740.0011 European War 1939/18038
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Ambassador Litvinov called at my request. The President had on Saturday33 handed to him a copy of a proposed Joint Declaration (copy attached) for all countries at war against Japan, Germany and Italy to sign, (with Japan excepted as to Russia), to be sent by the Ambassador to his Government for its approval. The Ambassador handed me the amendments to the Declaration submitted by his Government (copy attached). The Ambassador seemed a little surprised when I stated that the proposed declaration had not been delivered to any other country for signature pending the action of Russia. He then handed to me at my request a copy of a separate declaration (copy attached)34 which Russia had planned to make upon the possible assumption that the joint declaration was already in circulation among other countries for signature. After some informal discussion I indicated to the Ambassador that my tentative view was that the amendments were unobjectionable with the possible exception of the proposed amendment of the final paragraph which would strike out the words “towards the defeat of members or adherents of the Tripartite Pact” and insert “and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism”. I said that while this Government was engaged during past months in an effort to handle the Japanese situation pending fuller preparations of the United States, Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands East Indies to defend themselves against the Japanese military movement, the President and others of us had not mentioned Japan in summing up on Hitler’s efforts at world conquest and that, therefore, it would be almost impossible for us to omit Japan from the document, should Hitler be mentioned. The Ambassador said it was the other way around with his Government—that Hitlerism stood for Naziism, Fascism and Nipponism. I said that we must undertake to work the matter out in some way that would be mutually satisfactory, and that I was sure that it could be done. The [Page 19] Ambassador seemed to feel the same way about it. He thereupon left with the understanding that I would give the matter further attention and I would see the Ambassador later after consulting with the President on the suggested amendments.