740.0011 European War 1939/12862: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 7—6:05 a.m.]
933. The following is the substance of a telegram sent to London by my British colleague July 4:
“I called on Minister for Foreign Affairs today and observed that after reading his statement regarding the German-Soviet war with close attention, I had been struck by the absence of any repudiation of the recently concluded Neutrality Pact with Soviet Russia, which I had imagined would be the governing factor in the situation. His Excellency replied that it had always been made clear that just as the position of Soviet Russia was unaffected by the Tripartite Pact, so the position of Japan under that pact was the same as [under?] the Neutrality Treaty. He had explained this situation in his first broadcast statement to the Japanese people after his return from the U. S. S. R., and he had recently repeated this view to the Soviet Ambassador, who had telegraphed it to his Government. The fact that the Soviet Government had objected neither at the time of the broadcast address, nor on the occasion of his interview with the Russian representatives, indicated their acceptance of this view of the situation. The Tripartite Pact imposed on Japan no obligation to enter this war on Germany’s side. Similarly, Japan would not be prevented by the Neutrality Pact from taking any action arising out of this war which the preservation of Japanese interests might demand. Thus Japan’s liberty of action in respect of the situation created by the German-Soviet war remained unaffected, whether by the Tripartite Pact or the Neutrality Pact.
- 2.
- However, Minister for Foreign Affairs continued, it would be wrong to look on the Pact merely as a legal document [for?] one must also bear in mind [the cordial?] and close community of interests between the Allies which had resulted from it. He could best describe the objectives of Japan’s policy under the following three heads: (1) maintenance of Japan’s position and interests in East Asia; (2) avoidance of anything calculated to disturb the mutual confidence and understanding existing between Japan [and?] her allies; (the continuance [Page 997] of efforts to improve relations with the U. S. S. R. to permit the pursuit of objective); (3) it would be necessary for the Soviet Government carefully to avoid any action which, by embarrassing Japan’s relations with her allies might imperil the strict observance of point (2) above; rightly or wrongly, Japan’s whole foreign policy now revolved around the tripartite alliance. He had asked the Soviet Ambassador to make all this clear to his Government, and the latter would no doubt confirm what had passed between them.
- 3.
- I confessed that His Excellency’s interpretation of the Neutrality Pact came as a surprise to me; but it was at least satisfactory to note His Excellency’s confirmation of my supposition that the Japanese Government did not consider themselves under any obligation to intervene under the Tripartite Pact. Japan’s position is, as far as one could see at present, almost unique among the great powers, in that it is advisable if she wished to avoid involvement in the European conflict and impairment of her vital interests I felt sure that His Excellency would do everything in his power to avert from his country the horrors of modern warfare on a vast scale. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he was fully conscious of the great responsibility which weighed upon him and the Japanese Government in the extremely delicate situation which had now developed; it was a moment at which all parties concerned with peace in the Pacific must be careful to avoid even the slightest false step and must maintain as calm and objective an outlook as possible. [”]
Sent to the Department via Shanghai.