740.0011 European War 1939/14561: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 31—2:05 p.m.]
1111. We found Ostrorog this morning in a decidedly optimistic mood over recent developments in the East. We report his views below to show the interpretation given recent developments by the French Foreign Office:
He began by “congratulating” the United States on separating Japan from the Axis. The arrival of our merchant ships at Vladivostok without molestation, the failure of the Japanese to make further moves in Thailand, the President’s conversations with Ambassador Nomura are taken here, he said, to mean that Japan has decided that Germany is going to lose the war and she must therefore for practical reasons adjust her relations with the Anglo-Saxon powers accordingly. “With all objectivity I must say that this has been possible at French expense: the moderate civilian elements in Japan were able to give the military extremists a peaceful conquest in Indochina which will probably prove sufficient to satisfy them,” he said. “These moderate elements,” he went on, [“] have not yet succeeded in winning the Emperor to an open reversal of policy but that will come. Reports from Ambassador Henry lead me to believe that there may soon be discussions for a settlement of the Sino-Japanese war with the United States either formally or informally playing the role, always an advantageous one, of mediating power. Negotiations would of course be of long duration and could be successful only on the basis of complete military evacuation of China by the Japanese, possibly with recognition of some special Japanese economic interests in that country. While you might argue that this would merely give Japan a free hand for operations [Page 1018] either in the South or against Russia, I believe that you and the British and Dutch are now sufficiently strong to make both impossible. Furthermore, it is not to American interest to see Japan crushed. She plays a useful role in the Far East and our Chinese friends of today would quickly become insupportable without the counterbalance of Japan. We will remember how difficult they were in the period from 1928 to 1931. If the Sino-Japanese war were ended and your relations with Japan placed on a satisfactory basis it would free you, of course, for greater efforts in other areas.”
While he feels confident that the Germans are much annoyed at the Japanese “defection” from the Axis, he does not believe Hitler is in any position to exert pressure on his oriental allies. German chagrin, he said, must be doubly great in view of the recognition of the Nanking regime which the Japanese extracted as a sine qua non even for consideration of an attack on Russia. Ribbentrop and the Wilhelm-strasse, he said, have always advocated friendly relations with Chiang Kai Shek for the maintenance of Germany’s somewhat favored position in China after the war. The recognition of Nanking, he continued, which the Germans for 7 months declined to accord is a blow which the “personal vanity” of Chiang Kai Shek will never forgive. It must be therefore, he said, an extremely bitter pill for the Germans that, after presenting the Japanese with a concession that cost so dearly, the Japanese have made no move on Vladivostok.
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