Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

740.0011 European War 1939/12731: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, July 2, 1941—7 p.m.
[Received 8 p.m.]

924. Embassy’s 916, July 2, noon.¹¹

1. A bulletin just issued states briefly that a conference of high officials was held this morning in the presence of the Emperor and that decision on important national policies was reached. There has still been no indication of the direction in which the majority opinion was tending prior to the taking of the decision above-mentioned, and there is available therefore practically no conclusive material on which to base any definitive estimate of the significance of the interview which the Prime Minister gave Menken.¹² Any such appraisal would necessarily be an attempt to predict the policy which has been in process of formulation during the past 10 days, and we can only emphasize that any such attempt would be at this time wholly speculative. There are, however, a few straws in the wind.

2. The first of these is the striking dissimilarity in tone and content between the statements and views attributed to the Prime Minister by Menken and the statement issued by the Prime Minister on October 4 last year (Embassy’s 946, October 5, 5 p.m., 1940¹³). It would seem to us that Prince Konoye’s present plea for American friendship and for understanding by the United States of Japan’s position, his reference to Japan not being party to any German plan for world conquest and his alluding to the three-power alliance as an instrument for defense, are all a far cry from the pugnacious and menacing character of his statement of last year (it is being freely admitted by Japanese that the earlier statement was a “bad mistake” and that it had been suggested by Mr. Matsuoka as a part of his “diplomacy by menaces”). A few days ago the Prime Minister asked a close Japanese friend of mine whether I was fully aware of his strong desire to improve Japan’s relations with the United States. He had previously spoken most confidentially to another reliable Japanese contact of the prospect of adjusting American-Japanese relations. So far as the Prime Minister, along with some of his close associates who are themselves persons of considerable consequence, is concerned we can, I think, accept the statements which he made in his interview as reflective of his strong desire, if not determination, to avoid conflict with the United States.

3. To us perhaps the most significant observation attributed to Prince Konoye is his statement that the principal purpose of the triple alliance is defensive. It will be recalled that the position which Mr. Matsuoka took with me and with several of my colleagues after his return from Moscow was in effect that, except in the case of Germany’s attempt to invade the United States, outbreak of war between the United States and Germany would probably result in Japan’s involvement in the war on the side of Germany. Through various contacts we brought to the attention of the Prime Minister and his associates the interpretation being placed by Mr. Matsuoka on Japan’s obligations as defined under the alliance treaty. We pointed out that if Mr. Matsuoka’s interpretation was in fact that of the Japanese Government the enlargement of Japan’s obligation beyond that stipulated in the treaty itself converted an alliance which might perhaps plausibly be characterized as defensive into an offensive alliance. We further communicated the view that it was difficult to see how an offensive alliance could be reconciled with the characterization of the treaty by the Imperial rescript¹⁴ (issued when the treaty was concluded) as an instrumentality for peace (I am inclined to construe Prince Konoye’s observation under reference as a fairly open assurance that Mr. Matsuoka’s interpretation of Japan’s treaty obligation to assist their allies has not been accepted by the Cabinet as a whole [)].

4. As some clarification of Japan’s position will presumably be forthcoming shortly, I am reluctant to indulge in prophecy. We have been impressed by the frequency with which Japanese contacts have been referring, ever since the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, to the wisdom of Japan’s steady and progressive withdrawal, instituted with Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, from involvement in the affairs of Europe. Although I consider it highly unlikely that Japan will denounce or otherwise formally terminate her alliance with Germany, the almost universally expressed desire for noninvolvement in the European war, as well as Prince Konoye’s statement to Menken that Japan’s recent political relations with Germany have been motivated by desire to keep the European war away from the Far East, strongly suggests that the decision which is reported to have been taken today by the Imperial Conference will be of such a nature as to restrict and not enlarge the chances of conflict with the United States as a result of new Japanese initiatives.

5. With regard to paragraph numbered 4 of the Department’s 362, June 30, 6 p.m., a copy of Menken’s despatch obtained yesterday indicates that the following statements attributed to the Prime Minister were deleted by the censor: “Declaring Japan’s intention ‘adhere to all her treaties’—both toward Germany, Russia—Konoye opined Germans may win on Russia’s western front but unbelieved Russia will collapse or come under rule new regime other than Stalin’s [apparent omission] Konoye said unbelieved German offensive anti-Russia result establishment Germans on Pacific through Russia.”

Grew

11. See footnote 9, above.
12. The Department’s telegram No. 382, July 10, 2 p.m., advised the Ambassador in Japan as follows: “From what we have been told by the Japanese here we gather that the interview in question was designed specifically and deliberately to meet intimations given by us to those Japanese that it would be helpful for the Japanese Government to give some clearer indication than it has yet given of the desire of that Government to pursue peaceful courses.”
13. Foreign Relations, 1940, Vol. i , in section entitled “Relations of Japan With the Axis Powers and With the Soviet Union.”
14. See telegram No. 911, September 27, 1940, midnight, from the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. ii, p. 168.