the Period Ended June 11, 1942, p. 21.
35. Not printed.